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PREFACE 
In 1973-74, a group of law students at the University of 
Maryland School of Law organized the Maryland International 
Law Society; third-year student S. Jacob Scherr was elected its 
President. Under the able guidance of Faculty Advisor James P. 
Chandler and with the encouragement and support of the late 
Dean William P. Cunningham, the Society soon became the focal 
point for international activities in the Law School. Early 
activities of the Society included participation in the Jessup 
International Moot Court competition and the establishment of a 
Speakers' Program at the Law School under which the student 
body had an opportunity to hear talks by a number of leading 
scholars. 
Two years later, the Society began to engage in more 
ambitious projects when David Simon, then a third-year student 
and now an Associate at Bregman, Abell, Solter & Kay in 
Washington, D.C., was elected to the Presidency. Two series 
publications were launched in 1977: the first is the Occasional 
Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, under my 
editorship, with the cooperation of Mr. Simon as Executive Editor 
and of the staff of the Society. The second one is the International 
Law Society Occa'sional Papers Series, which complements the 
Law School's International Trade Law Journal. Both series have 
been enthusiastically received by the academic and business 
communities. Today, these series have received individual and 
institutional orders and subscriptions not only from within the 
United States, but also from the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Denmark, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Republic of 
China, France, Switzerland, Singapore and others. Courses at 
some universities have adopted publications in these series as 
required reading for their students. 
In the "great" year of 1977 of the Society, in addition to the 
activities outlined above, the Society organized the first interna-
tional conference to be held at the Law School, on April 15-16, 
1977: the Conference on Legal Aspects of United States -
Republic of China (ROC) Trade and Investment. The Conference 
was designated a Regional Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law and was attended by some one hundred 
scholars, businesspersons, lawyers, government officials and 
diplomats from here and abroad. 
(iii) 
Despite the disparity of size and population, the Republic of 
China is among the top twelve trading partners of the United 
States. At present, there are over 220 U.S. firms with direct 
investments in Taiwan, accounting for over US$500 million in 
investments. In 1976, US-ROC trade reached a record level of 
almost US$5 billion. The International Law Society's Conference 
was organized to present an overall review and projection of US-
ROC trade and investment relations, with a special emphasis on 
the role of the U.S. and ROC legal systems in those relations. The 
Conference was divided into three sessions: (1) Trends and 
prospects of US-ROC economic relations; (2) practical and legal 
aspects of US-ROC trade and investment interactions; and (3) a 
prospective look at US-ROC economic relations in light of the 
changing nature of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of 
China. 
The Conference Proceedings, as reproduced here, in my view, 
did produce a high-quality symposium aimed at both business and 
academic groups, and at the lawyers within each group. 
It is my great pleasure to serve as a Faculty Advisor to the 
Society and co-editor of the Conference Proceedings. I am deeply 
impressed by Mr. David Simon's leadership and administrative 
skill in organizing the Conference and seeing the work of 
publication through to its consummation. I should also like to 
thank other members of the Society - particularly Joyce 
Seunarine, William Helfand, Gilbert Genn and Arthur Webster-
who helped organize the Conference and were of invaluable 
assistance in preparing these Proceedings for publication. Dean 
Michael J. Kelly afforded me the benefit of his excellent advice 
and positive support throughout, and I am indebted to him. 
Finally, I wish to express my sincere thanks to Assistant 
Dean George Regan and his staff, LuAnn Young and Shirley A. 
Selin, for their administrative support; and Judith Hall, Adminis-
trative Director of the American Society of International Law, for 
her advice in organizing an international conference. 
Hungdah Chiu 
December 15, 1977 
(iv) 
FOREWORD 
Any serious reflection concerning the Republic of China raises 
some of the most perplexing issues facing the United States, and 
the world, today. The issue of the legal status of Taiwan, for 
example, has given rise to considerable controversy, and not just 
in the international-legal literature. The political question of 
United States relations with the Republic of China, of course, has 
been with us for a considerable time, and - as of this writing -
remains unresolved. These issues are reflected in the many 
paradoxes that characterize the Republic of China. It is a country 
that is well along on the path from "developing" to "developed," 
while at the same time, it has few internal material resources. Or, 
again, it is the second-largest trading nation in Southeast Asia, 
yet has lost diplomatic recognition from many of its most 
significant trading partners. 
When we at the University of Maryland International Law 
Society decided to stage a Regional Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law on United States-Republic of China 
relations, we considered what analytic tools were best suited for 
laying bare some of the principal facets of that relationship. 
Ultimately, we chose three principal frameworks: economics, law, 
especially the ways in which the ROC's legal regime has aided its 
development, and political-economic prognostication. In the 
presentation of each of these, history and hopes played as much a 
part as descriptions of the present; in none of them can a 
consideration of the others be left out. The conference, then, was 
divided into three sessions: trends and prospects of US-ROC 
economic relations, practical and legal aspects of US-ROC trade 
and investment, and the future of US-ROC economic relations. 
The proceedings of the University of Maryland International 
Law Society Conference on Legal Aspects of US-ROC Trade and 
Investment speak for themselves. The panelists - Chinese, 
American and European scholars and practitioners - were an 
informed, passionately engaged group of men and women. The 
audience was lively, its questions provocative. From the mass of 
data presented at the first session, a picture of the ROC's 
extraordinary economic vitality emerged. The second session 
afforded a view of the ways in which the ROC's legal structure 
has nurtured that vitality, frequently with a sense of experimenta-
tion, as in the case of the creation of Export Processing Zones. A 
somewhat contrapuntal theme, the legal resolution of trade 
(v) 
disputes under the United States Trade Act of 1974, reminded us 
that the economic progress of the ROC cannot be considered in 
vacuo: the ROC is, indeed, a member of the community of nations, 
and its actions must be considered as interactions, not merely 
internal shufflings of resources. The third session wove these 
economic and legal strands together in attempts to provide 
answers to some of the short- and long-term questions presently 
plaguing American and Chinese political and business leaders. A 
paper on the West German trading experience with the Republic of 
China provided further insight into the options available in US-
ROC relations. 
Throughout the conference, the strength of the ROC was 
argued with great skill and force; the familiar story of the ROC's 
economic rise unfolded in many guises. Equally important were 
some of the novel ideas and even "heresies" that were aired: for 
example, that the ROC should now turn from acting as "junior" 
partner in trade with developed nations to acting as "senior" 
partner and seek to expand its trade with less developed nations. 
It was truly a pleasure for me to act as Chairman for the 
conference whose proceedings are presented in this volume. I 
would particularly like to thank Judith Hall, Administrative 
Director of the American Society of International Law, for her 
encouragement and cooperation throughout the planning stages. 
The Asia Foundation, whose partial financial support was 
instrumental throughout, also deserves a warm acknowledgment 
for its contributions. I was gratified by the extent to which the 
community of the University of Maryland School of Law 
supported this first international conference at the Law School. 
My sincerest thanks go to Dean Michael Kelly for his support, to 
the faculty and student committees that assisted in preparations 
for the conference, to all the participants, and most especially to 
Professor Hungdah Chiu of the Law School faculty. As Faculty 
Advisor to the International Law Society, Professor Chiu was 
truly the guiding light behind the conference; his attention to 
detail in the midst of an exceptionally demanding schedule was 
extraordinary, and his patience and calm were a bedrock to rely 
on whenever problems seemed insurmountable. 
David Simon 
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Left to right: David Simon, William Morell, Oliver Oldman, Hungdah Chiu, Jane 
Brandt, Gaston Sigur. 
Left to right: Chun Li, Hungdah Chiu, Oliver Oldman, Yung Wei. 
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Li, Norman Littell. 
Left to right: Ralph N. Clough, Talbot Linstrom, Gaston Sigur, Robert Heuser. 
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I. TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF US-ROC 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
(10:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.) 
April 15, 1977 
The session opened at 10 a.m. with announcements made by 
Jane Brandt, Secretary of the Conference. Dean Michael Kelly of 
the University of Maryland School of Law extended greetings, 
thanked the Conference Committee, and acknowledged the 
contributions of Professors Chiu and Chandler in international 
law to the University of Maryland. David Simon, Conference 
Chairperson, extended greetings and turned the meeting over to 
Dr. Chiu, Chairperson for the first session. 
Dr. Chiu stated that U.S. trade relations with China date back 
100 years, and includes the use of the Port of Baltimore for the 
past century. Dr. Chiu then related some highlights of the history 
of U.S. relations with the Republic of China (ROC). 
Dr. Chiu pointed out that when the ROC was established in 
1912, the United States was the first country to extend recogni-
tion. The United States and the ROC share the additional 
common heritage of being the first democratic republics estab-
lished on their respective continents. Since 1912, Dr. Chiu said, 
the two countries have maintained close relations in all aspects of 
international life. During the Second World War, both countries 
fought side by side against the aggressor and both were among 
the five major sponsoring powers that established the United 
Nations in 1945. 
In 1946, the United States and the ROC concluded a 
friendship, commerce and navigation treaty which created the 
basis for further development of economic and trade relations 
between the two countries. In 1954, both countries concluded a 
mutual defense treaty. 
Mter making the above brief remarks, Dr. Chiu introduced 
the first speaker, Dr. Yung Wei, to present his paper on "The 
Republic of China in the 1970s." Dr. Wei stated that the Republic 
of China is striving in the 1970s for future growth, equity and 
security. He reviewed the economic growth and social progress of 
the ROC from 1952 to 1972. In economic growth, the ROC has 
experienced a rapid increase in national income, industrial 
production, exports and imports. The accompanying social 
development resulted in increases in literacy, nutritional intake 
(1) 
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and education at all levels. Dr. Wei stated that the ROC has 
experienced increases in trade despite the severance of diplomatic 
ties with many countries. However, the ROC, he said, wishes to 
strengthen and renew its ties with other nations. Dr. Wei added 
that the ROC regrets the current trend toward "normalization" of 
US-People's Republic of China (PRC) relations. Dr. Wei said that 
the present policy of the ROC is threefold: (1) The ROC will 
remain in the democratic camp; (2) The ROC will not negotiate 
with the Chinese Communists; (3) The ROC will not develop 
nuclear weapons for defense. 
[The following is the text of Dr. Yung Wei's paper.] 
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE 1970s: 
STRIVING FOR A FUTURE OF GROWTH, 
EQUITY, AND SECURITY 
YUNG WEI* 
This paper presents a general survey of the social, economic 
and political development in the Republic of China since 1970. 
The basic approach is that of modernization research and 
international-relations analysis. In the first part of the paper, the 
pace of economic growth and social progress are reviewed. In the 
second part of the paper, the problems and progress in the 
distributi9n of income, land ownership, educational opportunities 
and political participation are examined. Finally, in the last part 
of the paper, the external environment of the Republic of China 
and the question of security are discussed. 
The rapid economic growth in Taiwan, Republic of China 
(ROC), has been fully discussed by many social scientists in the 
western world and does not need further elaboration. To sum up, 
between the years 1952 and 1972, real national income has 
increased 484.3 percent; industrial production, 1,700.6 percent; 
export, 2,605.4 percent; and import, 1,373.7 percent. This rapid 
* Chairman of Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, 
Executive Yuan (Cabinet), Taipei, ROC; Professor of Political Science, National 
Taiwan University. 
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economic growth has made the ROC, which has under its effective 
control a territory comparable in size to Switzerland, one of the 
major trading nations of the world. What needs to be stressed here 
is that the rapid economic growth on Taiwan has been accompan-
ied by notable progress in the areas of education, health, 
communication and transportation. 
As a result of accelerated growth, significant changes have 
occurred in the Taiwanese economy (Table 1). Agricultural 
production decreased from 35.51 percent of the total economy in 
1951 to 15.66 percent in 1972. In the same period, industry 
increased from 19.42 percent to 36.56 percent; and commerce, from 
19.50 to 23.78 percent. A drastic increase of population, from 8.1 
million in 1952 to 15.3 million in 1972, provided the needed 
manpower for agriculture and industry; yet at the same time 
enlarged the ratio of dependent population and prevented a more 
substantive gain in per capita income. Rapid population growth 
has quickened the pace of urbanization in Taiwan: Urban 
population swelled from 4 7.6 percent of the total population of the 
island in 1952 to 61.1 percent in 1972. This urbanization process 
brought much needed labor to the various industrial and 
commercial establishments in urban areas; at the same time, 
however, it also created a heavy demand on housing, transporta-
tion and other public services and facilities in the bigger cities. 
Along with the overall economic growth, substantive gains 
were also shown on most social and cultural indicators. For 
instance, the average life expectancy of the people of Taiwan 
achieved an increment of more than ten years between 1952 and 
1972; that of male from 56.5 to 66.8 and that of female from 60.7 to 
72. Daily calorie intake increased from 2,078 to 2, 738; and daily 
protein intake (in grams), from 49 to 74.6. The percentage of 
school age children attending primary schools climbed from 84 
percent to 98.13 percent; and the percentage of college age youth 
enrolled in institutions of higher learning jumped from 1.4 percent 
to 12.5 percent. All these figures testify to the dramatic improve-
ment of the quality of life on Taiwan as a result of sustained 
social and economic progress. 
It must be pointed out, however, that starting from 1971, the 
Republic of China has experienced a series of challenges to her 
international position and economic development. The Nixon trip 
to Mainland China and the withdrawal of the ROC from the 
United Nations brought considerable difficulties to the diplomatic 
front of the ROC, but a significant growth of trade continued after 
1971. It was not until 1973, when the world economy was hit by 
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Table 1 
Social and Economic Indicators of Modernization on Taiwan 
Year 
Items 1952 1972 
Per capita income (US $) 110 395 
Population growth rate 3.8% (1953) 2.0% 
Population in urban areas 47.6% 61.1% 
Life expectancy 
Male 56.5 66.8 
Female 60.7 72.0 
Infant mortality 3.7% 1.6% 
Consumption of electricity 32 degrees 236 degrees 
Motor vehicles per thousand 
residents 0.3 63.3 
Per capita mails 7.7 45.6 
Per capita daily calorie intake 2,078 2,738 
Per capita daily protein intake 49g 74.6g 
Percentage of college age youths 
(18-21) in college 1.4% 12.5% 
Percentage of middle school age 
youths (13-17) in middle school 12.5% 57.8% 
Percentage of school age children 
in primary schools 84.0% 98.13% 
Illiteracy rate (of population 
15 years old and older) 34.7% (1965) 23.8% 
Television ownership per thousand 
residents (sets) 1.4 (1963) 54.6 
Data Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1973 (Taipei: Council for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Executive Yuan, 1974); and She Hui Fa Chan Chih 
Piao {Indicators of Social Development) (Taipei: Council for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Executive Yuan, 1974). 
serious inflation and a drastic increase of the price of oil, that 
Taiwan's economy began experiencing the process of stagflation. 
During the 1973-74 period, many of the problems inherent in the 
ROC economy became apparent. Among the more obvious 
problems were: a lack of large-scale firms and factories as well as 
trading companies; inadequate basic supporting facilities such as 
large seaports, power, transportation, and communication net-
works keeping up with Taiwan's rapid economic growth; labor 
shortage and wage increase, which have cut down the competi-
tiveness of the products of the ROC in the international market; 
an outflow of farm population to urban centers, which reduced the 
productivity of the rural areas and increased the price of farm 
products. 
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To cope with these problems, the government of the ROC 
(GRC) shelved the Sixth Four-Year Plan, which no longer suited 
the new economic situation, and devised a new Six-Year Plan for 
economic development. The more important goals and measures 
in the new Six-Year Plan include: (1) transforming Taiwan's 
economy from labor intensive to capital and technology intensive; 
(2) increasing and diversifying energy supplies by completing the 
nuclear power plants, exploring for oil and gas, seeking multiple 
sources of crude oil· importation, and expanding oil distilling 
facilities; (3) promoting farm mechanization, improving the living 
conditions in rural areas, and developing high-value farm 
products for export; (4) completing the major construction projects 
in transportation and communication, including the electrifica-
tion of the railroad system, the north-south superhighway, the 
international airport at Tao-yuan, the new Taichung and Suao 
harbors, and the northern railroad; (5) completing the building of 
the large steel factory and expanding the facilities for processing 
aluminum and copper ores; and (6) establishing a large export 
network, bringing in new technology and management methods, 
and encouraging the export of more advanced industrial products 
and high-precision instruments. In addition to these measures 
dealing with economic development, the Six-Year Plan also 
includes programs for social development such as family plan-
ning, public housing and urban renewal, pollution control, health 
insurance, an antipoverty program, and a manpower plan. It also 
calls for the establishment of an industrial park at Hsin-chu, 
where National Tsing-hua University is located. 
It is still too early to determine the effect of this new plan for 
economic development. Judging by the performance of the Taiwan 
economy in 1976, the Six-Year Plan has made moderate progress. 
For example, according to the report made by the premier to the 
Legislative Yuan in September 1976, the price increase of both 
wholesale and retail goods during the period of January-June 1976 
has been rather limited: the former registered an increase of 2.06 
percent and the latter 3.43 percent in comparison with the 
previous year. During the same period, exports increased to 
US$7.1 billion, which is 38.8 percent higher than that of the same 
months in 1975. Exports exceeded imports by US$125 million, 
which compares quite favorably with· the trade deficit of US$277 
million between January and June in 1975. The newest estimation 
of real economic growth during 1976 is somewhere between 10 and 
11 percent. Judging by these records, we may conclude that the 
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economy of Taiwan has been able to achieve significant growth 
with price stability in the past year. 
It ought to be pointed out, however, that the increment of the 
capability of the Taiwanese economy and society is not the only 
concern of the GRC. While growth has been an important goal, 
distribution or allocation of values also has been a primary 
concern. The concern can be traced back to the teaching of Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen, who advocated land reform as a prerequisite for 
economic development and social justice. Moreover, this emphasis 
on distribution by the GRC also reflects its determination in 
building Taiwan into a model province having an appeal to the 
people of Mainland China where the Chinese Communists preach 
an egalitarian philosophy yet have not yet been able to deliver 
anything more than one of the lowest living standards of the 
world. 
Owing to its conscientious efforts toward a more equal society, 
the government of the Republic of China has achieved significant 
progress toward equality in land ownership, income distribution, 
educational opportunities and political participation. First, let us 
examine the case of land ownership. It has often been asserted 
that one of the major reasons for the Nationalist defeat on 
Mainland China was the failure to carry out the land reform 
program envisaged by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Since the Chinese 
Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, a successful and peaceful land 
reform has been realized on the island. Through a series of policy 
measures such as the reduction of land rent, sale of public land to 
the peasants, and ownership of the land by the former tenants, 
the GRC has by and large achieved its goal of equalization of land 
ownership on Taiwan. 
The effectiveness of the land reform can be measured by the 
ratio of tenant farmers, semi-self-tilling farmers, and self-tilling 
farmers. In 1949, the ratio was 39 percent for the tenant farmers, 
25 percent for semi-self-tilling farmers, and 36 percent for the self-
tilling farmers. After the land reform, the proportion became 10, 
12, and 78 percent respectively in 1971. The effect of the 
redistribution of land can be further illustrated by using a widely 
used measurement of inequality, the Gini index. As the data in 
Table 2 indicate, the Gini index for land distribution for Taiwan 
in 1952 was 0.618. In 1960, the figure was reduced to 0.457, which 
indicates a much lower level of inequality in land ownership in 
Taiwan. In comparison to Columbia, India, Mexico, the Philip-
pines, and the U.A.R., Taiwan has the highest equity in the 
distribution of land in rural areas. 
CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 7 
Table 2 
Gini Index of Land Concentration in Selected Countries* 
Decline in 
Gini Index, in 
Percentage 
Country Year Gini Index Year Gini Index (C) - (E) 
X 100 (C) (E) (C) 
Colombia 1960 0.864 1969 0.818 5.32" 
India 1953-54 0.628 196Q-61 0.589 6.14 
Mexico 1930 0.959 1960 0.694 27.64 
Philippines 1948 0.578 1960 0.534 7.26 
Taiwan 1952 0.618 1960 0.457 26.08 
U.A.R. 1952 0.810 1964 0.674 16.74 
* In Hung-Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974), p. 310. 
Concomitant with the more equal distribution of land 
ownership in Taiwan is the increase of educational opportunities 
and a more equal distribution of those opportunities among 
different sectors of the population in Taiwan. In 1946 when 
Taiwan was restored to China, there were only four colleges, 215 
middle schools, and 1,130 primary schools on the island. Since 
then, a phenomenal growth has occurred at all levels of education. 
The 1972 educational data showed that there were 81 universities 
and colleges, 842 middle schools, and 2,193 primary schools on 
Taiwan. The ratio of school-age children and youths in educa-
tional instftutions at various levels has also witnessed a dramatic 
increase, with the colleges registering the highest rate of increase. 
In addition to the numerical increase in educational opportun-
ities, there are further indications that the opportunities for 
education have increased substantially for the tenant farmers. 
According to data released by the Land Institute of Taiwan, the 
number of former tenant farmer's children attending primary 
schools has increased 257 percent between 1948 and 1971; those 
attending middle schools, 2,827 percent; and those enrolling in 
colleges, 16,820 percent. These facts are made more significant 
when one realizes that between 1952 and 1971, the population 
employed in agricultural activities in Taiwan has increased only 
128.45 percent. 
In addition to land ownership, income distribution is another 
important measurement of social and economic equality. Simon 
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Kuznets, a leading economist, has theorized that inequality of 
income distribution tends to be wide in the earlier phases of 
growth and then to narrow in the later phases of growth. The 
Taiwan experience does not conform to this theory. According to 
data recently released by the Statistical Bureau, DGBAS, of the 
GRC, the Gini index on income distribution in Taiwan has 
declined from 0.36 in 1964 to 0.31 in 1975. This compares quite 
favorably with the records on the Republic of Korea (0.40), India 
(0.41), Thailand (0.48), and the Philippines (0.45). The same source 
also reveals, however, that the rural population has a lower 
income but a more equal distribution. The urban population, on 
the other hand, has a higher income but a more uneven 
distribution. In order to rectify the unequal distribution between 
the urban and rural population, the government of the ROC has 
made great efforts to raise the income of farmers, for example, by 
setting guaranteed prices for farm products and by offering large 
amount loans and grants to stimulate agricultural activities. The 
government has also tried to reduce the size of the poor sector of 
the population by launching a series of anti-poverty programs. 
Reports recently- released by Bureau of Social Affairs of the 
Taiwan Provincial Government show that through various 
programs, the size of poorest section of the population has been 
significantly reduced. 
Now let us tum to the opportunities for political participation. 
It should be said at the outset that several factors have 
complicated the distribution of political power on Taiwan. First, 
there is the existence of two major provincial groups among the 
population of Taiwan: the Taiwanese, who constitute about 84.4 
percent of the total population of Taiwan, and the Mainlanders, 
who make up about 13.6 percent. The Taiwanese are further 
divided into two subgroups: the Min-nan group, originally from 
Fukien, and the Hakka group, originally from Kwangtung. The 
former constitutes about 73.72 percent of the total population, and 
the later constitutes 12.68 percent. 
A second factor that has made distribution of political power 
in Taiwan more complex was the transplantation of a national 
elite from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1950. The third factor has 
been the continuing claim of the GRC to be the government of all 
China, thus having to maintain a national elite structure on the 
island. Finally, the existence of a ·notable disparity in political 
representation among different provincial groups also poses a 
problem with respect to distribution of political power on the 
island. 
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During the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, from 1895 to 1945, 
the Chinese on Taiwan had a very limited opportunity for 
anything remotely related to political activities. The Japanese 
monopolized all administrative positions, from the Governor-
General of the colonial government down to head master of 
village schools. After the departure of 480,000 Japanese, their 
political and occupational positions were largely taken over by the 
Taiwanese, especially those in the smaller cities and villages. 
Since 1951, provincial elections have been held in Taiwan. Many 
Taiwanese found an avenue into politics by participating in 
political activities at the provincial level. Today the overwhelming 
majority of the provincial assemblymen and women are Taiwa-
nese; and almost all the city mayors and county magistrates are 
Taiwanese. The governorship of Taiwan is now occupied by Mr. 
Hsieh Tung-ming, an elder Taiwanese statesman who commands 
much respect among the local population. 
Since 1969, the deadlock of political participation at the 
national level has been broken. With the holding· of supplemen-
tary elections in 1969, 1972, and 1975, a sizable number of new 
members has been added to the three branches of the representa-
tive bodies at the national level: the Legislative Yuan, the 
National Assembly, and the Control Yuan. Looking to the future, 
the GRC is committed to the enlargement of political participation 
in Taiwan, particularly for the local Taiwanese and the young. As 
many governments in Asia have altered their constitutional 
government after the "Nixon shock," the determination of the 
GRC to maintain a constitutional democracy under very trying 
conditions deserves due credit. 
Mter the examination of problems of growth and equity in the 
Republic of China, we may now turn to problems of national 
security. It goes without saying that since 1971 the ROC has 
experienced increasing difficulties in its external relations. But it 
is equally true that through various practical measures, the GRC 
has effectively defeated the attempt of Mainland China to isolate 
the ROC. In many places where official ties have been broken, 
alternative mechanisms have been set up to carry out consular 
and other intersystem relations. Trade between the ROC and 
states with which the ROC has no formal ties often has increased 
after the severance of relations. Canada, for instance, stands out 
as a district example. It must be made perfectly clear that the 
ROC takes no pride in having only semiofficial or paradiplomatic 
relations with the majority of the states of the world. Efforts have 
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been made to restore our ties with the nations of the world or at 
least to elevate the level of existing relations. 
Of all the diplomatic ties with countries of the world, those 
between the. ROC and the United States are considered by the 
people of Taiwan as the most important, for the United States has 
been an ally for more than thirty years and has provided the ROC 
with the generous economic assistance that made the Taiwan 
"miracle" a reality. Trade between the ROC and the United States 
exceeds 4.8 billion dollars and is crucial for the continuing growth 
of Taiwan's economy. It is most disturbing, therefore, for the 
government and the people of the Republic of China to see a long-
time friend and ally moving toward the so-called "normalization" 
with the Mainland. Today the ROC has an embassy in Washing-
ton, D.C. and the Chinese Communists have a Liaison Office 
there. It is not a situation in which the people of the ROC feel 
comfortable. But because the ROC treasures so much the close ties 
built over many decades and considers these ties so important to 
our security and prosperity, the situation is reluctantly tolerated. 
With Mainland China in constant turmoil and its leaders 
humiliated one after another in successive purges, it is very 
difficult for the people of the ROC to understand why some people 
in the United States· are so eager to push for further "normaliza-
tion" with the Chinese Communists who are busy trying to put 
their internal affairs back to normal. One may point to the Soviet 
factor. It should be remembered, however, that the Russians 
themselves have tried to control Mainland China through military 
and economic aid, only to be chased out of China and to become 
the primary target of Chinese Communist verbal assaults. 
Without thousands of miles of common boundaries and a common 
ideological base similar to that between the Soviet · Union and 
Communist China, how can the United States develop any kind of 
influence over the communist political system, which still 
produces huge amounts of propaganda attacking the United 
States? · 
Still others point out that only Japan is important to the 
United States policy in Asia. As a frequent traveller to Japan, this 
author can testify that not all the Japanese leaders and scholars 
of international relations enjoy the "honor" of being the nation 
singled out by the United States as the latter's only important ally 
in Asia. Without the smaller trilateral relations between the 
Republic of Korea, Japan and the Republic of China, the larger 
trilateral relations between Europe, United States and Japan may 
soon become devoid of substantive meaning, for without South 
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Korea and the Republic of China as its two fronts, Japan will 
have to reassess its international relations and defense postures. 
The Republic of China has adopted a very cautious and 
straightforward policy to safeguard its security. The ROC 
government has repeatedly declared that under no circumstance 
will it enter into any negotiation with the Chinese Communists, 
that the ROC will stay in the democratic camp, and that it will not 
make nuclear weapons. It is a policy of principles, prudence and 
pragmatism, for doing any of the three things could create 
immediate danger in the ROC's external and internal environ-
ments. According to the assessments of most military specialists, 
the ROC is fully able to defend herself against the Chinese 
Communists. But logistic support in terms of advanced weaponry 
from the United States is important. Furthermore, the likelihood 
of a hot war in the Taiwan Straits is not high in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the government and the people of the ROC do not 
like to take chances. For this reason, substantial efforts have been 
made to achieve self-sufficiency and self-reliance in the production 
of weapons and weapon systems. To the extent that it will not 
deter further economic growth, funds have been allocated to 
further strengthen the ROC's defense capability and to develop 
new military equipment. 
In the final analysis, a country's security lies in the faith, 
confidence and determination of its own people. The people of the 
Republic of China believe that they have a model of development 
and modernization that is much more effective and much more 
humane than the one used by the Chinese Communists on 
Mainland China. They believe that, given the opportunity of free 
choice, the people of Mainland China will choose the system 
successfully tried out in Taiwan. Thus, the security in the minds 
of the people of the ROC grows out of their conviction of the 
superiority of their model of modernization which has brought to 
them prosperity, equality, and the maintenance of their cultural 
heritage in an industrial society. It was with this conviction that 
the people of the ROC have succeeded in weathering many storms 
since 1971. They are determined to prove to the world that in an 
international system beset with power politics, their course of 
action will prove to be not only morally right but politically wise. 1 
1. For a more elaborate treatment of the subject matter, see Yung Wei, 
"Modernization Process in Taiwan: An Allocative Analysis," Asian Survey, Vol. 
16, No. 3, pp. 249-69, (March, 1976); and Yung Wei, "Unification or Confrontation: 
An Assessment of Future Relations between Mainland China and Taiwan," in Ray 
E. Johnston, ed., The Politics of Division, Partition, and Unification (New York: 
Praeger, 1976), pp. 67-79. 
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Dr. Chiu thanked Dr. Wei for presenting the paper and then 
invited Mr. M. T. Wu, Director of Chinese Investment and Trade 
Office in New York City, to present his paper on "Investment and 
Trade Climate in the ROC." Mr. Wu cited the factors contributing 
to the ROC's growth and discussed investment incentives and 
prospects of trade. He said the new emphasis now will be on 
upgrading technology. 
[The following is the text of Mr. M. T. Wu's paper.] 
INVESTMENT AND TRADE CLIMATE IN 
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
MEI-TSUN Wu* 
Taiwan is a roughly oval-shaped island, about 240 miles long 
from north to south and 98 miles wide at its broadest point. Its 
total area is 14,000 square miles, which is a little less than that of 
Connecticut (10,577 square miles) combined with Maryland (5,099 
square miles). Its population is approximately 16.5 million. 
The achievement in economic development in the past two 
decades is a record of which the Republic of China (ROC) can 
justly be proud. Taiwan's living standard is presently one of the 
highest in Asia, second only to Japan. 
The factors which brought about this successful economic 
development include the Land Reform Program carried out in the 
early 1950s, the consecutive Four-Year Economic Development 
Plans, the effective utilization of U. S. aid from 1950 to 1965, the 
rapid expansion of international trade, and the annual inflow of 
foreign and overseas Chinese capitals for industrial development. 
I. INVESTMENT 
To welcome foreign investment has been and will continue to 
be the policy of the government of the Republic of China. 
Promulgation of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment in 
1960 marked a concrete advance in giving incentives to such 
investment. Since this law came into force, the annual inflow of 
foreign private capital has risen sharply. For the nine years from 
* Director, Chinese Investment and Trade Office, New York, New York. 
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1952 through 1960, the total amount of foreign investment 
approved was US$35.6 million, averaging less than US$4 million 
per year. Since the promulgation of this statute, coupled with the 
continuous improvement of the investment climate, not only has 
the influx of foreign capital increased rapidly, but the formation 
of domestic capital has also increased, at an even faster rate. 
For the ten years between 1961 and 1970, approved foreign 
investments averaged US$52.4 million per year, 13 times that of 
the initial nine-year period. During the latest six years from 1970 
to 1976, the average reached US$164.5 million per year, 41 times 
that of the initial nine-year period. 
The total amount of foreign investment approved in the past 
25 years was US$1,547 million, of which 29% was from overseas 
Chinese and 71% from foreign nationals. Of this 71%, direct 
investment from the United States accounted for 31.8%; from 
Japan, 16%; from Europe, 12.6%; and 10.6% from other areas. 
Nearly half of the investments from Europe and other areas were 
made by subsidiaries or affiliates of American corporations in 
those areas. Hence, the United States is not only the ROC's 
largest trading partner but also the biggest source of the foreign 
investment capital that has gone into the ROC's industrial 
development. 
A. Foreign Sources of Investment Capital in 
Support of Economic Development 
In the process of Taiwan's economic development, domestic 
capital has come mainly from the private sector, followed by the 
government and public enterprises. Foreign capital is largely 
composed of U.S. aid, loans from international institutions and 
foreign private organizations, and investments by foreigners and 
overseas Chinese. Common to almost all developing countries, the 
supply of domestic capital at the initial stage of economic 
development was very limited, and had to be supplemented by 
foreign capital. Not until a country's economy has reached a 
certain level of development will domestic capital play a 
predominant role. The case is the same with Taiwan. 
1. U.S. Aid 
In the fifteen-year period between 1950 and 1965, the United 
States injected into Taiwan's economy an average of US$100 
million a year. These funds were used to import large quantities of 
daily necessities, agricultural and industrial raw materials, and 
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industrial plants and equipment. At the same time, the local 
currency proceeds generated from the sale of U.S. aid commodities 
were used for the financing of various social and educational 
projects. 
The U.S. aid during that period made up more than 90% of the 
deficits in Taiwan's international balance of payments, and 
provided one-third of its capital investments. 
a. The Initial Phase. U.S. aid was the main source of 
Taiwan's investment capital in this period because of the limited 
supply of domestic capital resulting from low income, meager 
savings and a lack of motivation and ability on the part of the 
private sector to make investments. Although the ratio of fixed 
investment to the GDP (gross domestic products) averaged only 
16% from 1953 to 1960, Taiwan still had to rely heavily on U.S. 
aid. The amount of U.S. aid to Taiwan ranged from US$80 million 
to US$120 million per year in the ten years from mid-1950 to 1960. 
It accounted for as much as 40% of Taiwan's gross domestic 
capital formation. It was also instrumental in stimulating the 
flow of domestic capital to economic development projects. In the 
initial phase of Taiwan's economic development, therefore, U.S. 
aid made immense contributions to increasing the commodity 
supply, stabilizing the economy, and laying the foundation for 
further economic progress in subsequent years. 
b. The 1960s. The 1960s were years of rapid growth for 
Taiwan's economy. Gross capital formation went up sharply and 
reached 26% of the GDP in 1970. The share ofU.S. aid as a source 
of investment capital declined and that of domestic capital 
increased. Moreover, prior to its termination in 1965, U.S. aid had 
not only been reduced but also shifted increasingly from grants to 
loans. 
c. The Termination of U.S. Aid. Since the termination 
of U.S. aid in 1965, there has been a marked change in the sources 
of investment capital, and the importance of domestic capital has 
greatly increased. Furthermore, an increasing amount of invest-
ment capital has been obtained from abroad in the form of foreign 
and overseas Chinese investment as well as loans from interna-
tional financing institutions and private organizations. 
The Taiwan public was once apprehensive that the termina-
tion of U.S. aid would be a blow to Taiwan's economic- growth. In 
fact, however, the government of the Republic of China had 
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realized long before the termination of U.S. aid that this source of 
financing could not remain available indefinitely. Therefore, 
timely efforts were made to improve the investment climate for a 
self-sustaining economy. 
2. Foreign Loans 
Since the 1960s, Taiwan has secured foreign loans from 
various international organizations and foreign countries. Up to 
June 1976, the total amount of loans stands at US$2 billion from: 
1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD or the World Bank) 
2. International Development Association 
3. Asian Development Bank 
4. U.S. Export-Import Bank 
These loans are used mostly to help develop Taiwan's 
infrastructure projects; a small portion is passed on as loans to 
private industrial enterprises. For years, Taiwan has had a 
reputation in the international money market for its consistent 
ability to make repayments on schedule. 
B. Investment Environment 
When investors search for investment opportunities, first of 
all, they look for places having political, social and economic 
stability so as to ensure the security of their capital. These 
requirements are abundantly met in the Republic of China. 
There are a number of factors contributing to Taiwan's 
investment environment. 
1. Political and Social Stability 
Political stability is one of the Republic of China's attractive 
features. The government is doing everything possible to improve 
the standard of living of the people through further development 
of its economy, and at the same time to provide a more equitable 
distribution of wealth. 
2. Significant Economic Development 
Economic policies adopted by the government of Republic of 
China brought about significant results in economic development. 
From 1951 to 1960, emphasis was placed primarily on develop-
ment of agriculture and establishment of import-substituting light 
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industries. From 1961 to 1970, stress was laid on industrialization, 
along with diversification of agricultural production and promo-
tion of agricultural and industrial exports. From 1971 to the 
present, attention has been devoted to expansion of foreign trade, 
promotion of agricultural modernization and industrial sophisti-
cation. 
3. High Quality of Labor 
Out of Republic of China's current population of about 16.5 
million, the existing labor force totals over 6 million. In addition, 
there is a potential labor force of over 3 million, consisting of such 
people as students and housewives who may or may not work as 
they wish. There is also a supply of 180,000 to 200,000 new 
workers entering the labor market every year, mainly young 
people reaching the age of 15 who wish to seek employment. 
Workers in the Republic of China are intelligent, hard-
working, well-disciplined and highly adaptable. No labor strike 
has ever taken place, and the unions are encouraged to cooperate 
with the management in promoting the welfare of their members. 
In recent years, more emphasis has been put on vocational 
and occupational training rather than academic studies. Further-
more, education in colleges and universities has lately become 
more closely geared to the needs of economic development. 
4. Improvement in Infrastructure 
Because of Taiwan's rapid economic development, the 
existing facilities, though improved from year to year, are 
inadequate to meet the ever-increasing demands of. growing 
industry and expanding trade. To improve the situation, the 
government is implementing the following projects. 
A modern freeway, linking the principal cities of Keelung, 
Taipei and Kaohsiung now under construction and to be 
completed in 1978. This new freeway, together with the existing 
highway network, will provide fast door-to-door transportation. 
A new railroad connecting the relatively less developed 
eastern part of the island to the more developed western part, for 
the purpose of accelerating the development of the eastern coast 
area. 
Electrification of the existing railway trunkline on the west 
coast for more efficient rail service. 
Construction of a new international harbor near Taichung in 
central Taiwan. 
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Building of a new harbor in the north to serve as an auxiliary 
to the congested Keelung harbor. 
Opening up a new modem international airport near Taipei. 
5. Electricity and Water Supply 
Public water and electricity are supplied almost everywhere in 
Taiwan. The rates for such public utilities are relatively low. 
6. Industrial Districts 
In order to facilitate the acquisition of land by investors for 
industrial purpose, the government of the Republic of China has 
designated land at about 80 sites throughout Taiwan as industrial 
districts. These sites are all easily accessible by rail and highway, 
and are located in areas with adequate labor supply. Such new 
sites are constantly being designated. At the present, Taiwan has 
40 developed industrial estates. 
7. Export Processing Zones 
There are three export processing zones, namely, the Kaohsi-
ung Export Processing Zone, the Nantze Export Processing Zone 
and the Taichung Export Processing Zone, established in Taiwan 
for the purpose of facilitating investments in industrial production 
for export. 
In addition to the industrial park facilities such as roads, 
water and power supply, and sewage systems, the export 
processing zones contain ready-built standard factory buildings 
which can be purchased on installment payments. Investors may 
also construct their own factory buildings in the zones. Land in 
such zones is owned by the government and leased to export 
manufacturers according to the provisions of the land law. 
In addition to the public utilities generally provided in an 
industrial estate, the export processing zones have extra facilities 
such as the services provided by the Export Processing Zone 
Administration, branch offices of customs, tax collection offices, 
banks, post offices, business offices of the telecommunications 
administration, service stations of the Taiwan Power Company, 
airline business offices, and service stations of the public 
employment center. 
By locating plants in export processing zones, manufacturers 
can be exempted from payment of import duties, commodity taxes 
and business taxes. Furthermore, the procedures concerning 
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imports and exports, settlement of foreign exchange, customs 
inspection and investment application are all handled within the 
zones, with minimal time and effort. 
C. Investment Incentives 
Substantial investment incentives are incorporated in the 
investment laws of the Republic of China. The Statute for 
Investment by Foreign Nationals, promulgated in July 1954, was 
enacted specifically for enhancing the inflow of foreign capital 
and protecting the interests of foreign investors. Its major features 
are: 
1. The right to repatriate capital as well as dividends and 
interest is guaranteed. 
The foreign investor may each year apply for foreign 
exchange settlement against 15% of the total amount of his 
invested principal two years after the completion of the invest-
ment project. 
He may also apply for foreign exchange settlement yearly 
against dividend and interest income from his investment. 
2, Protection against government expropriation or requisi-
tion is also guaranteed. 
As long as the foreign investor continuously holds more than 
51% of the total capital of the invested enterprise, the enterprise 
shall not be subject to government requisition or expropriation for 
20 years after commencement of business. 
If the investor holds and maintains less than 51% of the total' 
capital of the invested enterprise, he shall be reasonably 
compensated if the government, for reasons of defense needs, 
requisitions or expropriates the enterprise. 
3. The enterprise invested in by foreign nationals shall be 
accorded the same treatment as is accorded to the same type of 
enterprise operated by Chinese nationals. In other words, there is 
no discrimination between enterprises invested in by foreign 
nationals and those invested in by Chinese nationals. 
4. Full ownership by foreign nationals is permitted under the 
statute. Only when the enterprise is local-market oriented or poses 
a threat to established local producers will the domestic capital 
participation be deemed in order. However, the extent of such 
participation is negotiable. 
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The Statute for Encouragement of Investment was first 
promulgated in 1960 and has since been amended several times. 
Among the incentives granted by the statute, potential investors 
are perhaps concerned most with the exemption of import duty 
and income tax. 
1. Import Duty 
Exemption of deferred payment of import duty is made 
available to foreign and domestic investors alike for importation 
of capital equipment. The benefit is offered in three alternative 
forms: 
a. For the setting up or expansion of an encouraged 
industry, customs duty on imported capital equipment is com-
pletely waived under specific categories and criteria as prescribed 
by the government. 
b. A new investment or an investment in an existing 
enterprise belonging to one of the nine essential industries with 
production wholly for export is entitled for a five-year deferment 
for payment of import duty on capital equipment. The nine 
essential industries are (1) basic metals, (2) electrical manufactur-
ing, (3) electronics, (4) machinery manufacturing, (5) shipbuilding, 
(6) chemicals, (7) textile dying and finishing, (8) mining and (9) 
organic fertilizers. 
c. For an investment not belonging to any of the industries 
under government encouragement and not exporting all of its 
products, import duty on capital equipment may be paid by 
installments if the amount of duty involved exceeds NT$500,000 
(equivalent to US$13,200). 
2. Income Tax Benefits 
Regarding income tax benefits, the recently amended Statute 
for Encouragement of Investment offers the following: 
a. Profit-Seeking Enterprise (Corporate) Income 
Tax. The normal rate for all profit-seeking enterprises is levied 
at 35% of net profit. For productive enterprises, the rate is lowered 
to 30%. To encourage the setting up of new capital-intensive or 
technology-intensive industries, the rate is further reduced to not 
more than 22%. 
All newly established productive enterprises eligible for 
government encouragement are given the choice of either a five 
year tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed assets. 
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For expansion of existing government-encouraged productive 
enterprises, the investor may enjoy either a four year tax holiday 
or accelerated depreciation of fixed assets with respect to the new 
investment. 
b. Withholding Tax. The standard rate of consolidated 
personal income tax for local residents starts at 6% and progresses 
up to 60% when the consolidated personal income exceeds NT$2 
million (equivalent to US$52,600). For nonresidents, a withhold-
ing tax of 35% is· levied on the amount payable or distributable. 
For nonresident foreign investors whose investment has been 
approved by the Chinese government, the withholding tax is 
reduced to 20% on dividends distributed. However, if the taxpayer 
is required to declare and pay income tax on his income from 
Chinese sources to his home government, then the withholding 
tax rate is further reduced to 15%. 
c. Special Encouragement for Reinvestment. Reinv-
estment with undistributed earnings for expansion of production 
facilities is specially encouraged. The withholding tax on share 
dividends can be deferred until the transfer of the shares obtained 
through reinvestment. This measure has been most effective in 
the development of industry in the Republic of China and is also 
most welcome by all investors, both foreign and domestic. 
3. Other Tax Benefits 
a. Deed tax is reduced by 50% when acquiring fixed assets 
for productive use. 
b. House tax is also reduced by 50% for buildings used for 
productive purposes. 
c. For stimulating exports, export transactions are exempted 
from business tax. Stamp tax for export invoices is reduced by 
75%. 
D. Investment Opportunities 
The Republic of China is a developing country engaged in 
industrialization. Investment opportunities in the ROC cover a 
wide range. Local demands for new. products, raw materials and 
intermediates are steadily on the increase. These growing 
demands justify the setting up of new ventures for local 
production. The demands range from basic metals, machinery, 
electronic and electric products to petrochemicals. It is not feasible 
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to itemize them here. In a word, all investment projects conducive 
to further development of industry and commerce are welcome. 
For the inducement of technology transfer to promote 
industrial development, the Statute for Technical Cooperation was 
promulgated in 1962, providing guidelines for the payment of 
expenses and royalties for technical expertise. 
Technical know-how and patent rights can also be used to 
invest at 15% and 20% of total equity, respectively. 
Needless to say, the study of investment opportunities 
constitutes an important prelude to investment promotion. The 
Industrial Development and Investment Center of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs of the Republic of China has compiled a booklet 
entitled "Industrial Investment Opportunities in Taiwan, Repub-
lic of China" in which there are enumerated more than 120 
branches respectively under 10 major industries for reference of 
prospective investors. 
There are, of course, numerous other investment opportunities 
stemming from the continued development process. In many 
cases, certain industries viewed yesterday as not feasible do 
become feasible in the course of economic development. 
E. Investment Services 
Because overseas Chinese and foreign investors are fre-
quently unfamiliar with Chinese investment laws and other 
pertinent laws and regulations, and with the required investment 
procedures, the government of the Republic of China has 
established the Industrial Development and Investment Center 
(IDIC) under the Ministry of Economic Affairs to provide all 
necessary services to overseas investors. 
Another governmental body, the Investment Commission, is 
primarily a screening body that handles all investment applica-
tions. The commission, composed of ten members of vice-
ministerial level from various government organizations, also 
issues duty-free or tax-holiday certificates and import licenses, 
and serves the investors in a number of other ways as a one-step 
service agency. 
The Export Processing Zone Administration provides services 
for investors and screens investment applications intended for the 
export processing zones. All relevant government agencies, 
including customs and banks, have branches in the zones for the 
convenience of the investors located in the zones. 
22 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
American investors who are interested in obtaining detailed 
information on making investments in the Republic of China are 
welcome to contact any of the following agencies: 
Chinese Investment & Trade Office 
515 Madison Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10022 
Tel: 212-752-2340 
Trade Representative Office 
Consulate General of the Republic of China 
222 North Dearborn Street 
Chicago, Ill. 60601 
Tel: 312-332-2535 
Office of Trade Representative 
Consulate General of the Republic of China 
Suite 1060 
3660 Wilshire Blvd. 
Los Angeles, Ca. 90010 
Tel: 213-380-3644 
F. Future Prospects 
Over the 24 years since 1953, six Four-Year Plans have been 
launched by the government of the Republic of China. Under 
these plans, Taiwan has experienced a sustained and rapid 
economic growth. The worldwide economic recession drastically 
altered the basic economic conditions of the Republic of China, to 
such an extent that the Sixth Four-Year Plan was no longer 
practicaL At the same time, ten major construction projects have 
been vigorously pushed forward and their completion will 
automatically have a profound impact on the economic develop-
ment in the Republic of China. Because of these facts, the Chinese 
Government decided to drop the Sixth Four-Year Plan, which was 
in its third year of implementation in 1975, and replaced it with a 
new Six-Year Plan starting from 1976. Initially, the plan will 
focus on the implementation of the on-going projects. In a later 
stage, it will spell out the guidelines and programs to be pursued 
after the completion of the ten major projects in order to usher the 
economy into a higher stage of development. 
The new Six-Year Plan envisions an average annual rate of 
growth of 7.5% in terms of gross domestic product, and stresses 
the need for modernization of the economic structure through the 
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development of heavy and chemical industries, such as petro-
chemicals, steel, electrical and nonelectrical machinery, and 
precision products, as well as sophisticated labor-intensive 
industries. These undertakings will require massive inputs of 
capital and know-how. For the Six-Year Plan period, an estimated 
US$36.6 billion is needed for investment. Most of this amount will 
come from domestic savings. The remainder, amounting to 
US$330 million a year or 5.4% of the total, will have to come from 
external sources, ideally together with the latest managerial and 
technological know-how which are also essential to the moderni-
zation of the ROC economy. Foreign capital will therefore 
continue to play a very important role in the years ahead. 
To encourage the inflow of foreign capital, the ROC govern-
ment will continue to provide incentives and to improve invest-
ment climate including such infrastructural facilities as electric 
power and transportation. 
In attracting the inflow of foreign investment capital, the 
following areas deserve priority consideration: 
1. Where investment creates greater value-added through the 
introduction of modern methods of production. 
2. Where the investment significantly improves the quality 
of local products or reduces their manufacturing costs. 
3. Where the investment is made for significant import-
substitution. 
4. Where the investment has a strong linkage effect; and 
finally, 
5. Where the investment contributes significantly to the 
expansion of exports. 
II. FOREIGN TRADE 
The major force behind the rapid economic growth in the 
Republic of China has been the expansion of international trade. 
Of all the sectors of the economy of the Republic of China, foreign 
trade has shown the most dramatic growth. While total trade was 
still in the neighborhood of one-third of a billion US dollars 
throughout the 1950s, it amounted, in 1976, to as much as 
US$15.67 billion, 8.08 billion for exports and 7.59 billion for 
imports. The Republic of China has enjoyed a consistent trade 
surplus since 1974. 
In the decade between 1964 and 1973, the Republic of China's 
export increased from US$860 million to US$8.3 billion. 
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From 1970 to 1974, the Republic of China had enjoyed a 
steadily growing trade surplus. On the basis of customs clearance, 
the Republic of China's total imports in 1974 amounted to US$7 
billion and total exports US$5.64 billion. The substantial deficit 
registered in 1974 was largely due to the worldwide recession and 
sharply increased cost of such essential imports as crude oil, 
grains and industrial raw materials. 
The Republic of China's progress in industrialization in recent 
years could be reflected in export and import compositions; 
industrial products now account for almost 85% of the total 
exports, while in 1952, they made up only 8%. 
In 1974, textile products remained as Republic of China's top 
dollar earner. The second major export item was electrical 
machinery and appliances. Machinery and metal products came 
next. The other principal export items were plywood, lumber 
products, and plastics and plastic products. 
The Republic of China, with its economy characterized as a 
typical island economy, has to import large quantities of raw 
materials and capital goods to sustain a steady economic growth. 
Machinery and tools, most of these imported to meet the needs of 
the ten on-going construction projects, topped the import list of 
1974, followed by basic metals, electrical machinery and supplies, 
crude oil, chemical products and transportation equipment. 
A. Recovery from the Recession 
The big recession of the free world economy that came in 1974 
also hit the Republic of China hard. The Republic of China's 
difficulty is that its trade pattern is similar to that of a developed 
country although the Republic of China is still a developing 
nation. 
Like all other petroleum-importing countries, both trade and 
the balance of payment of the Republic of China suffered severe 
blows in the year of 1974. On January 26 of that year, the 
government of the Republic of China lifted all subsidies on grain 
imports, etc. Prices jumped from 25% to 60% in the ensuing weeks 
but have held that line ever since. 
Since May 1974, the government of the Republic of China has 
taken various steps to stimulate the export trade. Among the 
important steps are the Fourteen-point Fiscal and Economic 
Program launched on November 14, 1974 and the Ten-point 
Financial and Economic Plan announced on December 9, 1974. 
Through adjustment in taxation and reforms in economic 
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regulations, these remedial steps helped set the stage for a slow 
but steady revival of export trade. 
However, it must be pointed out that the huge trade deficit of 
US$1.33 billion in 1974 was largely the result of policy implemen-
tation. In order to stabilize prices in the country, the government 
had to purposely suspend or curtail the export of many essential 
commodities to ensure an adequate supply for domestic market. 
On the other hand, for facilitating rural reconstruction and 
expediting the ongoing infrastructure projects, the importation of 
agricultural and industrial raw materials and capital equipment 
was substantially increased. 
The export slump also led to a decline of the economic 
activities of the Republic of China as a whole. Therefore, there 
appeared on the economic scene typical signs of recession: sharp 
drop of purchasing power, rise of unemployment, accumulation of 
inventories, the simultaneous increase of interest rates and 
commodity prices. 
Fortunately, the steps for countering the recession paid off. 
The economy of the Republic of China started to pick up from 
1975. In February 1975, both trade and the balance of payments of 
the Republic of China began to climb and by May of that year, the 
Republic of China successfully left the recession behind. 
In 1975, the Republic of China exported US$5.31 billion in 
goods and services, but imported US$5.95 billion, thereby 
suffering a small deficit of US$640 million. In 1974, the figure was 
US$1.33 billion. 
B. The 1976 Trade Performance 
The Republic of China's foreign trade volume in 1976 totaled 
US$15.67 billion, representing an increase of US$4,409.5 million 
or 39.2% over 1975. According to customs statistics, in 1976, 
exports totaled US$8,080 million, up 52.2%, against imports, 
US$7,590 million, up 27%, resulting in a surplus of US$490. 
million. During 1976, the Republic of China registered trade 
surpluses with 13 of 20 major trade partners and deficits with 
seven others. A breakdown of the 13 countries and areas with 
which the nation registered surpluses is given in Table 1. A 
breakdown of the seven countries and areas with which the nation 
suffered trade deficits is given in Table 2. 
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Table 1. 1976 Trade Surpluses 
Country Exports Imports Surpluses 
1. U.S. A. 3,010 1,802 1,208 
2. Hong Kong 607.6 100.6 507 
3. Canada 312.1 56 256.1 
4. Singapore 207.2 38 169.2 
5. West Germany 416.1 253.7 162.4 
6. The Netherlands 159.3 55.1 104.2 
7. Panama 61.7 5.5 56.2 
8. Philippines 76.8 31.2 45.6 
9. Australia 223.9 181 42.9 
10. Belgium 56.1 34.6 21.5 
11. Indonesia 220.1 199 21.1 
12. Italy 61.4 54.1 7.3 
13. France 63.3 58.3 5 
Unit: US$1 million. 
Table 2. 1976 Trade Deficits 
Country Exports Imports Surpluses 
1. Japan 1,090.3 2,442,4 1,352.1 
2. Kuwait 108 682.3 574.3 
3. Saudi Arabia 124.7 410.6 285.9 
4. Malaysia 53.5 105.5 52 
5. Thailand 75.7 90.3 14.6 
6. Korea 72.8 83.5 10.7 
7. United Kingdom 159.2 165.8 6.6 
Unit: US$1 million. 
The Republic of China's two-way trade with other areas 
totaled US$1,659.7 million with a surplus of US$179.3 million in 
1976. 
An Analysis of foreign trade of the Republic of China in 1976 
is as follows: 
1. Export Composition 
With the transformation of the economic structure, the 
composition of the Republic of China's exports and imports has 
shown a marked change. Agricultural products such as rice and 
sugar accounted for an overwhelming 86% of the total exports in 
1952. In 1976, the main exports were textiles, electronics, electrical 
appliances, machinery and metal products. 
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In 1976, industrial products were still the leading export of the 
Republic of China, accounting for 87.7% of the total export. The 
export of processed agricultural products was the next, being 7.4% 
of the total export, and the agricultural products accounted for 
only 4.9% of the total. 
Industrial products exported from the Republic of China in 
1976 included 53 sets of complete machinery plants, of which 10 
sets were for manufacturing PVC products, 13 for paper making, 
and three for cement manufacture. 
Industrial goods exported from the Republic of China with 
higher export volumes in 1976 were: Textile products, worth 
US$2,475.8 million, accounting for 30.6% of the nation's total 
exports and representing an increase of 53% over the previous 
year. Exports of electrical machinery amounted to US$1,269.6 
million, accounting for 15.7% ofthe export total, up 71.3%. Plastics 
and plastic products amounted to US$571.8 million, representing 
7.1% of the export total, up 55.1%. Machinery and total products 
were worth US$566.8 million, 7% of total exports, up 53. 7%. 
Wooden products and furniture valued at US$534.8 million, 6.6% 
of the total, up 61.8%. Exports of transportation equipment totaled 
US$194.3 million, 2% of the total, up 65.6%. Exports of refined 
petroleum products totaled US$122.4 million, 1.5% of the total, up 
125.4%. 
2. Import Composition 
In the early 1950s, textiles, agricultural products, and fertilizer 
made up over half of total imports of the Republic of China, while 
in 1976, agricultural and industrial raw materials constituted 63% 
of total imports of the Republic of China, while capital goods 
made up 30.7% and consumer goods 6.3%. 
To meet the domestic production and construction require-
ments, machine tools have been imported in large quantities in 
recent years. In 1976, the import value of major manufacturing 
equipment totaled US$4,614.9 million, topping all other items. 
This amount was 60.8% of total import value. Next were major 
primary products. The import value of this item was US$1,860.8 
million or 24.5% of the total import value. Machine tools and crude 
petroleum came next with total import value at US$1,187.8 million 
and US$1,050.9 million, respectively. Still next in the descending 
order of their values were electrical machinery and apparatus, 
chemicals, basic metals and transportation equipment. 
For such agricultural and forestry items as soybean, corn, 
wheat, lumber and raw cotton, their import values either 
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increased or decreased much depending on the price fluctuations 
in the world market and the level of the stockpiled inventories 
carried over from 1975. 
C. Trade with the United States 
Close friendship and strengthened bilateral economic ties 
have fostered rapid growth in the trade volumes between the 
United States and the Republic of China in recent years. In 1964, 
the two-way trade volume was only US$220 million. After 
approaching the US$1 billion mark in 1970, it hit a record high of 
US$3,716 million in 1974. In spite of the world recession, the total 
trade between the two countries in 1975 still reached US$3,474 
million, or 30.9% of the aggregate value of the Republic of China's 
foreign trade. 
The United States retained its position as the largest market 
for the Republic of China's products, taking US$3,010.7 million or 
37.3% of the Republic of China's total exports for the year. The 
Republic of China's imports from the United States in 1976 
amounted to US$1,802.3 million, or 23.3% of the total imports. 
The Republic of China is now the eleventh largest supplier 
and the fifteenth largest customer of the United States. And the 
Republic of China is the largest trade partner of the United States 
in the Far East after Japan. 
During the last few years, the Republic of China's leading 
exports to the United States were: 
1. Electrical and electronic products, including TV sets and 
radios 
2. Textile products 
3. Manufactured products 
4. Plastic articles 
5. Plywood and rattan products 
6. Metal products 
7. Machinery 
The Republic of China's imports from the United States were: 
1. Agricultural products 
2. Electronic parts 
3. Machinery 
4. Cotton goods 
5. Iron and steel 
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6. Transportation equipment 
7. Chemicals 
In this overall picture of the trade relations between the 
Republic of China and the United States, however, there is one 
problem which has been causing careful reflection and thoughtful 
scrutiny in both the Republic of China and the United States. The 
problem is one of imbalance. 
The Republic of China has in recent years taken a series of 
steps to enhance the reciprocity of trade and is doing its utmost to 
improve its trade relations with the United States. 
One of the most important remedial measures the Republic of 
China instituted in 1973 was a "Buy American" program. A 
special trade mission was sent to the United States from Taiwan 
in that year. The mission, after scouting the various industrial 
and agricultural centers, signed a series of long-term contracts to 
buy US$750 million worth of American products, including 5.5 
million metric tons of grain, over the next three years. 
Again in 1976, another grain purchase mission from Taiwan 
successfully concluded negotiations and signed an agreement 
with nine American suppliers for the supply of soybeans, wheat, 
corn and barley totaling 10.2 metric tons for the next five years 
starting July 1, 1976 and worth US$1.5 billion at current prices. 
On the other hand, the government of the United States has 
also taken steps to further United States trade with the Republic 
of China. For the express purpose of promoting the sale of 
American goods in Taiwan, the United States Trade Center, the 
third in Asia and fourteenth in the world, was officially dedicated 
on March 18, 1974. 
The trade between the United States and the Republic of 
China is bound to keep rising for the following reasons: 
1. The plants and equipment needed in the development of 
capital- and technology-intensive industries in Taiwan will most 
probably have to be purchased from a few highly industrialized 
nations, and the United States is surely among them. Such 
sophisticated plants and equipment can not as yet be produced in 
Taiwan locally, nor could they be readily imported from other 
countries. For such items as nuclear power generators, aircraft 
and computers, Taiwan will have to rely on countries like the 
United States. 
2. As the standard of living rises rapidly in Taiwan, the 
demand for luxury goods in all aspects of daily living from home 
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decoration to recreational facilities will certainly increase rapidly. 
This can be a growing and attractive market for the U.S. products, 
especially consumer durables. 
3. For the same reason, the Republic of China will need more 
American agricultural products. The United States, as the leading 
food grower and cotton exporter in the world, will be the first 
country the Republic of China will tum to for these commodities. 
4. Another certainty in US-ROC trade is the latter's growing 
dependence on the United States for industrial know-how. The 
modernization of the economic structure and infrastructural 
facilities in Taiwan calls for large outlays of capital. Advanced 
technology in such areas as electronics and petrochemical 
industries will be a crucial factor in the next stage of the 
industrial development in Taiwan. Thus, the Republic of China 
will become a good customer of the American industrial equip-
ment and technology. 
D. Trade Environment in Taiwan 
1. Foreign Trade Administration 
a. The International Trade Commission acts on the 
following matters: 
1. Approval of and amendment to trade regulations; 
2. Approval of measures for import of essential and staple 
commodities; 
3. Approval and planning of the use of funds for the 
promotion of exports; 
4. Approval of regulations governing essential imports and 
exports not involving exchange settlement; 
5. Approval of regulations governing imports and exports by 
processing industries; 
6. Approval of export program and promotional measures; 
7. Approval of and amendment to the classification of 
import and export commodities; 
8. Other important matters related to trade. 
b. Board of Foreign Trade. The functions of the Board 
of Foreign Trade are: 
1. Screening of applications for export of agricultural, 
forestry, livestock, mining and industrial products and 
issuance of export licenses; 
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2. Screening of applications for import of various kinds of 
commodities and issuance of import licenses; 
3. Screening and supervision of imports approved for 
overseas and foreign investment projects; 
4. Formulation of an "Annual Import and Export Program"; 
5. Studying and making recommendations for improvement 
in packaging and quality of export products; 
6. Studying and making recommendations regarding export 
standards and inspection; 
7. Regulation of the trading activities of traders (importers 
and exporters), local agents of foreign suppliers and other 
exporters/importers (e.g., manufacturing plants); 
8. Research and development relating to international trade; 
9. Other matters relating to international trade. 
c. Semi-official or Private Organizations for Export 
Promotion. 
1. China External Trade Development Council 
2. China Productivity Center 
3. Taiwan Handicraft Promotion Center 
4. Chinese Display Center 
5. Chinese Products Promotion Center 
d. Government Trading Agencies. 
1. Central Trust of China 
2. Taiwan Supply Bureau 
e. Overseas Agencies concerned with Trade Promo-
tion. 
1. Economic Offices and Trade Missions: 
Office of Economic Counselor 
Embassy of the Republic of China 
4301 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Suite 420 
Washington, D.C. 20008 U.S.A. 
Office of Economic Counselor 
Embassy of the Republic of China 
83, 2-Ka, Myong-dong, Chung-Ku 
Seoul, Korea 
Office of Economic Counselor 
Embassy of the Republic of China 
No. 503/504 Maghrabi New Building 
New Street 
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Bureau de Conseiller Economique 
Ambassade de la Republique de 
China 
Imm. S.M.G.L. BLD-11, AV. BARTHE 
Abidjan, Ivory Coast 
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Office of Commercial Attache 
Consulate-General of the 
Republic of China 
Suite 605, The Trust Bank Center 
56, Eloff Street, Johannesburg 
Republic of South Mrica 
Office of Commercial Attache 
Embassy of the Republic of China 
Between the First and Second Circle 
of Jabal Amman, Amman, Jordan 
P.O. Box 2719 Amman, Jordan 
Oficina del Agregado Comercial 
Embajada de Ia Republica de China 
Edificio Pan America 
2 Piso, 6 Av., 11-43, Zona 1, 
Guatemala City, Guatemata, C.A. 
Oficina del Agreg ado Comercial 
Embajada de Ia Republica de China 
Edificio Corecol. 
Calle 71 No. 11-10 5° Piso 
Bogota, Colombia 
Office of Trade Representative 
Consulate General of the 
Republic of China in Los Angeles 
3660 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1060 
Los Angeles, California 90010 
U.S.A. 
Trade Representative 
Chinese Consulate-General 
222 N. Dearborn Street 
Chicago Ill., 60601 U.S.A. 
Chinese Investment & Trade Office 
515 Madison Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10022 U.S.A. 
2. Overseas Representatives of China External Trade Devel-
opment Council: 
CETDC Representative's Office in 
San Francisco 
604 Commercial St., San Francisco, 
Calif. 94111, U.S.A. 
Officina Comercial de Taiwan 
Av. R. S. PENA 636, 8 
Buenos Air~s. Argentina 
CETDC Representative's Office in 
Indonesia 
C/0 Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
to Jakarta, P.O. Box 2922, Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
CETDC - Officio Di Rappresentanza 
in Italy 
Via Fabio Filzi, 2, 20124, Milan, Italy 
CETDC Representative's Office in 
Singapore 
Rm. 310, Industrial & Commercial 
Bank Bldg., No. 2, 
Shenton Way, Singapore 
CETDC Correspondent in Chicago 
9302 N. Tripp 
Skokie, Ill. 60076 U.S.A. 
CETDC Correspondent in Melbourne 
P.O. Box 4823, Melbourne, Vic. 3001 
Australia 
Far Eastern Trading Co., Ltd. 
P.O. Box 349, Place Bonaventure 
Montreal 114, P.Q., Canada 
CETDC Branch Office in New York 
14th Floor New York Merchandise Mart 
41 Madison Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10010, U.S.A. 
CETDC Representative's Office in West 
Africa 
P.O. Box 20872, Abidjan, Ivory Coast 
CETDC Representative's Office in 
Korea 
C/0 Embassy of the Republic of China 
Seoul, Korea 
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3. Others: 
Far East Trade Service, Inc. 
Switzerland Office 
Seefeld Strasse 35 (3 Stock) 
8034 Zurich 8, Switzerland 
Far East Trade Service, Inc. 
Suceursale en Belgique 
World Trade Center 1 
16 E Etage, Boulevand Encile 
Jacqmain 162, 1000 Bruxelles 
Belgique 
Far East Trade Service Center 
West Germany Office 
Alfred-Brehm-Platz 19 
6 Frankfurt/main 
West Germany 
Far East Trade Service, Inc. 
Toronto Branch Office 
2 Bloor Street, East, Suite 2624 
Toronto, Ontario, M4W lAS 
Canada 
A.S.P.E.C.T. 
17, Ave. Matignon (Time-Life Bid.) 
75008 Paris, France 
Majestic Trading Company Ltd. 
5th Gl., Bewlay House 
2 Swallow Place 
London WlR 7 AA 
England 
Investment Liaison Office 
415 Central Building Pedder Street 
Hong Kong 
Centro Commerciale per L'estremo 
Oriente 
Via-Fabio Fizi 2-20124 Milan, Italy 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce to 
Djakarta 
JL Banyumas No.4 
P.O. Box 2922 
Jakarta, Indonesia 
Trade Mission of the Republic 
of China 
Room 310, Industrial & Commercial 
Bank Bldg., No. 2, Shenton Way 
Singapore 1 
Tokyo Office, Association of East Asian 
Relations (Economic Department) 
2-4th Floor, Heiwado Booki Honsha 
Bldg., No.8, 1-Chome, Higashi Azabu 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Pacific Economic and Cultural Center, 
Manila Office (Economic Division) 
8th Fir., B.F. Homes Building, Aduana 
St. 
Intramuros, Manila, Philippines 
Economic Section, Office of Represen-
tative China Airlines Ltd. 
lOth Fl., Shell House, 140 Wireless Road 
Bangkok, Thailand 
Oficina Comercial Del 
Lejano Oriente 
Huerfanos 886-0ficina 714, 
Santiago, Chile 
East Asia Trade Centre Fiji, Ltd. 
4th Fl., Air Pacific House, 
CNR. McArthur & Butt Streets, 
Suva, Fiji 
Oficina Comercial de Taiwan 
Av. Pte. Roque Saenz Pena 636 
Piso 8, Buenos Airos 
Republica Argentina 
Far East Trading Co., Pty. Ltd. 
Suite G, 5th Fl. 582 St. Kilda Rd. 
Melbourne, Vic., 3004 Australia 
Taiwan Trade Office 
5, Argyokastron St. 
Strovolos, Nicosia 
Cyprus 
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2. Control Over International Trade 
a. General Description. With a view to promoting the 
wholesome growth of domestic productive enterprises and as a 
necessary measure in economic development, the Board of Foreign 
Trade is exercising certain control over the nation's international 
trade. Thus, exports of goods which are either living necessities 
not produced in adequate quantities locally or commodities needed 
for national defense have been put under a ban or under 
restrictions; and so are the imports of weapons, narcotics, precious 
stones and goods which can be supplied locally. 
The control is subject to adjustment in accordance with the 
developments in the particular fields of production at home and 
also with the changes in the international market. Hence, there 
have been constant changes and modifications in the classifica-
tion of import or export commodities. 
According to the provisions of the Regulations for Classifica-
tion and Control of Imports and Exports, imports and exports are 
classified as follows: 
1. Permissible imports 
2. Permissible exports 
3. Controlled imports 
4. Controlled exports 
5. Prohibited imports 
6. Prohibited exports 
b. Various Restrictions on Imports. 
i. Restrictions on Procurement Area. For political, diplomatic 
and economic reasons, restrictions have been placed on sources of 
import of certain commodities. At present, areas designated as the 
sources of their supply are: 
1. Free world countries and areas other than Hong Kong 
and Macao; 
2. Areas other than Hong Kong, Macao, Australia, Singa-
pore and Malaysia; 
3. Areas other than Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Malay-
sia and Japan; 
4. Europe and America; 
5. Europe, America, New Zealand and Australia; 
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6. North America; 
7. Countries specified. (Commodities to be imported from 
specified countries are mostly Chinese medicines, e.g., 
medicines from South Korea, Japan, etc. Details are shown 
in the Commodity Classification Table.) 
ii. Eligibility of Applicants. Certain commodities, while 
being permissible imports, are not to be imported by traders. For 
these imports, BOFT has limited the eligibility for application to 
the following: 
1. Industrial plants 
2. Processing plants for export 
3. Public trading agencies 
4. Tobacco & Win~ Monopoly Bureau 
5. Public enterprises 
The above provisions show that sometimes there are not only 
restrictions in regard to applicants but also on area of procure-
ment. For example, waste paper can be imported only by paper 
manufacturing plants and must be procured from free world 
countries and areas other than Hong Kong and Macao. This dual 
restrictive measure is .adopted in accordance with the actual 
necessity. 
c. General Provisions for Import and Export Applica-
tions 
i. "Permissible" imports. Applications for import or items 
on the "Permissible" list may be submitted by traders directly to 
the responsible departments of BOFr. They may also be 
submitted to the responsible department of a government bank if 
the bank has been authorized for import licensing for the 
particular commodities provided, however, that there is a record of 
such imports in the past. 
However, if the article to be imported is not specified in the 
"Permissible" list and there is no record of such import in the past 
(e.g., an item to be imported for the first time, as discussed in 
Section 3), applications may be made only after the importation of 
that item is considered and approved by the Committee on 
Commodity Classification. 
ii. "Controlled" imports. Applications for import of items 
on the "Controlled" list may not be made by traders. Only 
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industrial plants and direct end-users may apply for import of 
such items according to existing regulations. 
iii. "Prohibited" imports. Import of commodities under this 
category is prohibited mainly for security, health or economic 
reasons. Neither traders nor manufacturers nor productive 
enterprises are permitted to apply for such imports. 
iv. "Controlled" exports. Export of such products is not 
absolutely prohibited; approval for export of such products should 
be based on the regulations for Application for Export by 
Productive Enterprises which provide: 
1. that the export may not affect the people's livelihood or 
economic development needs; 
2. that for strategic goods, there should be no possibility of 
their being transhipped for supply to the communists; 
3. that all applications for export of "Controlled" items 
should be submitted to the 1st and 2nd Departments of 
BOFI' for approval. 
v. "Permissible" exports. For export of "Permissible" items, 
the exporter may file an "Application for Export License" directly 
with one of the authorized licensing banks. 
vi. "Prohibited" exports. Application may not be made for 
export of goods of this category. 
3. Procedures for Application 
for Export 
Unless otherwise provided for by the Board of Foreign Trade, to 
apply for a license for export of goods on the "Permissible" list, an 
exporter manufacturer/trader registered with and approved by 
BOFI' may file an "Application for Export Permit" directly with 
one of the licensing banks appointed by the Foreign Exchange 
Department of the Central Bank of China. 
An export manufacturer or trader may collect his foreign 
exchange earnings through export transactions by one of the 
following methods: 
1. Letter of Credit (L/C); 
2. Advance settlement of Export Foreign Exchange (T /T); 
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3. On collection basis: 
a. Document Against Payment (DIP) 
b. Document Against Acceptance (D/ A); 
4. Export sales on consignment basis; 
5. Payment made by installment or in other ways. 
4. Export Loans 
There are two kinds of export loans, viz., industrial export 
loans and general export loans. 
1. Industrial export loans are conducted by the International 
Commercial Bank of China to help finance export capital goods 
and important industrial products in keeping with the govern-
ment policy of promoting export; 
2. All appointed foreign exchange banks may engage in the 
activity of extending general export loans for the purpose of 
promoting foreign trade. 
5. Import Financing 
For the import of necessary consumer goods and important 
raw materials for industrial production, if the importer is unable 
to obtain the consent of the foreign supplier to import on D/ A 
basis, he may submit application to the BOFT for issuing the 
import license thus enabling him to apply for financing at the 
appointed bank. 
6. Foreign Exchange 
The government of the Republic of China permits unlimited 
conversion from authorized currencies into New Taiwan Dollars. 
But this function and foreign currency financing of imports and 
exports is limited to appointed foreign exchange banks. 
7. Air and Sea Connections with 
the Outside World 
a. Shipping. The shipping industry in Taiwan has kept 
pace with the demand from the rapid growth of foreign trade and 
other sectors of the national economy. Shipping companies 
operate liner services all over the world. The opening of new 
routes are always under planning. New ships including contain-
ers, refrigerator-ships and super tankers have been obtained for 
special purposes. 
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At the end of 1975, the Republic of China had a merchant fleet 
of 168 ships, totaling 2.1 million DWT. If Chinese vessels flying 
foreign flags of convenience were counted, the Republic of China's 
fleet would be one of the biggest in the world. 
Foreign shipping lines serving ports in Taiwan include the 
American President Lines, the Barber Blue Sea Line, the United 
States Lines, the Sealand Service Inc., etc. 
b. Airlines. Taiwan is on the main route between Tokyo 
and Hong Kong, the most heavily traveled air line in Asia. Apart 
from domestic airlines, there are twelve international airlines 
serving Taiwan. Foreign airlines serving Taiwan include the 
Cathay Pacific Airway, Japan Asia Airway, Korean Air Lines, 
Northwest Orient Airlines, Pan American World Airways, 
Philippine Air Lines, Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways, etc. 
c. Harbors and Airports 
i. Harbors. There are three international harbors in Tai-
wan, located at Keelung in the North, Kaoshiung in the South and 
Hualien in the East. With the expansion of international trade and 
ever-increasing demands for navigation services, harbor authori-
ties have taken steps to increase facilities such as warehouses, 
loading-unloading equipment, container wharves, terminals and 
expanded entrances. 
With a view to easing the congestion at Keelung and 
Kaohsiung and to stimulate the development of business and 
industry in central Taiwan, a decision was made in 1969 to build 
an international port at Taichung. The project will be carried out 
in three phases. Full completion is scheduled for 1982, when the 
new harbor will have an annual cargo handling capacity of 12 
million tons. 
At the same time, the Suao Harbor, originally a fishing port 
which serves as an auxiliary for Keelung, will be expanded into 
an international seaport in eight years. When it is completed in 
June 1979, cargoes bound for and originating from Suao and its 
surrounding areas are expected initially to reach 2 million tons. 
ii. Airports. There are two international airports in Tai-
wan, at Taipei and Kaohsiung. A third, eventually to replace the 
Taipei International Airport, is being built at Taoyuan in 
northern Taiwan. 
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E. Future Trade Prospects 
The worst and longest recession since the 1930s has now 
bottomed out. While the world trade is making an upturn, the 
Republic of China will certainly grasp every opportunity to 
explore sales outlets for its products in the foreign markets, for it 
is only through export that the Republic of China can induce an 
acceleration of economic growth and impart renewed vigor to its 
national economy. 
The Republic of China is about to enter a new era of 
technological expansion. Despite the phenomenal increase of her 
industrial capacity and trade volume over the past years, the fact 
remains that the progress has been more quantitative expansion 
than qualitative improvement. In other words, the expansion of 
industrial capacity was much more impressive than the advance 
of industrial capability. The result of this is that the Republic of 
China continues to depend on simple industrial products for 
export. 
However, both the government and the people of the Republic 
of China are keenly aware that the time to rely on labor-intensive 
and low-technology industries as the foreign exchange earners is 
definitely over. The new emphasis is on upgrading industrial 
technology. Progress is being made in this regard, particularly in 
the machinery and the petrochemical industries. Certainly, 
however, the technical level in the Republic of China is still way 
below that of the advanced countries. 
The Republic of China can not, of course, afford to remain in 
this stage very long. For one thing, the market for simple 
industrial products is limited, and for many items, already 
saturated. Furthermore, the rising wage scale in the Republic of 
China is beginning to reduce her competitiveness in simple 
industrial products while new competitors continue to arise from 
among other developing countries. 
To maintain the high growth rate of the Republic of China's 
foreign trade, it is absolutely necessary for her to upgrade the 
quality of its products, selling them at higher prices, rather than 
exporting them in greater quantities; and the Republic of China 
has to develop more sophisticated products in order to make labor 
more valuable. Only then can the Republic of China solve the 
problems of limited labor supply, rising wages and growing 
competition from other developing nations and keep foreign trade 
expanding. Therefore, in the Republic of China, upgrading of 
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industrial technology will be the first priority within the next 10 to 
20 years. 
As I have said before, the economy of the Republic of China is 
in a period of rapid expansion. It will not be long before the 
Republic of China could attain the status of a developed country. 
With rising income will come greater purchasing power and a 
keener desire for the things that make life more pleasant. Under 
such circumstances, the Republic of China will become a very 
large open market in Asia and also one of the most effective 
suppliers of industrial products in international markets in the 
years ahead. 
Dr. Chiu thanked Mr. Wu for preparing such an excellent 
paper for the conference and then invited Ms. Norma Schroder, a 
Ph.D. candidate at Stanford University, to present her paper on 
"The American Economic Stake in Taiwan." Ms. Schroder 
compared the current status of Taiwan with respect to import and 
export trade with the ·u.S. and Japan. She stated that Taiwan is 
attempting to reduce its dependency on Japan and that the ROC 
wishes the U.S. and Europe to have the largest share in capital 
goods, despite certain advantages of using the Japanese. She 
characterized the U.S. growth in direct investment as accelerating 
faster than elsewhere in the world. 
[The following is Ms. Norma Schroder's paper.] 
AMERICA'S ECONOMIC STAKE IN TAIWAN 
NORMA SCHRODER* 
Whether directly involved in the business of foreign trading or 
not, most members of the U.S. business community are at least 
dimly aware that U.S. economic interdependence with the Far 
East and Taiwan has increased dramatically since the early 
*Department of Economics, Stanford University. 
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1960s. The fuzziness of their perception of the Asian trade 
situation may be attributed to the fact that the bulk of published 
international business reporting remains devoted to U.S.-
European affairs. Thus, this audience, as well as the broader 
audience of all American voters, would surely be surprised to learn 
the true degree of U.S.-Far Eastern trade interdependence. As of 
1973, Taiwan was the seventh largest source of U.S. imports -
more important than France. It was the fifteenth largest 
purchaser of U.S. exports, outranking countries such as Switzer-
land and Israel. The most recent assessment, 1976, places Taiwan 
thirteenth in two-way trade with the U.S. It is widely reported that 
multinational corporations regard developing countries as attrac-
tive investment sites, but seldom has Taiwan been able to attract 
new U.S. direct investment at the rate of 28% per annum, which is 
more than double the average rate for all developing countries. 
These figures are bound to grab the attention of the general 
business audience, and although they are suggestive, they are not 
adequate to relate the magnitude of America's economic stake in 
Taiwan. Before embarking on that exigesis, it is helpful to review 
the question, "What is America's stake in participating in world 
trade at all?" The answer is, of course, that the U.S. can increase 
its level of consumption by specializing in the productions of those 
goods in which it enjoys a comparative advantage - cereals and 
sophisticated manufactures - and can trade some of these for 
foreign-made consumer goods. Thus, the U.S. gains from trade, 
but the American stake in this worldwide exchange is, in the 
following sense, less than that of virtually any other free world 
nation. Because it has such a huge domestic economy, the U.S. 
level of economic activity and consumption is comparatively less 
subject to the vagaries of world supply and demand than that of 
many of our allies. When one examines the list of those 
commodities of which at least 10% of the value of total U.S. supply 
originated abroad in 1971, one sees that the list consists 
predominantly of raw materials and consumer goods - generally 
non-strategic items in nonessential amounts. Our sole fear of 
unhealthy dependence, a newly emerged one, is the case of crude 
oil. Accordingly, the U.S. has embraced a policy of "import-
substitution." 
Just as imports seem insignificant in relation to domestic 
supply, so too do export markets for U.S. output seem piddling in 
relation to the domestic market. Historically, the U.S. has had one 
of the lowest exports to GNP ratio's in the world - in the past, 3 
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or 4%, recently a bit higher. However, for some classes of U.S. 
producers the foreign buyer is of somewhat greater significance; 
in excess of 10% of the output of chemicals, equipment and grain 
are exported. 
U.S. IMPORTS 
Having placed the U.S. stake in the international economy in 
perspective, let us return to the examination of the American 
stake in the Far East and Taiwan in terms of imports, exports and 
direct investment. Between 1960 and 1973 the annual growth rate 
of U.S. imports from East and South Asia (excluding Japan) was 
16%. This is a couple of points faster than from the developing 
nations group as a whole and faster than the world average. Over 
that period our imports from Taiwan have grown at an 
extraordinary 39% per annum. Back in the early 1960s, when 
Taiwan's major export earner was sugar, the island was of 
marginal import supply significance to the United States. As 
stated above, by 1973 Taiwan was the seventh largest source of 
U.S. imports, outranking France. This rapid trade expansion by 
Taiwan is not solely with the United States, but with other 
trading partners as well: Japan, Asia and the EEC. Beginning in 
1967, the U.S. became Taiwan's largest foreign market, overshad-
owing Japan ever since. As of 1975, America absorbed 34% of 
Taiwan's exports, while Japan took only 13%. In recent years the 
U.S. share has been slipping as Taiwan has begun to develop its 
European markets. 
Obviously, Taiwan now makes commodities it did not make 
before; commodities which the United States and the rest of the 
world are eager to buy - namely, textiles and electrical goods. 
Looking at the 1974 composition of Taiwan's exports, one is struck 
by the fact that sugar, the first-ranked export earner in 1965, by 
1974 had been demoted to fourth place, dwindling to 5.5% of total 
export value. In 1962 industrial products were 51% of exports; by 
1972 they had risen to 83%. Thus, the importance of all 
agricultural products, both raw and processed, declined precipit-
ously from a 49% share to 17% of exportables in just one decade. 
This steady economic shift in the composition of Taiwan's exports 
was stalled and even reversed a bit in 1975 when the price of 
sugar shot up, misleadingly magnifying the importance of that 
commodity. What underlies this realignment in the composition of 
exports are Taiwan's take-off into economic growth and the 
accompanying changes in the domestic structure of production 
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and employment indicative of the transformation of an agrarian 
economy into a predominantly industrial one. 
Taiwan's development is self-generated; Taiwan no longer 
receives U.S. economic or military aid (a minor exception: there 
are benefits from residual economic funds that generate 50 million 
dollars a year, i.e., old low-interest loans from the 1950s, and from 
purchases of weapons on credit); and the foreign debt is less than 
5% of the gross national product. The remarkable Taiwanese 
achievement is, precisely put, that these people have propelled the 
growth of their real GNP at a rate of 10.7% per annum between 
1963-73 (Background Notes, Department of State, May 1974): In 
1972 the World Bank ranked Taiwan's per capita income as Asia's 
third highest after Japan and Fiji (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Yearbook 1975). The extent of the Taiwanese economy's structural 
transformation is revealed in the following figures: between 1963 
and 1974 the percentage of agriculture in GNP shrank from 22% 
down to 12%, while the contribution of industry swelled from 25% 
to 33%; the service sector remained constant at 24%. 
U.S. EXPORTS 
Computations based on annual trade data appearing in the 
U.S. Commerce Department's Overseas Business Reports indicate 
that over 1960-73 the growth of the U.S. share in foreign markets 
has not kept pace with imports. 
The computations reveal that between 1960 and 1973 the 
growth of the East and South Asia market for U.S. exports 
(10.73%) was below the world pace (11.83%). But the growth rate of 
the Taiwan market (12.39%) is above the world market average, 
although it trails the growth of the Japan market (14.43% per 
annum). 
In 1973, Taiwan was the fifteenth largest purchaser of U.S. 
exports, outranking Switzerland and Israel. By 1974, it had 
jumped to tenth place among our export markets, and it has been 
forecast to rise to sixth place in a relatively few years. ROC 
Ministry of Finance statistics for 1975 show that Japan was 
Taiwan's largest supplier, 31.83%, followed by the U.S. at 27%. 
Between 1964 and 1972 Japan had been increasingly edging the 
U.S. out of the largest share of the Taiwanese market. In 1964 the 
disparity in market shares was at its starkest: 44% versus 24%. 
Since 1972, however, Taiwan has had increasing success in 
reducing its dependence on Japan by taking its shopping list to 
Europe. 
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In contrast to the very pronounced shifts in the commodity 
composition of Taiwan's exports over the period 1960 to 1973, the 
evolution of the general commodity composition of Taiwan's 
purchases from abroad has been very gradual. As in the past, the 
largest import category in 1975 was agricultural and industrial 
raw materials, accounting for more than 60% of the total import 
bill. Capital equipment amounted to about 33% of the total, while 
consumer goods accounted for about 6%. Between 1972 and 1973, 
when imports of agricultural and industrial raw materials, on 
which Taiwan's resource-scarce processing economy depends, rose 
eightfold in absolute value (from $212 million to $1.6 billion), they 
declined only 8% as a share to total imports. Consumer goods 
dwindled from 9.3% to 6%. Not surprisingly for an industrializing 
economy, the greatest gain in share of imports was registered by 
the capital goods category. It gained almost a third, rising from 
22% to 32% of the total value of imports. 
The major import sources of these capital goods are Japan 
and the United States. In 1975 these two nations held virtually 
equal shares in the Taiwanese machinery and tools market, but 
that outcome was probably the result of the severity of the 
recession in Japan. In 1974, a year of more normal market shares, 
Japan enjoyed sales of $700 million, whereas the U.S. registered 
sales of only $550 million. 
For some years Taiwan has been incurring increasingly 
severe trade deficits with Japan, a situation which has focused the 
Taiwanese authorities' attention on the idea of trying to reduce 
reliance on Japan. To sustain industrialization, the ROC has 
planned a shift from light and labor-intensive industries such as 
textiles to capital- and technology-intensive industries such as 
petrochemicals, precision machinery and heavy industries. This 
means substantial sales opportunities for capital goods producing 
nations. The stated preference of the ROC authorities is that the 
U.S. and Europe should win the largest share of these new sales. 
However, several factors point to the continued strength of Japan 
in the capital goods market. Because Japanese suppliers have 
been ~~le to offer local Chinese firms comparatively inexpensive 
products'; there has been little inclination to "buy American" or to 
"buy European." The Japanese supply high-quality goods while 
offering lower freight costs, shorter delivery schedules, and in 
many cases easier payment terms. Furthermore, as many 
manufacturers are currently using production equipment origi-
nally purchased in Japan, reliance on Japanese suppliers for 
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parts and consulting services, at least for the meantime, is 
unavoidable. 
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT 
East and South Asia comprise a region in which the net 
capital flow component of U.S. direct investment grew more 
quickly, over the period 1960 to 1974, than anywhere else in the 
world. This particular measure is used here, rather than total 
direct investment, because this was the only type of data available 
on Taiwan. 
Computations based on Commerce Department data appear-
ing annually in its Survey of Current Business show that between 
1960 and 1973, U.S. venture capital was attracted to the East and 
South Asia region at a growth rate of 32.22% per annum, which is 
more than twice the average for all developing countries, 13.69%, 
during this period. In Taiwan the growth rate of new U.S. 
investment has been 28.21% per annum. 
Venture capital is sent where its owners expect to find rapid 
growth in sales and profits. Indications are that U.S. capital is 
being deployed to Asia at such a rapid rate because that is where 
it gets the best of both. A recent Department of Commerce survey 
of sales by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corpora-
tions, covering the years 1966 through 1972, shows that the Asian 
region has enjoyed much more rapid market growth than, for 
example, Latin America, and a total of more than 200% in sales 
growth over the period for these majority-owned subsidiaries. 
Next, consider the sales record of a subset of U.S. multination-
als - the manufacturing subsidiaries, that is, excluding those 
engaged in such operations as trading, petroleum, mining and 
smelting, and finance. Between 1966 and 1972, U.S. manufactur-
ing subsidiaries in East Asia have outperformed those located 
elsewhere. A sales index based on Commerce Department sources 
shows that the Far East outstrips Africa, Latin America and the 
world average. But this performance is heavily influenced by 
Japan, which did significantly better than the rest of the Far 
East. In 1972, a solid 60% of sales in the Far East were controlled 
by U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries located in Japan. Sales 
growth by non-Japanese Asian manufacturing subsidiaries con-
forms to the world average 15.2%, and is only slightly better 
than that achieved by subsidiaries in other developing economies, 
14.0%. Within the manufacturing category, U.S. subsidiaries in 
non-Japanese Asia engaged in the manufacture of machinery had 
a sales field day. During the period 1966 to 1972, their sales 
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increased at the rate of 44.5% per annum, nearly double the rate 
anywhere else. 
The Far East (including Japan) continues to be the world's 
most profitable region for U.S. investment in manufacturing. 
Business Asia, a Hong Kong weekly, using Commerce Depart-
ment data, reports that the average 1973 rate of return on U.S. 
direct investment in manufacturing in Asia was 22.8%, and 
Australia 19.7%. In stark contrast, Latin America offered a return 
of only 13.3%, a rate below the world average of 15.9%. As usual, 
the high return from Middle East oil operations made this region 
the leader in overall profitability. In 1974-75, as world inflation 
surged and recession set in, profit rates sank in all areas except 
the oil regions. The rate of return on U.S. investment in 
manufacturing in Asia in those abnormal years plummeted to 14% 
from the lofty 22% figure. · 
Unfortunately, there are no accessible published sales and 
profit data on U.S. multinationals located in Taiwan. However, 
since 90% of the foreign capital in Taiwan is devoted to 
manufacturing, it seems reasonable to accept the average sales 
and profit statistics on all Asian multinational manufacturers 
presented above as suggestive of the Taiwanese profit rates. 
In the latter half of the 1960s, these sales and profits lures 
drew U.S. investments into the Far East at an increasingly rapid 
pace, especially in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines (the 
U.S. share of total invested stock in this area reached about 40% 
in 1969). But as the 1970s opened, Japan's investments in this 
area began to increase sharply; investment stock at the close of 
1975 increased 10.8-fold compared with the 1969 year-end. By the 
end of 1973, Japan's investment share topped all investor 
countries including the U.S., in Thailand and South Korea. And 
by the 1974 year-end, Japan's share was the highest also in 
Indonesia. Japan's share in Asian investment stock rose conspicu-
ously from 13.6% at the close of 1969 to 33.6% at the 1975 year-end. 
In contrast, the share of U.S. investments in Asia declined from 
38.5% to 25.2%. However, the U.S. share of investment in the light 
industry countries - South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore - did not fall so precipitously as it did in the primary 
product countries - Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia. In the former group it slid from 39% to 31%, whereas in 
the primary products group it dove from 38% to 21% in just six 
years. Accordingly, Japan's gains were far more dramatic in the 
primary group, up from 13% to 33%, than in the light group, from 
16% up to 26%. Of these eight Asian nations, Indonesia,. with its 
opportunities for petroleum extraction, has taken the lion's share 
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of foreign capital - $4.8 billion as of 1975. Taiwan with $1.3 
billion was a close third to Singapore's second place with $1.4 
billion. 
Having assessed the general Far Eastern direct investment 
situation, we turn to an explicit examination of the available 
Taiwanese data. At the end of September 1976, the total amount of 
overseas Chinese and foreign investments reached $1.5 billion, of 
which $488 million under 280 projects came from the U.S., 
accounting for more than 32% of the total inflow of foreign private 
capital. During the recession years 1974-75 the U.S. was adding 
but little new investment. In 1974, the U.S. held $428 million (only 
$50 million less than the 1976 figure) or an overwhelming 46% of 
the total stock in 1974. The source of America's importance as a 
foreign investor in Taiwan can be traced to the nature of the 
annual new capital flows in 1974 through 1976. In 1974, Japan 
and the U.S. committed equal shares of the flow of new 
investment; in 1975, the U.S. took the lead again, 42% versus 24% 
of the new flow. But in 1976, Japan put up 30% compared to our 
21% of the inflow. 
Although U.S. direct investment commitments to Taiwan 
have faltered, other items in our capital account dealings with 
ROC remain prominent. Loans from U.S. banks remain strong. 
The U.S. Eximbank alone has, in fact, extended more than $1 
billion in loans to Taiwan and guaranteed another $700 million of 
private bank loans. This clearly makes Taiwan the country with 
the third largest Eximbank exposure worldwide, (only Brazil and 
Spain have more). As of the end of March 1977, $1.54 billion of 
loans had been granted to state-run enterprises like Taiwan Power 
Co., China Steel Corp., Chinese Petroleum Corp., and Taiwan 
Railway Administration. 1 The largest recipient was Taiwan 
Power Co., with a large portion of the funds going to Taiwan's 
ambitious nuclear power development program. And as Minister 
Sum of the ROC remarked in his address to the USA-ROC 
Economic Council, this Eximbank credit will bring American 
firms $2.5 billion worth of business. (Eximbank lo.ans are granted 
for 60% of the purchase price.) 
1. During discussion at the conference, Marvin Solomon, Senior Counsel to the 
Export-Import Bank, supplied these figures to replace the already out-of-date 
published ones I had presented orally. 
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CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the reader is feeling more befuddled than informed 
after this heavy onslaught of statistics. As one last exercise, tally 
up America's economic stake in Taiwan- nearly $500 million in 
direct investments; enjoyment of one of the highest rates of 
profitability and sales growth in the world; all the goods 
exchanged with our thirteenth-ranked trading partner; $1.54 
billion in loans outstanding and the $2.5 billion in sales which 
they generate - in this author's opinion, a very substantial stake 
indeed. 
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Dr. Chiu thanked Ms. Norma Schroder for presenting her 
paper and then invited the discussants to comment on the papers 
presented. The first discussant was Mr. Martin Pilachowski, Vice-
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President of Maryland National Bank, who discussed the 
economic relations between the Port of Baltimore and Taiwan, 
giving a banker's view of the ROC. Mr. Pilachowski cited the ROC 
government's determination to succeed through internal develop-
ment and through participation in the international market, and 
the ROC government's ability to implement its ongoing economic 
evolution. 
[The following is the summary of Mr. Pilachowski's state-
ment.] 
COMMENTS 
MARTIN PILACHOWSKI 
I won't go into some of the numbers that have been very ably 
presented by my predecessors, other than to say that I do agree 
with them. The progress that has been made is certainly 
substantial. I had a somewhat unique opportunity to see it on two 
levels, first during the sixties as a naval officer in Kao-hsiung, 
and later in my banking career travelling extensively through 
Asia. 
I think it's important to look behind the progress and try to 
get a feel for the motivating factors that have generated the 
ROC's significant progress. I think the ROC is to be commended, 
and I think the ability of the country to come to the international 
marketplace is a very strong indication of just how soundly and 
how well they run their affairs internally and internationally. 
The financial institutions in Taiwan bear a very heavy 
burden because of the lack of the substantial capital markets that 
one sees in other areas. To say the least, they have handled this 
role in a very commendable fashion. Looking at the structure, all 
the financial institutions are under control of one format under 
the Ministry of Finance with an ongoing relationship with the 
Central Bank of China, which is the lender of last resort. There is 
progress being made in areas that would be considered weak-
nesses based on the short-term money market operations which 
would expand the ability of both the investor and business to take 
advantage of varying opportunities for taking and replacing 
funds. 
In looking at how we as a bank invest in the financial 
community in the ROC, it has traditionally been an ongoing 
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source of profits for U.S. banking institutions as well as European 
and other Asian institutions to provide not only for the 
infrastructure or developmental financing but also trade financ-
ing. On a more local level, trade between the Republic of China 
and the Baltimore area is probably a lot more significant than 
most people would realize in looking at the total tonnage that 
passes through the Port of Baltimore. We have been doing 
business there for quite some time. While I can't give you the exact 
figures, it is substantial, and it is constantly growing. For those of 
you involved in the Baltimore business community, our local 
involvement will continue to expand with some additional 
shipping lines coming into the Port, which I think bodes well for 
future prospects of two-way world trade. Since there was mention 
made of the relationship between the ROC and the attitudes 
revolving around the American businessman's approach to the 
PRC, I think all we need to do in this area is look at the numbers 
that are involved. Two-way trade with the Republic of China, as 
was mentioned, has now exceeded $4 billion; certainly, the trade 
volume with the PRC in no way approaches this volume. I think 
that the attitude of current business, as bankers see it, is that the 
numbers are the key in a sense, and that we should continue to do 
things in this vein. 
In summary, I again feel that the driving forces have been the 
government's determination to succeed in both internal develop-
ment as well as implementing the practice and putting their 
products in the international marketplace. They have done a 
commendable job. Certainly the stability of the ROC economy is 
one of the most enviable in all of Asia. The exchange rate of the 
NT dollar has remained significantly stable over the last twenty 
years or so, varying only slightly, again attributable to the 
government's ability to implement ongoing economic ·thought 
processes which have kept the country headed in the right 
direction. Thank you very much. 
Dr. Chiu thanked Mr. Pilachowski for his comments, 
especially his remarks on Baltimore's trade and financial 
relations with the ROC. He then introduced the second discus-
sant, Professor J. S. Prybyla, to speak. Dr. Chiu said that 
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Professor Prybyla is a prolific writer and also a person of wide 
experience. He recently visited both the People's Republic of 
China (1974) and the ROC (1976) to observe their respective 
economic development, and is Professor of Economics at Pennsyl-
vania State University. 
Professor Prybyla praised Mr. Wu's presentation as a 
synthesis of the crux of the situation. He cited the ROC's 
"textbook transition" from dependency to economic independence. 
He said Mr. Wu's guide should be followed by those responsible for 
economic decisions, and that insufficiently informed decisions as 
to future U.S. relations with the ROC could be destructive. Dr. 
Prybyla commented that while Mr. Wu's presentation is positive 
on the investment and trade climate of the ROC, it does not reveal 
the difficulties and frustrations that investors face, e.g., frustra-
tions arising from difficulties with workers and bureaucracies. 
[The following is the summary of Professor Prybyla's state-
ment.] 
COMMENTS 
J. S. PRYBYLA 
I 
Allow me, first of all, to congratulate Mr. Wu on his 
informative, well organized, and lucid presentation of the basic 
elements which constitute the investment and foreign trade 
climate of the Republic of China. The paper represents, in my 
view, a good synthesis of the fundamental facts of the situation 
and is a helpful guide for potential investors and traders. 
Mr. Wu performs a distinct service in stressing (i) the 
significant achievements of the Republic of China in economic 
growth over the last quarter century; (ii) the successful creation of 
a model of development that combines private initiative with 
constructive governmental intervention, and the profit motive 
with equity in the distribution of land, income and opportunity; 
and (iii) an almost textbook perfect transition of a once dependent 
economy to self-sustained growth. Not the least of the paper's 
merits is to remind us of the close commercial relationship 
between Taiwan and the United States and of the important stake 
which this country has in the continued viability and prosperity 
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of the Republic of China. Such reminders are especially important 
at this time when crucial political decisions affecting our 
diplomatic and legal relations with the ROC are under active 
consideration in Washington. Mr. Wu's guide to investment in and 
trade with the ROC merits attention by our policy makers and by 
those whose involvement in trade and investment with Taiwan 
puts them in a position to bear influence on decision-making 
councils of our nation. As other papers at this conference make 
clear (I have in mind, in particular, the analyses by N. Shroder, Y. 
L. Wu and K. C. Yeh as well as the instructive German case study 
by R. Heuser), nothing could be more disruptive to the economy 
and society of Taiwan as well as damaging to our own economic 
interests and international credibility than an insufficiently 
informed decision concerning our future relations with the 
Republic of China. In this setting, Mr. Wu's essay is most timely 
and sobering. 
II 
My reservations about the paper are of two kinds. The first 
concerns a methodological point which, I think, is important both 
as a matter of substance and from the standpoint of the paper's 
persuasiveness or - if I may use the word - "saleability" to 
informed American opinion. The second concerns updating and 
elaboration of some of the facts mentioned by Mr. Wu. 
1. As is to be expected, the paper draws a very positive 
picture of the investment and trade climate in the ROC, and 
concludes on an optimistic note. If there are shadows on the 
economic landscape, as there surely are, and if future prospects 
are fraught with dangers and uncertainty, they are hardly to be 
detected in the presentation. Now, we all know that there exist 
difficulties with which foreign investors in Taiwan must cope and 
of which they should be made aware in fairness to all concerned. 
While the argument of a favorable investment and trade climate is 
basically accurate, it is not the whole story. Failure to spell out, 
openly and clearly, some of the more important problems, and 
frustrations which foreign investors and traders are likely to 
encounter in their dealings with Chinese managements, workers, 
and government bureaucracies can only contribute to later 
disillusionment and discouragement. I think the paper's value 
would have been much enhanced had the author enumerated some 
of the major negatives and suggested ways and means of dealing 
with them. In this regard the paper weakens, through omission, 
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its own strong case. I have seen analyses of this kind from the pen 
of researchers in the Republic of China, so the subject is clearly 
not taboo. 
2. (a) The author correctly points to the crucial changes 
currently taking place in the structure of the ROC economy. The 
pivotal change concerns the transition to a more capital- and 
technology-intensive economy and the preoccupation with upgrad-
ing the quality of output, especially exportable output. In this 
connection it would be useful, I think, to mention some of the 
measures currently under active consideration by the government 
of the ROC aimed at revising the present Statute for Encourage-
ment of Investment in a way that would generate the appropriate 
investment from foreign and domestic sources. I am thinking in 
particular of discussions concerning the possibility of extending 
the five-year tax holiday by one to three years to encourage 
investment in the priority industries; proposed tax incentives to 
large trading companies as a means of expanding the export 
trade; the proposed revision of tax incentives to firms undergoing 
mergers; suggested .exemptions from import duty to be given to 
productive enterprises for the import of equipment not produced 
domestically; and the exemption from withholding and consoli-
dated income tax of one year savings deposits, post office savings 
deposits, and trust funds. These, plus the proposed revision of the 
Statute for Technical Cooperation, are important measures 
designed to stimulate domestic and foreign private investments in 
the years to come when the present stimulus provided by 
expenditures on the ten major projects declines with the projects' 
completion. 
(b) Mr. Wu addresses himself briefly to the problem of 
imbalance in Taiwan's trade with the United States. This is a 
sensitive issue in this country and will certainly require thought-
ful corrective measures by both partners. It would have been 
desirable, I believe, to have dealt more fully with this subject in 
the paper, for a continuation of the present lopsided exchanges 
could easily lead to a deterioration in the climate of US-ROC 
trade. 
(c) Finally, I would have liked to hear more about the 
progress being made in the development of the twelve new 
industrial parks and the implementation of the Hsinchu Scientific 
and Industrial Park Project, which appears to be a most 
interesting pilot experiment in providing an appropriate environ-
ment for the development of technologically advanced industries. 
I would be especially interested in the author's views on the 
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ability of Taiwan's social structure to absorb rapidly high-level 
technology. 
I understand, of course, that time and space limitations 
militate against the inclusion of all these various issues in the 
paper. I am quite simply raising them as a possible subject of our 
discussions. 
Dr. Chiu thanked Professor J. S. Prybyla for presenting such 
constructive comments on Mr. Wu's paper; he then announced a 
fifteen minute break for this session, after which the floor would 
be open for discussion. He also informed the participants that the 
third discussant, Professor James P. Chandler, had just arrived 
and would present his comments at the discussion period. 
This session adjourned at 11:20 a.m. and resumed at 11:30 
a.m. 
Dr. Chiu called the session into order and announced that the 
floor was now open for discussion. 
[The following is the summary of questions and answers.] 
DISCUSSION 
VALERIE WATTS JAMES: I have a question for Mr. Wu. I am 
Assistant Professor of International Law and Political Science at 
Morgan State University. Mr. Wu made reference to the fact that 
there are no strikes in Taiwan, or very few strikes. He also 
mentioned the unions. What positions do unions play insofar as 
the economy of the ROC is concerned? 
DR. CHIU: Dr. Wei will be more competent to answer that 
question. 
DR. WEI: There are labor unions in Taiwan, and their way of 
getting what they want is not to strike, but to put pressure upon 
the government, and through the government to put pressure 
upon the factories. For instance, when the pay of some local 
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factory financed by foreign investors is too low in the opinion of 
the workers, then the workers have several ways of getting what 
they want. In the first place, they can make their wage demand to 
the owner of the factory directly. In most factories there is 
someone called the officer of labor relations, so usually this 
worker or representative of the workers goes to that officer and 
says, "It's too low, we have to increase the pay." If they cannot 
find satisfactory answers from the factory, then they can go to the 
provincial or City Bureau of Social Affairs. There is a branch in 
that Bureau which can serve as an intermediary between the 
workers' group and the factory. So this is the way to get things 
done. Maybe this is in the traditional Chinese cultural context and 
is not by direct confrontation. It's by some kind of behind-the-
scenes maneuver that the workers are able to get what they want. 
That's as much as I can say. I do not know the detailed legal 
arrangements as to how the workers actually resolve differences 
between themselves and the factory owners. 
DR. HEUSER: I would like to ask Dr. Wei another question. Dr. 
Wei emphasized in his quite articulate overall presentation of the 
present circumstances in Taiwan, that Taiwan will remain a 
democratic land. It seems to me that people in western countries 
are wondering why despite the facts that in Taiwan there are 
economic improvement and political stability, as well as a 
growing living standard, nevertheless the country is still in a 
situation of emergency and martial law. People in western 
countries are interested to hear something from the people who 
are in government in Taiwan why this is so, because for us it is 
not easy to understand, viewing the facts I have just mentioned. 
DR. WEI: As to this question, again I will answer not in the 
legal sense; I think Dr. Chiu can add to my answer in that regard. 
I will give you essentially a political assessment of the situation. 
Taiwan has martial law, but no curfew. There are cases in which 
there are constant curfews in some countries, such as in South 
Korea and the Philippines, and there are nations in which curfew 
is the martial law. We have martial law, but no curfew. The 
martial law has been declared more for preparation for the 
possible emergence of a critical situation. In other words, at least 
formally speaking, we are still in continuous conflict with 
Mainland China, and if you review the developments after 1971 
after we withdrew from the U.N., then I think we have a pretty 
good record in protecting civil rights, particularly in the areas of 
private citizens. South Korea, to my knowledge, has nine times 
declared national emergencies, and the Philippines has suspended 
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its democracy by proclaiming martial law for the whole country, 
and Thailand has a coup and student revolt. What we did, we not 
only resisted any change in the form of government, we initiated 
two supplementary national elections, adding more than fifty new 
members to the national Yuan, to the Control Yuan, and to the 
National Assembly. People have asked this question of martial 
law again and again. We are aware of this problem, and we are 
concerned with this problem, but again, my answer here is that it 
is more for preparation for a possible emergency situation rather 
than actually applying every facet of law to restricting the 
.freedom of the people of Taiwan. 
DR. CHIU: With respect to the question of martial law, I just 
want to remind you that there is a de facto martial law curfew in 
all United States cities. So I warn you not to go out after the 
conference is over in the evening (laughter). But martial law here · 
is enforced not by the government but by the gangsters in this 
country. 
QuESTION [to Prof. Prybyla; speaker unidentified]: What is the 
viability of economic expansion in the ROC? 
PROF. PRYBYLA: There are some problems. I'll mention some 
of the less innocuous factors. I think there is serious question 
among some Chinese as to viability in some labor projects. There 
is some question in the people's minds as to the educational 
qualifications of the labor leaders in the Republic of China. There 
is, I think, a certain growing restlessness, too, in the labor force, 
in regard to wage structures, wage levels, consumer aspirations 
and so on, which may not be as ea,ily dealt with by legal 
injunctions. . . there are problems, I think, in management, the 
quality of management in Chinese firms. So these are some. And 
also, I am not as optimistic about the future international climate 
for investment in Taiwan as some of the speakers. I do tend to 
share Mr. Wu's and Mr. Wei's fears that some shift in our 
relations with China may very adversely affect the climate of 
investment. I am not sure whether Ms. Schroder mentioned this -
I think she did- but much of the foreign investment, especially 
American investment in Taiwan, is rather short-term in terms of 
equity. This may be in part because of the concentration of 
investment in light industry. But it is symptomatic that the 
United States investor has confidence in the future of Taiwan, but 
it is not very long-tenn. 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: How much investment in 
Taiwan is short-term? 
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DR. WEI: I agree with Ms. Schroder that a more extensive 
answer to this question should be based upon a careful review of 
data. But I can base an answer on my own experience up here as 
an Eisenhower Fellow visiting the U.S. While I was in New York I 
met with four major bank executives, including the J.P. Morgan 
Bank & Trust Co., I asked a question, "Before you loan the money 
to the ROC, with whom do you check? Do you check with the U.S. 
Department of Commerce or Export-Import Bank?" And I got an 
answer from the J. P. Morgan vice-president for foreign invest-
ment. He told me that we rely on our own experts; we make our 
own assessments, because the amount of money is too large to be 
insured by anybody, so we'd better be sure what we're doing. So 
they invested in a loan for building six nuclear power plants, and 
this is a very large amount of borrowing. Of course we Chinese in 
Taiwan are more careful, you may say more prudent, in borrowing 
money. In our economic situation, we could have borrowed much 
more. If we follow, say, the example of Korea, we would have at 
least doubled or tripled our borrowing from international markets. 
But we want to maintain our good record and to maintain a 
relatively low portion of our economy which is based upon 
borrowing money. So this much I can say. The kind of projects 
which involve large amounts of money are on long-term loans, not 
short-term loans. I know less about the investment part, but I do 
know about the loan part. 
Ms. SEUNARINE: This question is for Mr. Pilachowski. I would 
like you to comment on whether Maryland National Bank finds 
any special allure in the Republic of China as compared to other 
eastern countries for investment. 
MR. PILACHOWSKI: We find it a great deal more attractive 
than some other countries. We are primarily a bank concerned 
with the financing of trade, again connected with the Port of 
Baltimore. The Republic of China offers us as an institution an 
opportunity to do both the medium-term lending that Dr. Wei was 
referring to and short-term lending. If you look at other countries, 
their demand for short-term funds is not as strong, and also we 
view them as being less stable for varying reasons. Other 
developing Asian countries have been mentioned - I do not mean 
that we do not do business with those places also. But our desire to 
increase our business is dependent upon more immediate evidence 
of stability in those countries than is presently seen vis-a-vis what 
we see in the Republic of China. It's a very favorable atmosphere 
for us. The only more favorable atmosphere is that of Japan. 
58 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: I want to comment on Dr. 
Heuser's remark about national emergency in Taiwan. Actually, 
the United States has been in a national emergency since 1917. 
Indeed, that's how the President regulates foreign activity. My 
question is, what do you see as the ultimate situation in the 
Republic of China - what will it be in the year 2000? 
DR. CHIU: I think I will call Dr. Wei to answer that question, 
as a scholar, not as a government official (laughter). 
DR. WEI: Thank you very much, Hungdah. You have just 
saved my case. Let me put it this way. Let me give you three 
pitfalls which we try not to fall into. I have met so many people in 
the United States while representing the ROC in Taiwan in 
varying capacities, first as Director of the Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, and now as Chairman of the Research, 
Development and Evaluation Commission. There are several 
traps which we can fall into if we are not careful. One is that 
Taiwan can continue trading (after the U.S. has normalized its 
relations with the PRC); and that Taiwan is now economically so 
good that it does not need formal ties with the U.S. So to the 
person who asks, "Do you think Taiwan's economy is good?" One 
may say, "Yes, it is good." "Do you think Taiwan's economy can 
withstand any shock?" One may say, "I think maybe yes." "Then 
why should you worry about diplomatic ties with the U.S.? We 
think you can stand any shock." This is one pitfall. Another 
question asked is, "You people have been very successful in 
dealing with unfavorable money situations since 1971. You have 
been able to even increase trade with countries with which you 
have no ties -is that correct?" One would say, "Yes." "And you 
have developed substantive ties with many countries (without 
diplomatic ties with the ROC)." One would say, "That's correct." 
Then they say, "Why should you worry about ties with the U.S.A.? 
You have developed a whole bunch of substantive ties. You can 
keep up the same thing." This is another pitfall. The third pitfall 
is this: "Is Taiwan secure?" Now, the instinctive response is, "Yes, 
Taiwan is secure." "Well, can you be secure in the near future? 
Can you defend yourself against Mainland China?" We are more 
likely to answer, "Yes, we will be able to defend against Mainland 
China." "Then, why should you worry about a defense treaty?" 
These three pitfalls I have encountered again and again. I got so 
tired of it that whenever I had anything to do in the U.S.A., I 
would say first, let me tell you three things. Then we are in 
business. 
My honest evaluation as a person trained in development, 
international law, and political science is this: There is no 
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substitute for formal ties. Without formal ties, your existence at 
best is something of a para-social, political, and economic entity, 
something which is less than that of a state. In this regard, we 
recently had a meeting at St. Louis of the International Studies 
Association on the legal status of divided states. What we have is 
a situation in which there is a zero-sum game in the chapter of 
recognition and the conventional international law. That is, the 
winner gets all. Until 1971, the ROC was a beneficiary of 
conventional international law in which we received the recogni-
tion of the majority of the states of the world. After 1971 we were 
the victim of conventional international law in which a diminish-
ing number of states recognized the ROC. How can we resolve this 
question? The resolution is not going to come from us; it is for the 
international jurists to deal with this question. Under interna-
tional law, there are three types of international personalities: 
states, belligerents, and insurgents. Where do you find divided 
states? Are they belligerents? Are they insurgents? They are more 
than that. The experience of the ROC has been that we try very 
hard to be a good member of the international community. We 
behave as a state. We adhere to all the regulations and codes of 
behavior which are worthy of any entity that is a state. We are out 
of the W.H.O. (World Health Organization), we are out of the 
I.C.A.O. (International Civil Aviation Organization), we are out of 
many international organizations, but we still adhere to the rules 
of behavior, with the hope that the international community will 
treat us as a political system worthy of the recognition of the 
world community. We are trying very hard to increase diplomatic 
ties with other countries. We are not satisfied with substantive ties 
- ties that are maintained only in the absence of diplomatic/for-
mal ties. 
CoMMENT, MR. CLOUGH: American companies investing 
directly in the ROC, e.g., EXXON, do not invest lightly in 
countries like Taiwan without some confidence in the future. 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: I would like to ask Dr. Wei 
about the extent of political participation in Taiwan. You have 
indicated in your discussion that most of the political power is in 
the hands of the Taiwanese Chinese .... What had been the 
experience of minority groups in light of the fact that you have 
varying political power groups in Taiwan? 
DR. WEI: The ruling party is the Chinese Nationalist Party 
(Kuomingtang, K.M.T.). For those who have done research on 
Taiwan's political process, it has become apparent that the 
process of political representation on Taiwan is far more complex 
60 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
than has been described by western scholars. In order to win 
election in Taiwan, one generally must gain nomination by the 
ruling party. In some cases nomination by the ruling party as a 
candidate amounts to election. In selecting candidates to run for 
positions, the ruling party is very careful. They want to get a 
person who is respected, who has the means to run in the election 
and win. So in this case, in local areas if you seek out a Mainland 
Chinese to run in a predominantly Taiwanese area, you are not 
going to win. So by necessity, the party has to select a Taiwanese 
Chinese candidate: So because the Mainland Chinese are mostly 
living in the cities and only a few in the countryside, the 
proportion of Mainland Chinese who have won seats in the 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly is less than their overall percentage 
in the whole population, a situation which can be compared with 
the United States in some ways. What I can say here is that it is a 
deliberate effort made by the government of the ROC as well as a 
natural process of gradual emergence of the majority influence. 
The Constitution of the Republic of China does have certain 
guarantees for minority groups to be represented in the National 
Assembly and other representative organizations. The Aborigines 
in Taiwan have guaranteed seats, as well as women. According 
to our constitution, women must have 10 percent of the seats in all 
levels of legislative bodies, which I understand is not the case in 
many countries. 
DR. CHIU: I want to call to your attention that in China there 
are some small minorities. They have representatives in the 
National Assembly. The Aborigines in Taiwan, for example, 
number only 200,000, and in order to be seated in the National 
Assembly you need 400,000. But they are guaranteed one seat. For 
instance, in the United States, if you have about 12 percent Black, 
if you use the Chinese formula, Blacks would be guaranteed at 
least 12 to 15 percent or 20 percent in the U.S. Congress. 
[Dr. Chiu then invited Professor James P. Chandler - the 
third discussant - for this session to speak.] 
PROF. CHANDLER: Dr. Chiu, I appreciate the invitation to 
come. I had other commitments in St. Louis which prevented me 
from leaving there until this morning. As I listened to the panel 
and I looked at the panel, I noted that except for the Chairman, 
they were economists and bankers and not international lawyers. 
But that is what I am- I am a professor of international law. The 
last question that was discussed by Dr. Wei, I should say, the 
second to the last question he discussed in response to a question 
concerning the future of the ROC in the year 2000, is of interest to 
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me. I have only two comments which I want to make in 
connection with that. First of all, in my travels in the Republic of 
China in Taiwan I have found a delightful and beautiful country, 
and I have found there an extremely hospitable and happy and 
contented people. This is significant, I think, in terms of our 
conceptions of international law, particularly as it relates to 
rights of self-determination. I think at bottom the question 
becomes whether or not the current evolution of relations between 
the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world 
will result in great harm to the existing state of the Republic of 
China. I think, under conventional ideas of international law, the 
right of a desirable people, in a desirable territory, to determine for 
themselves the type of government, the type of state, and the type 
of allegiance they will have, is a basic and a fundamental human 
right, and one that ought to be respected by the people in the 
Republic of China as well as the people in the People's Republic of 
China. So it is that principle of contemporary international law 
which should be of overriding importance here, and I think the 
current emphasis on the importance of individual rights at the 
national level in this country and its probable evolution in terms 
of its influence upon other states is undoubtedly to have an impact 
as yet unforeseeable upon the future prospects of the Republic of 
China. I want to commend Dr. Chiu for sponsoring this very fine 
conference and to thank all of you for coming. 
DR. CHIU: Thank you, Professor Chandler. You mentioned 
that you are an international lawyer. But I want to advise the 
audience that Professor Chandler is also a computer scientist. He 
is now putting out a book called Computers and the Law, to be 
published by the West Publishing Company, which is one of the 
leading law publishers. We can entertain one more question. 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: This concerns investment on 
Taiwan. Taiwan is apparently self-sufficient in generating 
capital. In the area of capital, does it really matter very much to 
the Taiwan people what kind of investments are made? 
MR. PILACHOWSKI: That is a very good and also a very 
difficult question. In regard to the statement that only five percent 
of private capital comes from outside sources, I personally believe 
that it is probably a bit optimistic to say that this part of outside 
capital is of the least importance. The types of projects the 
government is looking toward - and this is my personal view -
are going to need substantially more input from outside, not only 
in dollars but in the technology necessary to continue to expand. 
If you look at their trading partners in the area - Korea, Hong 
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Kong, Japan - the basic products are pretty much the same. 
What flight of capital would do to the economy of Taiwan is, 
again, very difficult to estimate. Obviously it would end the 
expansion of technical capabilities. In case of flight of capital, it 
would certainly hurt the economy of Taiwan; it's very difficult to 
put a dollar value on the actual economic impact that would result 
from the flight of capital. 
DR. WEI: I have a comment. Foreign investment has not only 
an economic meaning but also a political meaning for Taiwan, 
particularly investment by important, established companies in 
Taiwan. It imparts a feeling of security to overseas Chinese 
investors. Also the fact that a foreign company is willing to invest 
in Taiwan gives some assurance to local people and indicates 
something about an objective evaluation of Taiwan. In that light, 
foreign investment, although not very large in percentage terms, 
has a meaning. Capital flight is a wise decision if the country 
falls. If you transfer your capital out of the country and the 
country does not fall, you have had it. This actually occurred with 
a few people in Taiwan. There were a few people in Taiwan in 
1971 or 1972 who tried to get their capital out of Taiwan- but the 
problem is, Taiwan is a very favorable investment market. It has 
a good stable government, stable social environment, and 
relatively reasonable wages. Consider, for example, a textile 
factory owner with, say, 20 million NT, which is a small, but not 
too small, establishment in Taiwan: when he converts that money 
into U.S. dollars, it amounts to $500,000. He can only open one or 
two restaurants in the United States, that's all. What can he do 
with that? Therefore, when someone thinks of transferring to the 
United States, he only finds that his competition with the same 
factory is earning more money. So the final analysis is still the 
question of profits and the favorable environment, and that, I 
think, is probably a more crucial factor in determining whether 
capital will stay in Taiwan. 
PROF. PRYBYLA: That's like jumping over the Grand Canyon 
and finding yourself short (laughter). I think that, seriously, 
whatever the religion one is practicing at the moment, it is the 
kind of capital that I don't think Taiwan is at present capable of 
generating. They are moving to a very high-powered, very 
sophisticated skill-intensive technology. 
MR. Hsu: I just want to stress one point. We talk about 
capital. Capital actually has several meanings. For a wealthy 
Chinese industrialist who has made a lot of money in the past, 
well, he's sitting on the money, he doesn't know what to do. This 
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type of capital has little meaning on Taiwan economy. On the 
other hand, a foreign company is trying to make an equity 
investment in Taiwan - a loan that would bring in mass 
technology would be used quite differently. 
I also want to make a brief comment on the national 
emergency situation. We all recognize that change of legislation 
will take time. In the process, we also realize that many existing 
laws are not being enforced. So there are two separate issues, 
looking at the existence of certain laws and at what laws are 
being enforced. In other words, just reading in the law books there 
is a national mobilization act or a national emergency law, is 
quite different from saying as a fact how much these laws are 
enforced on a daily basis. 
DR. CHIU: Thank you. The afternoon session will start at 2:30 
p.m. sharp. The Chairperson will be Oliver Oldman, Learned 
Hand Professor of Law and Director of the International Tax 
Program at Harvard Law School. 
The first session ended at 12:30 p.m. 
Reported by Joyce Seunarine 
WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMI'ITED BY 
PROF. CHUNG-SEN YANG* AFTER 
THE CONFERENCE 
I would like to make some remarks on the question raised in 
the first session about the labor law and working conditions in the 
ROC. To improve the workmen's livelihood and welfare as a 
means to foster social security is set forth in the Constitution of 
ROC as the basic national policy. There is a great amount of labor 
legislation aimed at protecting the working conditions and 
promoting the welfare of the workers. The workmen's right to 
organize or join a labor union is not only protected but also made 
mandatory by the Labor Union Law. Certain unfair labor 
practices which might hinder the activities and development of 
* Professor of Law, National Chunghsing University, Taiwan; Visiting 
Scholar, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976-77. 
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labor unions on the part of the employers are prohibited with 
criminal sanctions. The Factory Law sets forth various safety and 
sanitation standards as well as minimum working conditions 
which every employer shall comply with. The contents of this law 
are pretty comprehensive. It covers, among other things, maxi-
mum working hours, minimum wage, allowance, overtime 
payment, fringe benefits, vacation and termination of contract. 
Among these provisions, one especially merits attention, namely, 
that the workers are entitled to participate through their 
representatives in the decision-making process of the fQ.ctory 
policies with their employers (Art. 49-55). In order to enforce this 
Factory Law, the government employs many factory examiners 
who have the duty of visiting periodically each factory to examine 
whether the legal requirements are observed. If there is any 
irregularity or violation on the part of the employer, the employer 
may be prosecuted and punished by the court. As far as I know, 
there have been a number of court cases in which certain factory 
owners were fined heavily by the court for failure to maintain the 
minimum sanitary facilities or for having the workers work 
beyond maximum working hours. 
Since 1960, the ROC government has enforced a compulsory 
insurance program for the workers so that they are insured 
against sickness, injury, disability, unemployment, old age, death 
and childbirth. This program has turned out to be very successful. 
As far as collective bargaining and labor disputes are 
concerned, the labor union may negotiate with the employer 
through the collective bargaining process (see the Law Concern-
ing Collective Agreement). If certain labor disputes should happen 
and both sides fail to reach an amicable settlement through 
conciliation, then the workers may go on strike according to Art. 
26 of the aforementioned Labor Union Law. However, a special 
law entitled Law Governing the Settlement of Disputes between 
Labor and Management provides that in a time of emergency any 
labor dispute shall resort to conciliation and arbitration and the 
employers are not allowed to shut down their factories nor are the 
workers permitted to go on strike (Art. 36, Sec. 2). Since at the 
present time the ROC is still facing the military threat of the PRC, 
the right to strike on the part of the workers is therefore 
temporarily suspended in order to assure industrial peace and 
internal stability. 
It is to be noted that the government agencies concerned in 
the ROC are not unmindful of the welfare of workmen. As a 
matter of fact, in the past years, the Ministry of Interior Mfairs 
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has endeavored to revise and codify the existing labor laws and 
regulations and bring them in line with those of the developed 
countries for the purpose of promoting considerably the welfare of 
laborers and giving them much better protection. However, such 
revisions may increase the costs of doing business and may have 
an adverse effect on the competitive power of the ROC's exports as 
well as on the incidence of foreign investment, which may in turn 
retard the economic prosperity in the ROC. Since at the present, 
the first priority for the ROC is to enhance industrial prosperity 
and economic development, the attempt to raise workers' benefits 
cannot but yield to the general national interest to a certain 
extent. 
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II. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF US-ROC 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
(2:3Q-5:00 p.m.) 
April 15, 1977 
The second session was opened by David Simon, Chairperson 
of the Conference. Mr. Simon welcomed the participants and 
introduced the Chairman of the second session, Oliver Oldman, 
Learned Hand Professor of Law and Director of the International 
Tax Program, Harvard Law School. 
Professor Oldman stressed the importance of legal incentives 
to investment and trade, in terms of tax advantages and 
flexibility in corporate options, as well as the importance of 
viewing the ROC not as an isolated entity but as an active 
member of the international trading community, with the rights 
and duties that accompany such membership. 
Following his introductory remarks, Professor Oldman 
introduced the session's first speaker, Norman Littell. Mr. Littell, 
who practices law in Washington, D.C., spoke of his experiences 
as drafter of the ROC's Foreign Investment Encouragement Law. 
[The following is the text of Mr. Littell's paper.] 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT ENCOURAGEMENT LAW 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA* 
NoRMAN M. LITTELL t 
While the United States expended nearly $23 billion of United 
States taxpayers' dollars between the end of World War II and 
1949, we learned by trial and error how to export our mightiest 
resource: the secret of the dynamic relationship that joins 
resources, manpower and capital investment to ensure production 
and employment. 
*An expansion of the present paper, providing a more complete exposition of 
the author's political views on the US-ROC experience, has been published: 123 
CoNG. R.Ec. 86804 (daily ed. April 29, 1977). 
tAttomey at Law, Washington, D.C. 
(67) 
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In creating the Economic Cooperation Administration 
through the ECA Act embodying the Marshall Plan, Congress 
sought to surmount the many obstacles preventing private 
enterprises and investment from going abroad, and adopted as a 
part of the Act the so-called Guarantee Clause for private 
investment abroad, offering to insure the investor for an approved 
American investment abroad against loss by (a) inconvertibility 
of foreign currency into dollars because of exchange and other 
restrictions, (b) loss through destruction by riot or revolution, and 
(c) war, for projects approved by ECA and the foreign government 
concerned on undertakings helpful to general recovery. 1 
It so happened that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
House and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate 
approved and adopted a draft of the "Guarantee Clause" 
submitted by the writer in testifying as Chairman of the Foreign 
Investment Committee of the International Bar Association (and 
successively thereafter as Chairman of a corresponding committee 
of the American Bar Association and of the Inter-American Bar 
Association). This ECA program worked so well that by 1959, a 
program was developed to bring many delegations from under-
developed countries to the United States in order for them to see 
the private enterprise system in operations by visiting chain 
stores, banks, factories, stock exchanges and other enterprises. 
Doubtless because of the above-mentioned background, the writer 
was asked by the Secretary of State to meet with each of these 
delegations during one day of their visit to the United State& to 
examine the foreign investment encouragement (or discourage-
ment) laws of their respective countries. 
This sounds like an assignment requiring great learning in 
foreign and international law but in meeting with these delega-
tions, having had advance briefing as to their laws and 
translations of the material parts, their legal restrictions on 
foreign investments were, generally speaking, so hopelessly 
impossible for a foreign investor to face or live with, that it was 
like shooting sitting ducks to tell the delegations (as diplomati-
cally as possible!) what was wrong with their laws. 
An alert and able group was from Taiwan.2 The delegation 
returned to Taiwan to draft the Foreign Investment Encourage-
1. See "Guarantee Idea," Fortune Magazine, Nov. 1949, by the writer. 
2. One member of the ROC group, the Honorable C. K. Yen, is now President 
of the Republic of China, succeeding the Honorable Chiang Kai-shek. Another 
member, the Honorable K. T. Li, became Minister of Finance and is now semi-
retired, because of ill health, as "Minister Without Portfolio." 
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ment Law of 1959. The new law as drafted was adopted by the 
Legislative Yuan, the elected "Congress" of Taiwan. 
Impracticability of some provisions of the law of 1959 soon 
became apparent. Request was made from Taiwan to Secretary of 
State Dulles to send the writer to Taiwan to help revise the 1959 
law. I was invited to go as consultant to the State Department. 
While under great pressure in other legal business, I agreed to use 
my vacation time to go to Taiwan, accompanied by Mrs. Littell, a 
member of the Bar of Louisiana and the Supreme Court of the 
United States. We went together during our vacation time in the 
summer of 1960. 
Without detailed discussion of the intensive redrafting period 
in Taiwan, it is sufficient to say that what became the "Foreign 
Investment Encouragement Law of 1961" took shape. The writer 
was the first "foreigner" to be invited to appear before the 
Legislative Yuan in order to explain the law, and he was also 
invited to the "White House" of Taiwan to see President Chiang 
Kai-shek for the same purpose. In the course of the latter 
discussion, the President said that he understood that I would like 
to visit Quemoy, which islands lying off the mainland of 
Communist China, together with Matsu, was under Nationalist 
control, but was under bombardment by the Communist People's 
Republic of China on alternate days. 
I readily seized the opportunity afforded by the Presi-
dent's very kind offer to provide transportation by plane, and in a 
small government plane landed at Quemoy on a day when 
bombing was not scheduled. On that day and on the alternate 
days when the Republic of China from the mainland was not 
sending real bombs, the air force from Taiwan "bombed" Quemoy 
and Matsu with leaflets showing on one day the picture .of clothes 
and their prices available in the free order of Taiwan, and on 
another day, yardage of goods-needed in all households, readily 
available in Taiwan ...and the low prices of such merchandise, 
together with all manner of products, including food readily 
available in the steadily rising standard of living on Taiwan. I 
mention the incident because it dramatized graphically the force 
and effect of private enterprise as a weapon in the arsenal of free 
government. 
The success of the Republic of China in bringing the fruits of 
the private enterprise system to Taiwan achieved a record in 
economic progress, temporarily interrupted by a world recession 
in 1974-75, but mounting to a gross rate of 10% annual increase in 
contrast to 7.2% in the ten years preceding the Foreign Investment 
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Encouragement Law (1953-62). While great credit must be given to 
the performance of the high productivity of the Chinese worker in 
the Republic of China's economy, and sound government 
management, American policy in encouraging foreign invest-
ments with its own guarantees of security, plus the incentives 
offered by the Chinese law, the percentage of gain in gross 
national production in 1976 attained 11.86%, surpassing the target 
of 6.4%. The Gross National Product was $17,145 million. In 
realistic terms, after allowance for inflation, the increase was 
11.86%, compared with 2.4% in 1975. 
Above all, getting down to the lives of individual citizens of 
Taiwan, the per capita income was $809, or an increase of 14.6% 
over 1975. 
All of which was aided and precipitated by a flow of private 
investments from abroad from the United States, the overseas 
Chinese, Japan, Europe, and a number of other countries.3 
Following the exodus of the Nationalist government from 
Mainland China in 1949 to Taiwan, there was a brief period in 
which world opinion was that Mainland Communist China 
represented the wave of the future, but under the dictum of 
President Chiang Kai-shek that "self-help was the best help," the 
government of the Republic of China on Taiwan grew to 
spectacular success. As Ambassador James C. H. Shen from the 
Republic of China to the United States stated to the 20th Century 
Club in Hartford, Connecticut, on December 2, 1976: 
The United States has played a major role in Taiwan's 
economic growth from its beginning. At a time when Free 
China was in dire need of help of many kinds, the United 
States provided us, shortly after our government was 
transferred to Taipei, with a liberal economic assistance 
program. Such aid continued for a period of 15 years, from 
1950 to 1965, totalling US$1.5 billion, which contributed 
considerably toward stabilizing Free China's currency and 
3. Statistical reports and releases of the U. S. State Dept., 1965-77. "Free 
China Weekly," Feb. 27, 1977, p. 3; "Free China's Strategy for Prosperity," Address 
by James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States, 
before the 20th Century Club, Hartford, Conn., Dec. 2, 1976; "U.S.-ROC Economic 
Cooperation, Past and Prospects" by the Hon. Leonard Ungar, U.S. Ambassador 
to the Republ.ic of China, Jan.-Feb. issue of International Business, March 9, 1977; 
Chinese Information Service release of Jan. 25, 1977. 
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helping to build up Taiwan from an agricultural economy to 
a semi-industrialized society.4 
The head of ECA aid to Taiwan from 1958 to 1960, Wesley 
Haraldson, said that the hard work of the Chinese people "fueled 
the rapid growth of Taiwan's economy .... I have never known a 
people who worked so hard as the people of Taiwan. It was 
amazing. And I never saw a hint of hanky-panky with our aid 
funds." 
So successful was this cooperative program between the 
United States and the Republic of China that it stands as a 
monumental lesson to our foreign aid policy - namely, that self-
help in the private enterprise system is the ultimate key to a sound 
economy. In 1965, the Republic of China was the first country to 
be dropped from our foreign aid appropriations. 5 
As Ambassador Shen rightly pointed out, American private 
industry took up where the American government aid left off, and 
in due time evolved specifically no less than 250 industrial 
projects, from the manufacture of automobiles to the production of 
plastic shoes, but with the largest segment being invested in 
electronic and chemical industries. 
Our former American Ambassador to the Republic of China, 
the Honorable Leonard Unger, was lavish in his praise of 
achievements on Taiwan in his article in the January/February 
1977, issue of International Business. 6 
Now, in overwhelming statistics and generalities as to the 
individual, we can note these sensational gains: The people in 
Taiwan are far better fed and clothed than in Mainland China. 
The individual calorie count exceeds 2,800 daily, up 37 calories for 
the past ten years, and the per capita daily consumption of protein 
has increased from 57.8 grams in 1962 to 74.8 in 1975.7 
4. Speech by James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the 
United States, before the 20th Century Club, Hartford, Conn., Dec. 2, 1976, entitled 
"Free China's Strategy for Prosperity," p. 5. 
5. See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help 
and Development, New York: Praeger, 1966. 
6. "U.S.-ROC Economic Cooperation: Past & Prospects," by U.S. Ambassador 
to Republic of China, Leonard Unger, Jan.-Feb. issue of International Business; 
March 9, 1977, Chinese Information Service release. 
7. Supra, note 4, p. 12. 
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Energies were not devoted entirely to material progress as 
indispensible for national survival, but every effort was made to 
fashion a viable free nation of cultural enlightenment and social 
justice, fostering democratic rule, cultivation of universal educa-
tion, advancement of social well-being, promotion of public health 
and revitalization of Chinese culture. 
In spite of the vulnerability of Taiwan as a subtropical 
country, normally spawning grounds for tropical diseases, 
Taiwan has succeeded in eliminating such Asiatic scourges as 
smallpox, malaria, cholera, typhoid fever and yellow fever. 
According to the World Health Organization, Taiwan has become 
"one of the healthiest places in Asia," increasing the life 
expectancy on Taiwan to an average of 66.7 years for men and 
72.2 for women, as compared to 41 years for men and 45.7 for 
women in 1945. The Constitution of the Republic of China charges 
the government with ·the responsibility of providing universal 
education, beginning at the age of nine with free education for all 
children. The attendence rate of children of school age has 
reached an all time high of 99.3% -possibly unequaled elsewhere 
in the world.8 
At the end of 1975, there were 3,400 schools of all levels, with 
an enrollment of 4.42 million students, or 27.4% of the entire 
population. Great strides have been made in the field of higher 
education; whereas there were only four college-level institutions 
in 1945, today there are about 100 universities and colleges. 
A vital facet of national life on Taiwan has been the effort 
made to foster human freedoms under the rule of law. Visiting 
American jurists noted that significantly impressive progress has 
been made in maximizing the basis for the people's enjoyment of 
all fundamental human rights. The people there enjoy the rights 
of free election, freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
freedom of the press, freedom of religion, the rights of private 
ownership, free choice of education and employment, freedom of 
travel and the rights of a free judiciary. 
The importance of the US-ROC economic interaction lies not 
so much in the outstanding growth which the ROC has 
experienced, as evidenced by the impressive statistics of the last 
fifteen years, but in the effect of that growth on the people of 
Taiwan and in the foreign policy lessons to be learned. As to the 
first lesson, the statistics do speak for themselves; there can be no 
8. Id. 
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doubt that, as a people, the Chinese in the ROC enjoy a level of 
existence that exceeds that in virtually every other developing 
country. The ROC's present policy, of shifting from labor- to 
technology-intensive production, will undoubtedly increase the 
ROC's standard of living even further, as Taiwan moves beyond 
the developing countries and joins the developed countries 
economically. 
But the foreign policy lessons are at least as important, 
especially from the U.S. point of view. Although the ROC remains 
strongly dependent on the United States as a trading partner, it is 
important that that dependence is grounded in trade for mutual 
benefit rather than on U.S. governmental largesse. The ROC's 
tum-around in this respect- from aid recipient to trading partner 
- is perhaps the most spectacular example of the success of the 
American free-enterprise system as expressed in American foreign 
policy. The American blend of public expenditures and private 
enterprise has ensured the survival of a nation that had teetered 
on the brink of absorption, has given Americans the benefits of a 
highly desirable trading partner, and has given the Taiwanese the 
benefits which accrue to a free and prosperous nation. It is 
important, in this period of re-evaluation of American policies 
with regard to China, to remember the successes and lessons of 
our experience with Taiwan. We must remember that the Chinese 
in Taiwan were willing partners in their development, neither 
subservient nor bullying, and that the key to the success of US-
ROC relations has been and continues to be the strong community 
of interest and mutuality of respect between the two nations. 
Surely, the Republic of China, the great experiment and exemplary 
success of the free-enterprise system in American foreign 
relations, should not be delivered up as an expendable pawn on an 
impersonal chessboard in the maneuverings between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China: the loss would simply 
be too great, in terms of the personal stake of the Taiwanese, in 
terms of America's moral options in world politics, and in light of 
what would be the vast contradictions between America's express 
belief in free enterprise and its spurning the very people who most 
relied on that belief, the Chinese in the ROC. 
Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Littell for his presentation 
setting the historical stage for the afternoon's session. He then 
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introduced Dr. Chun Li, who spoke on the lawyer's role in 
structuring trade and investment in the ROC. Dr. Li, who is an 
attorney in Taipei, outlined the principal tax advantages offered 
by the ROC for foreign investment and set forth the forms of 
corporate structure available to foreign investors, foreign traders, 
and enterprises wishing to establish resident agents on Taiwan. 
[The following is the text of Dr. Li's paper.] 
HOW TO STRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND 
TRADE OPERATIONS FOR AMERICANS 
IN THE ROC: A LAWYER'S 
EXPERIENCE 
CHUN LI* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In writing this paper, my sole purpose is to bring to the notice 
of prospective American investors and traders certain crucial 
aspects relating to investment and trade in the Republic of China 
(hereinafter ROC) from my many years' experience of private law 
practice in that country. 
Land and People 
As many are undoubtedly aware, the ROC used to be a huge 
national entity whose territory embraced the entire Mainland 
China and many outlying islands, large and small, including, 
among others, Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu and Penghu (the Pesca-
dores). In late 1949, following the Communist take-over of 
Mainland China, the government of the ROC moved its seat to 
Taiwan. At present, only Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu, and Penghu 
are under the effective control of that government, Taiwan being 
the largest land mass of all, on which over 95 percent of the ROC's 
population resides. 
For centuries Taiwan has been known to Westerners as 
Formosa, a name given by the 16th century Portuguese mariners 
who first occupied and administered the island following their 
* Attorney at Law, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China. 
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discovery. Subsequently, the island was taken over by the Chinese 
and renamed "Tai-Wan," meaning literally "terraced bay." In 
1887 Imperial China proclaimed it a province, formally bringing it 
within the ambit of the Chinese Empire. Upon China's defeat in 
the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan, 
thus becoming a Japanese colony. It was restored to China in 
1945 after World War II. Thereupon, it was made a province of the 
ROC. 
Shaped roughly like a tobacco leaf, Taiwan is 240 miles in 
length and 85 miles in width at its broadest point. It has a total 
land area of 13,885 square miles. Its present population is 
approximately 16 million, with an annual rate of increase at 
slightly less than two percent. 
Some comparison between Taiwan and mainland China 
might be of interest. Mainland China, with a total land area of 4.4 
million square miles, is 300 times the size and its massive people 
of 800 million 50 times the population of Taiwan. However, 
notwithstanding Mainland China's undisputed superiority in 
territorial space and manpower, it lags behind the ROC in the 
important areas of economic development and foreign trade. In 
1976 foreign trade of the ROC totalled US$15,760 million, while 
that of Mainland China was only US$13,400 million. 
Economic Development and 
Foreign Trade 
Since the early 1950s the people and government in Taiwan 
have made economic development their foremost national goal. 
Through a series of governmental processes which included a land 
reform program, basic social structural changes, many legislative 
enactments designed to encourage investment, credit revision, 
expansion and improvement of infrastructure, and upgrading of 
education, the economy of the ROC has prospered, so much so 
that today many leaders of the world community speak of her as a 
model of economic development among developing nations. 
Concomitantly, foreign trade of the ROC has expanded by leaps 
and bounds. The latest statistics of the International Monetary 
Fund lists her the twentieth among the world's trading countries. 
She is a major trading partner of the United States, being as of 
the present the twelfth on the list of America's trading partners. 
Two-way trade between the United States and the ROC in 1976 
amounted to over US$4.6 billion, with the latter enjoying a 
surplus of approximately US$1.3 billion. If trade between the two 
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countries keeps expanding, it is hopeful that the ROC will move 
up to the seventh or sixth place among U.S. trading partners 
within the next few years. 
Taiwan has been one of Asia's most attractive investment 
sites and it will remain so if the government's present 
development-oriented policy continues. Foreign investment since 
1952 totals US$1.405 billion. The United States is the single 
largest investor (US$470.04 million), followed by overseas Chinese 
(US$411.33 million), Japan (US$215.9 million) and European 
countries principally West Germany and the Netherlands 
(US$161.6 million). Since the energy crisis in late 1973, foreign 
investment has somewhat tapered off, but this is believed to be a 
transient phenomenon. As economies of major industrial powers 
are gradually recovering, it is expected that more foreign investors 
will come to the ROC to make investment in the years to come. 
II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ROC LEGAL SYSTEM 
AND MAJOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
REGULATING INVESTMENT 
AND TRADE 
Legal System 
Although ancient Chinese society was principally guided by 
the moral teachings of Confucius, law as a social institution was 
known to the Chinese as early as before the birth of Christ. 
China's first legal code, Fa Ching (The Canons of Law), dates 
back to 255-206 B.C. in the Ch'in dynasty. From then on down to 
the Ch'ing (Manchu) Government (1644-1911), all Chinese 
dynasties had their own codes oflaw. It should, however, be noted 
here that from today's point of view, these codes could hardly 
have been called law, as they were enacted without any form of 
legislative process. Largely penal in nature, they were actually 
fiats promulgated by the governor for control of the governed. 
In the closing years of the Ch'ing dynasty, because of China's 
repeated military defeats at the hands of foreign powers, 
agitations for constitutional, legal, social and industrial reforms 
gained nationwide momentum. Legal reforms were given top 
priority as the entire Chinese nation was pained by the 
humiliating effects of the extraterritorial rights imposed by the 
victorious powers. The Ch'ing Government made a special effort 
to formulate new laws to meet public demands, but before the 
work was completed, revolution broke out in 1912 causing the 
downfall of the Manchu dynasty. 
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After the establishment of the Chinese Republic, the work of 
law reform continued. In the initial stage assistance of Japanese 
legal scholars was sought. As Japanese law is by and large 
German and French oriented, so is ROC law. Up to the time the 
ROC Government evacuated to Taiwan in 1949, the nation had 
various modem statutory laws comparable to those in force in 
other civilized nations. 
Today the laws previously used in Mainland China remain in 
force in ROC-controlled territory. 
The ROC has three levels of courts. On the national level, 
there is the Supreme Court, which is the court of last resort. On 
the provincial level, there is the High Court, which is a court of 
intermediate appellate jurisdiction. The High Court may have one 
or more branches, depending upon the volume of judicial business 
that comes before it. On the local level, there is the District Court, 
a court of first instance having general jurisdiction in both civil 
and criminal cases. Attached to each court is a Public Procurator's 
Office staffed by one or more public procurators whose duty it is to 
investigate and prosecute criminal offenses on behalf of the State. 
The nation's chief public procurator is the Procurator-General, an 
executive official serving under the Minister of Justice. 
Like other foreigners, Americans in the ROC, except for those 
enjoying diplomatic privileges and immunities or those enjoying 
privileges and immunities under the Status of Forces Agreement, 
are all subject to the jurisdiction of ROC courts. ROC criminal law 
has both territorial and extraterritorial application. Thus, if a 
ROC national or foreigner commits a certain act outside the ROC 
which is an offense under her criminal law, such as counterfeiting 
ROC national currency, sedition or high treason, the actor is 
punishable by ROC law. Once he is in ROC territory, he can be 
arrested, prosecuted, tried, and convicted. 
There are no jury trials in ROC courts. For this reason, the 
judge is all powerful: he finds facts, rules on evidence, and renders 
judgment. The role of the lawyer in the courtroom is rather limited 
-a trial is in the main the judge's show. In this respect, the ROC 
judge very much resembles his counterpart in German courts. 
There are local bars and one national bar in the ROC. The 
national bar is an association of all local bars. ROC bars, 
however, are in fact lawyers' guilds, as, unlike bars in the United 
States, their membership is restricted to private law practitioners 
and does not extend to judges, public procurators, government 
attorneys and law professors. 
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Agencies Regulating Investment 
and Trade 
Foreign investment and trade are under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). A special agency by the 
name of Investment Screening Commission (ISC) was set up 
within the MOEA to screen and approve investment applications 
submitted by overseas Chinese and foreign nationals. A Vice-
Minister of the MOEA serves ex officio as Chairman ofth~ ISC, 
whose membership includes several officials at the vice-minister 
level of other ministries and representatives of the provincial and 
local governments. The ISC has a secretariat and a number of 
divisions, each charged with certain responsibilities of daily 
routine. Decisions, however, are made by the members of the 
Commission at meetings on a collective basis. 
For every investment application that has to do with 
manufacturing, the clearance of the Board of Industrial Develop-
ment, also an agency under the MOEA, is essential. The Board 
has responsibility for the overall planning of the nation's 
industrial development, so investment applications involving 
manufacturing activities are subject to its review. In fact, without 
its favorable recommendation a foreign investment application 
has little hope of being approved by the ISC. 
If a foreign investor desires to import from abroad equipment 
and raw materials for its own plant, his investment application 
will, as a rule, be forwarded by the ISC to the MOEA's Board of 
Foreign Trade (hereinafter BOFT) for review and recommenda-
tion. Invariably, the BOFT will require the foreign investor to 
purchase equipment and raw materials from the local market to 
the extent that they are available locally. What is more, it will 
refuse to permit the foreign investor to import used equipment 
from abroad for fear that foreign manufacturers would use the 
ROC as a dumping ground for obsolete equipment. Only in very 
exceptional cases where the foreign investor is able to support 
importation of used equipment with incontestable grounds will the 
BOFT make an exception to the above. 
On a more general level, the BOFT controls all imports and 
exports through its power to grant import and export licenses. 
Together with the Bureau of Commodity Inspection of the MOEA, 
it also exercises a certain degree of supervision over the quality of 
export merchandise. Occasionally, the BOFT, when requested to 
do so, will go out of its way to mediate in disputes between the 
local purchaser and the foreign supplier and vice versa. 
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Mention should also be made of still another agency under the 
MOEA which, though not regulatory in nature, stands promi-
nently in the government hierarchy insofar as foreign investment 
is concerned. That agency is the Industrial Development and 
Investment Center (IDIC), created solely to provide assistance to 
foreign investors. The IDIC maintains overseas offices in half a 
dozen major cities around the world, including New York City, 
Chicago, Los Angeles and Frankfurt. These offices furnish 
information to and assist prospective investors in identifying 
investment possibilities in the ROC. 
The Ministry of Finance also plays an important role in the 
administration of foreign investment. Many tax incentives, 
including those of tax exemption and accelerated depreciation of 
fixed assets, fall within its jurisdiction. Other investment 
inducing benefits, such as free importation of equipment, five-year 
deferred payment or installment payment of import duty, tax 
rebates for raw materials used for export products, establishment 
of bonded warehouses or factories, and so on, also must receive its 
approval. Of all the Ministry's powers the greatest is, perhaps, 
that of determining what products should be accorded the status 
of encouraged products, thus entitling them to five years tax 
exemption. In this connection, attention is called to the fact that 
not every product manufactured by the investor's plant is eligible 
for the tax holiday; the Ministry has prescribed certain criteria 
which products must meet in order to qualify therefor. Reference 
will be made to such criteria elsewhere in this paper when the 
subject of foreign investment is to be treated in more detail. 
At the provincial level, the Department of Reconstruction of 
the Taiwan Provincial Government is the agency with which 
foreign investors will come into the most frequent contact. This 
agency is responsible for the licensing of all factories in Taiwan 
save those situated within the Municipality of Taipei, which has 
its own Bureau of Reconstruction to do the job. The Provincial 
Department of Reconstruction has one other important function, 
that is, classifying land and issuing industrial land certificates 
without which factories will not be permitted to be established. 
This function is, however, rarely exercised by the Bureau of 
Reconstruction of the Municipality of Taipei, as land within the 
city limits is too expensive to be used for factories. 
Occasions may arise when foreign investors are called upon to 
deal with the local governments within whose jurisdictions they 
keep business offices or factories of their invested enterprises. 
Clothed with no decision-making or supervisory powers, these 
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local governments are not regulatory agencies and they treat 
foreign invested enterprises the same way as they would any local 
enterprises. 
III. THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
AND TRADE 
Local lawyers specializing in investment and international 
business transactions ought to be a valuable asset to the foreign · 
investor or trader. As a common practice, American investors or 
traders used to retain their own American lawyers for consulta-
tion on legal matters. This is certainly fine at home, but several 
considerations weigh against the use of American lawyers in the 
ROC. In the first place, American lawyers usually do not speak, 
read, or understand enough of the Chinese language to be capable 
of effectively handling their clients' legal business. Second, it 
cannot be expected that they possess a thorough knowledge of the 
local laws and regulations applicable to foreign investment and 
trade. Third, not being brought up in a Chinese environment, they 
usually lack that degree of tactfulness which is characteristic of 
the Chinese in the course of human relations. Of all these 
qualifications the last is particularly important in terms of 
accomplishment of objectives in Chinese society, but it apparently 
cannot be acquired through learning processes. Thus, it is perhaps 
to the advantage of the American investor or trader to utilize the 
services of a local lawyer to handle for him matters relating to 
investment or trade in the ROC. A most ideal arrangement, which 
has in fact been widely adopted by American investors or traders, 
is to employ a local lawyer to work with their own American 
counsel. By so doing, the local lawyer complements the work of 
the American counsel, with the client getting the benefit of the 
legal talents of both. 
The local lawyer's role should not be limited to handling legal 
technicalities for his clients. It does not take much legal expertise 
. to fill out a foreign investment application or application for 
import or export license, even though it is required to be written in 
the Chinese language. What should be the first and foremost 
requirement for the local lawyer is to help his clients map out 
investment strategies. For instance, he should be able to advise 
his clients as to whether a small equity with a large loan from the 
parent company is a better mode of investment than a large 
equity investment without a loan, or whether loaning equipment 
by the parent company to the subsidiary enterprise is a more 
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flexible arrangement than an outright cash equity investment in 
times of fast technological or other changes. Advice such as this is 
crucial to the investor in the sense that it will help him arrive at a 
correct decision so that he can set his venture on a proper course 
at its very beginning. 
It is not even unusual for American investors or traders to 
consult with their local lawyers on business issues. To generalize 
here the kind of advice sought by them is both impractical and 
impossible, but a couple of examples may throw some light on the 
nature of questions they commonly ask. They may, for instance, 
be concerned with the pricing of their export products and ask 
whether it should be at a higher or lower level because of possible 
consequences upon their present or future tax liabilities. They 
may also ask whether purchase of raw materials from local 
sources is, in regard to cost and in other respects, more desirable 
than importation from abroad. Quite obviously, not every local 
lawyer is competent to answer such questions, as they call for 
some familiarity with the client's business as well as a fair 
knowledge of general business know-how. These examples 
nevertheless give some indication of the whole spectrum of 
services the local lawyer may be called on to perform. 
If the American investor or trader is not physically present in 
the host country, the local lawyer may have to act as his 
representative. In this capacity, the local lawyer will conduct 
negotiations with the client's business counterparts or officials of 
gov~rnment agencies on behalf of his absentee principal. He will 
thus· be more than the investor's or trader's attorney; in a truer 
sense, he will become the latter's business agent. 
Last, but not least, the local lawyer will at times serve as 
interpreter for his American clients, most of whom do not speak 
the Chinese language. While English is the second language for 
the majority of the educated sector of the ROC population, it is 
deemed advisable and prudent for the American investor or trader 
to use his Chinese lawyer as interpreter in conversation with his 
business counterparts or government officials, particularly when 
matters of legal importance are involved. 
At present, there are in the ROC a dozen or so law 
practitioners who not only have excellent English language 
capability but also received legal training in the United States, 
some being holders of the J.D. degree. These lawyers are generally 
competent for legal service to American investors and traders. 
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IV. INVESTMENT 
Not all American investors or traders have the same business 
objectives in the ROC. Some are attracted to the country by the 
favorable investment climate there and they desire to set up 
factories to manufacture products for sale to local consumers or 
for export, or both. Others are interested in purchasing merchan-
dise from local producers and exporting it to the United States 
and/or other areas, and vice versa. Still others simply want to 
send a representative to the ROC and have him stationed there for 
liaison purposes, such as doing market research, supervising 
execution of purchase orders by local suppliers, maintaining 
contact with prospective customers, and so on. Depending on the 
objectives of a particular client, the local lawyer's role is to advise 
him on the proper approach to take and to assist him in the 
structuring of his operations within the legal framework of the 
ROC. 
From what has been stated, it may be appropriate to classify 
the business objectives of American investors and traders in the 
ROC, according to their nature, into two major categories, i.e., 
investment and trade. Representatives of American business 
establishments sent to and stationed in the ROC are sui generis, 
having little to do with either investment or trade. They· perform, 
nevertheless, a pattern of activities quite commonly adopted by 
American companies, thus deserving some treatment as a 
separate and distinct category. The main object of the writer, as 
previously stated, is to deal with certain crucial legal aspects. 
relating to foreign investment and trade. 
Foreign Investment - Legal Definition 
and Scope 
To the layman, investment may conceptually mean a variety 
of business undertakings: setting up a factory for manufacture of 
products, forming a company to carry on trade, purchasing real 
estate, buying stocks and bonds, and the like. The writer had the 
personal experience of being asked on one occasion by an 
American businessman to assist him in making an "investment," 
as he called it, in the ROC by opening a steak house. 
The legal definition of investment can, of course, be markedly 
different. Under the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, 
promulgated July 14, 1954, and last amended June 22, 1968 
(hereinafter SIFN), investment has a restricted meaning. Only the 
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establishment of one of the following enterprises will be treated 
legally as foreign investment: (i) productive or manufacturing 
enterprises capable of meeting domestic needs; (ii) enterprises 
whose products have export markets; (iii) enterprises which will 
foster the development and improvement of the nation's major 
industries, including mining and communications industries; and 
(iv) other industries which will benefit the nation's economic and 
social development. Thus, it is clear that not every type of 
business is open to foreign investors. The dominant theme is 
production and manufacture, since the government policy With 
respect to foreign investment is primarily oriented toward 
national economic development. 
When legal assistance is sought by an American client on a 
specific investment project in the ROC, the local lawyer should 
first carefully look into the client's plans to see whether the 
proposed project can qualify for foreign investment. In this 
regard, a few key questions should be asked. Will the investment 
provide import-substitutes needed for domestic consumption? Will 
the investment produce export items to improve the nation's trade 
balance and generate more foreign exchange earnings? Will the 
investment tend to develop or improve the nation's important 
industries, including mining and communications industries? If 
the answers to the above are all in the negative, then ask a last 
question: Will. the investment be in any way beneficial to the 
economic and social development of the nation? This last question 
is broad enough to provide a leeway through which a good case 
may be made for the client's project, as any direct financial 
investment is bound to result in some benefit to the economic and 
social development of the host country. 
The SIFN provides certain privileges and benefits for foreign 
investors, such as repatriation of invested capital, outbound 
remittance of net profit, guarantee against requisition or expropri-
ation, waiver of nationality and residence requirements, and so 
on. Attention is, however, called to the fact that the SIFN itself 
contains no provisions of tax benefits which for practically every 
foreign investor are a major incentive. Tax benefits are provided 
in the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (hereinafter SEI), 
a statute applicable to both national and foreign investors. These 
include a five-year tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed 
assets, a maximum rate of business income tax, import duty 
exemption or five-year deferred payment of import duty on capital 
equipment, and many other lesser benefits. 
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It is overridingly important to point out that even though a 
proposed project of a foreign investor approved by the government 
may qualify for foreign investment, it does not necessarily mean 
that it will be entitled to the tax holiday or accelerated 
depreciation of fixed assets under the SEI. Only certain enter-
prises prescribed in government executive orders published from 
time to time may enjoy such benefits, subject to the further 
condition that they meet certain procedural requirements. The 
prescription of these enterprises is officially designated "Catego-
ries and Criteria of Productive Enterprises Eligible for Encourage-
ment." The local lawyer must check carefully to see whether the 
particular investment project proposed by the client falls within 
the prescribed categories and meets the prescribed criteria. 
The latest categories and criteria, amended and published by 
the Executive Yuan, the nation's highest administrative body, on 
April 28, 1975,* list 14 categories of enterprises with various 
criteria as being entitled to encouragement treatment in the form 
of a tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed assets. The 
principal categocy is manufacturing industries, which include: 
food processing industry, paper industry, rubber processing 
industry, chemical industry, processing industry of non-metallic 
minerals, basic metals manufacturing industry, machinery 
manufacturing industry, electrical equipment manufacturing 
industry, electronics industry, transportation equipment manufac-
turing industry, ceramic industry, textile industry, building and 
prefabricated materials manufacturing industry, and other 
manufacturing industries (such as clinical and surgical instru-
ments; photographic and optical instruments, watches, clocks, 
and their parts and assemblies; etc.). The other 13 categories of 
encouraged industries are: handicraft industry, mining jndustry, 
agricultural industry, forestry industry, fishery industry, animal 
husbandry industry, transportation industry, warehousing indus-
try, public utilities industry, public housing construction industry, 
enterprises providing technical services, enterprises engaged in 
tourist hotel operations, and heavy equipment construction 
industry. For each industry the government prescribed certain 
criteria of which a detailed description here is infeasible due to 
limited space. 
* Editors' Note: The Statute for Encouragement of Investment was again 
amended on July 26, 1977. The English translation is available from the Chinese 
Investment and Trade Office in New York, see p. 22 supra. 
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In addition to the above, the form of organization of the 
invested business is also a key factor in the granting of the tax 
holiday or the accelerated depreciation of fixed assets or other 
prescribed benefits. The SEI (Art. 3) explicitly stipulates that to 
qualify for productive enterprises within the contemplation of the 
"Categories and Criteria of Productive Enterprises Eligible for 
Encouragement," each invested enterprise must be organized as a 
company limited by shares in accordance with the Company Law. 
In structure and legal ramifications a company limited by shares 
is more or less similar to an American corporation, but it does 
have some unique features which are worthy of note from the 
standpoint of the American investor. These features are briefly 
stated below. 
1. There must be seven or more incorporators, more than 
one-half of whom must have their domiciles within the ROC (Art. 
128, para. 1). This domicile requirement is, however, waived in the 
case of foreign investment. Both corporate persons and natural 
persons can be incorporators. Thus, if X corporation, a Delaware 
corporation, makes an investment in the ROC and organizes a 
wholly owned subsidiary under the Company Law, then X 
corporation itself can be an incorporator. To meet the requirement 
of a minimum of seven incorporators, it will have to nominate six 
or more other persons, corporate and/ or natural, but preferably its 
employees, to be incorporators. To qualify for waiver of the 
domicile requirement, however, such persons must join the 
principal investor in applying for recognition of their status as co-
investors. 
2. The company must have, at least, three directors elected 
from among its stockholders (Art. 192; para. 1). The latter 
qualification means that to be eligible for election to a director-
ship, one must, at least, own one share of stock. Since a corporate 
investor cannot act by itself, it will have to appoint one or more 
representatives to represent and act for it as stockholder, and such 
representatives will be eligible for election to directorships. The 
Company Law does not require directors to have ROC nationality, 
nor does it require them to keep their residence in the ROC. It 
does, however, require the chairman of the board of directors to 
have both ROC nationality and residence, but again such 
requirements are waived in the case of foreign investment. The 
86 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
term of office of directors cannot be longer than three years, but 
they are eligible for reelection (Art. 195, para. 1). 
3. Directors must attend board meetings personally, except 
that the articles of incorporation of a company may provide that 
one director may by written authorization appoint another 
director as his proxy to attend board meetings on his behalf (Art. 
205). No director, however, may act as proxy for more than one 
other director. Each director is entitled to one vote. 
4. A company limited by shares may, but is not required to, 
have a number of executive directors elected from among the 
directors. They meet regularly when the board of directors are in 
recess to make decisions on corporate business and affairs. The 
Company Law requires a majority of executive directors to have 
their residence in the ROC, but if they are foreign investors or co-
investors, such requirement is waived under the SIFN. 
5. The chairman of the board of directors, elected from 
among the directors or executive directors, as the case may be, is 
the legal representative of the company vis-a-vis the outsider. He 
presides over board and stockholders meetings. He must be an 
ROC national and have his legal residence in the ROC. Both 
requirements are, however, waived if the company is a foreign 
investment company. 
6. The Company Law requires a company limited by shares 
to have, at least, one supervisor elected from among the 
stockholders. If a company has more than one supervisor, at least 
one of them must be an ROC resident. Again, this requirement is 
waived in the case of foreign investment. The institution of 
supervisorship is of continental origin. Both the German Commer-
cial Code and the Japanese Commercial Code have similar 
provisions. Under the Company Law the structure of a company 
limited by shares contemplates three direct sources of power and 
control: the stockholders, the directors and the supervisor. The 
directors, whose functions are executive in nature, are solely 
responsible for the management and business operations of the 
company. The supervisor, on the other hand, represents the 
stockholders in overseeing the work of the management and the 
financial condition of the company. One of his primary functions 
is to check on the financial reports prepared by the board of 
directors before they are submitted to the annual stockholders 
meeting. Although the directors are legally bound to respond to 
the requirements of the supervisor and to supply to him full 
information concerning the business operations and financial 
condition of the company, the ultimate controlling authority 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 87 
remains the stockholders, who may not only remove directors and 
the supervisor through their voting power, but may also make 
policy decisions and declare dividends. In actual practice, 
however, the stockholders rarely, if ever, do so and tend to rubber 
stamp recommendations of the directors on matters relating to 
company policies and dividend distribution. 
7. The president and vice president of the company must be 
ROC residents, although they need not be ROC nationals (Art. 29, 
para. 4, and Art. 39). This means that if the investor desires to 
appoint a foreigner to be president or vice president of his invested 
company, the appointee must take up his residence in the ROC. 
This, in turn, means that the appointee must enter the ROC with 
an entry visa, as only this type of visa will make it possible for 
him to apply for resident status in the ROC. 
8. To require stockholders or board meetings to be held 
within the ROC would cause much inconvenience to foreign 
investors, even though modern air transportation has considera-
bly reduced the distance between the various continents. For 
convenience sake, the articles of incorporation may provide the 
holding of stockholders and board meetings outside the ROC. 
Local Participation 
To prevent foreign dominance of national economy, most 
developing countries require some degree of local participation in 
foreign investment. Either a foreign invested enterprise should be 
joined by indigenous partners at the time of its initiation, or 
indigenous partners should be allowed to participate in the . 
enterprise after it has been in operation for a certain number of 
years. In general, the ROC Government, even at this .date, still 
allows foreign investors to freely set up 100 percent self-owned 
subsidiaries. However, it does require local participation in certain 
selected industries. The basic metals manufacturing industry, 
considered crucially important for national economic and other 
development, is, for example, one such industry; no foreign 
investor or investors may own more than 40 percent of total equity 
except in cases where special approval has been granted by the 
ISC. Local participation is also required for the electronics 
industry, but wholly owned subsidiaries are permitted if all their 
products are intended for export. In the pork processing industry 
local equity participation is prescribed at 50 percent at the 
minimum. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, if an invested enterprise is 
100 percent foreign owned, the ROC Government may require the 
transfer to local people of a designated percentage of equity 
ownership after a limited number of years. When such dilution of 
foreign equity ownership is required, the percentage of capital 
stock to be transferred and the time limit within which the 
transfer should take place are invariably prescribed in the 
investment approval granted by the ISC. 
Joint Ventures with Local Partners 
Most American investors seem to prefer wholly owned 
subsidiaries to joint ventures with local partners, largely out of a 
desire to run their business without interference from any non-
governmental third parties. Where a wholly owned subsidiary is 
impermissible and joint venture the only answer, the negotiation 
and drafting of a joint venture agreement becomes vital to the 
interests of the foreign investor. In this connection, the local 
lawyer will have an important role to play. As a law pr~ctitioner 
specialized in foreign investment, the writer wishes to offer the 
following for the consideration of American investors interested in 
joint ventures in the ROC: 
1. In the absence of a required percentage of local equity 
ownership, it will be a distinct advantage for the American 
investor to own 51 percent or more of the total equity of the 
invested enterprise. In the first place, his investment will then be 
guaranteed by law (Art. 15 of the SIFN) against government 
requisition or expropriation within 20 years from the date of 
commencement of operation of the invested enterprise as long as 
he maintains a minimum ownership of 51 percent of the total 
capital stock. Secondly, he will have a majority vote - thus a 
bigger voice - at the stockholders meeting. Because the 
stockholders are the ultimate authority and controlling body of a 
company limited by shares under the Company Law, this will in 
turn assure him of firm, if not absolute, control of the business. 
2. How many persons each ·party can nominate and have 
elected to the board of directors is vitally important for corporate 
decision making, for resolutions at board meetings are adopted by 
a majority vote in number of the directors, each director, as noted 
before, being entitled to one vote regardless of the amount of stock 
owned by hjm. The nurp.ber of directors controlled by each party 
becomes all the more important in the appointment of the 
president of the company, which is legally effectual only by the 
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concurrence of a majority of the directors. It is quite common for 
joint venture partners to agree upon and set forth in their joint 
venture agreement the respective numbers of directors they each 
shall be entitled to nominate and have elected to the board as well 
as the party which shall have the right to nominate the president. 
Most American investors also like to reserve to themselves the 
right to nominate the plant manager and the controller because of 
the importance of these positions to the success of their ventures. 
A suitable provision to this effect in the joint venture agreement 
will prevent possible controversies over the issue from arising 
between the partners. 
3. The partners should agree upon the place or places where 
stockholders and board meetings are to be held. As non-
indigenous investors and their nominated non-indigenous co-
investors cannot visit the ROC too often, a provision in the joint 
venture agreement that such meetings may, if requested, be held 
outside the ROC should be of advantage to them. To ensure full 
compliance by local partners with such a provision, it is desirable 
to have it written into the articles of incorporation. 
4. The mode of settling possible controversies between the 
partners is one aspect deserving the closest attention of the 
American investor. Joint ventures are usually business undertak-
ings of long duration, and there is no guarantee that the 
American investor and his local partner or partners will see eye to 
eye on everything with respect to the business and operations of 
the joint venture. To provide in the joint venture agreement how 
differences or controversies arising between the parties out of, or 
relating to how their joint venture should be settled, ought to be a 
prudent and necessary step. Largely due to their cultural 
background, local people are loath to fight legal battles whether in 
ROC or foreign courts. Their centuries-old preferred dispute-
settling methods are reconciliation and arbitration. In recent 
years there has been witnessed a growing tendency among 
American investors favoring arbitration in the United States or a 
third country in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association or the rules of conciliation and arbitration 
of the International Chamber of Commerce at Paris, and this is 
permissible under the ROC law if the local partner or partners 
agree. Under Article 8 of the Statute for Technical Cooperation, 
where a dispute should arise out of technical cooperation, it shall 
be settled in accordance with the arbitration method as agreed 
upon between the parties. Thus, if a certain foreign investment 
has a licensing arrangement, i.e., supply by the foreign investor of 
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technical know-how to the invested enterprise on a royalty basis, 
the inclusion of an arbitration Clause in the licensing agreement is 
mandatory. 
Whether arbitration awards rendered outside the ROC will be 
honored by ROC courts is surely a matter of deep concern for the 
American investor. There is no precise legal provision, nor do 
there exist any precedents, on this point. The law on the 
enforceability of foreign judgments may, however, provide some 
assistance in ascertaining the possible judicial attitude with 
respect thereto. Under Article 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
the validity of a judgment of a foreign court will not be recognized 
by ROC courts if one of the following elements is present: (i) such 
judgment is not res judicata; (ii) according to the laws of the ROC 
the foreign court rendering the judgment did not have a valid 
basis for exercising jurisdiction over the case; (iii) such judgment 
is considered incompatible with the public order and good morals 
of the Republic; and (iv) judgments of courts of the ROC are not 
reciprocally recognized by the foreign court rendering the 
judgment. It is believed that when a foreign investor applies to an 
ROC court for execution on a foreign arbitral award the court will 
probably refrain from subjecting the award to a review on its 
merits, but that the possibility of the court applying some of the 
criteria applicable to foreign judgments cannot be totally ruled 
out. 
5. The American investor and his local partner or partners 
are free to agree upon a law governing their legal relationship 
under their joint venture agreement. Under Article 6 of the Law 
Governing Application of Laws in Cases Involving Foreign 
Persons, contracting parties are permitted to choose any applica-
ble law to govern their contracts. Most American investors wish to 
choose laws of the State of New York as governing law, and this is 
acceptable to the ROC authorities provided the choice is not 
imposed upon the local partner or partners against their free will 
and provided, further, that none of the provisions of the joint 
venture agreement are against ROC laws or public policy. 
6. Joint venture agreements may be written in the English 
language. The ROC authorities, including the ISC and other 
regulatory agencies, will accept English language agreements if 
Chinese translations are attached thereto. It should, however, be 
brought to the attention of the American investor that if he signs 
a joint venture agreement in the United States, his signature must 
be notarized at the nearest ROC Consulate in order for the 
instrument to be effectual in the ROC. The signatures of signers of 
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joint venture agreements executed elsewhere other than in the 
ROC must likewise be notarized either at an ROC Consulate or by 
an ROC representative if there exists no ROC Consulate in the 
area. 
Tax Benefits 
It has become an established practice for developing countries 
to offer certain benefits to investors as an incentive to investment. 
The ROC follows this practice. Of the many benefits granted to 
domestic and foreign investors under the SEI, the following are 
worthy of particular mention. 
A productive enterprise newly established and eligible for 
encouragement in accordance with the "Categories and Criteria" 
prescribed by the government, as referred to above, is entitled to 
apply for a five-year income tax exemption starting from the date 
of the first sale of its products or the date services were first 
rendered, as the case may be, or for accelerated depreciation of the 
fixed assets of its plant, which must be either imported or entirely 
new. In his investment application the investor must state what 
his choice is as between these two options. If his election is 
accelerated depreciation, the useful lives of fixed assets for the 
stated purposes shall be determined as follows: (i) for machinery 
and equipment, if the useful lives prescribed by the tax authorities 
are 10 years or more, they may be accelerated to 5 years; if the 
prescribed useful lives are less than 10 years, they may be reduced 
to one half of the prescribed number of years; and (ii) for 
buildings, installations, or communication or transportation 
equipment, their useful lives may be reduced to one-third of the 
prescribed number of years. 
When an existing productive enterprise eligible for encourage-
ment expands its productive equipment to increase the quantity of 
its products or capacity of its services, it is entitled to apply for a 
four-year income tax exemption or accelerated depreciation of the 
fixed assets of its plant, which, also, must be imported or entirely 
new. Only that portion of the income which is derived from the 
production of expanded plant facilities is tax exempt and only 
expanded plant facilities can be depreciated on an accelerated 
basis. The same useful lives of originally acquired fixed assets for 
accelerated purposes apply to expanded plant facilities. 
Under the SEI, as last amended D"ecember 30, 1974* 
maximum rates of business income tax payable by productive 
* See Editors' Note p. 84 supra. 
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enterprises not eligible for tax holiday or after termination of tax 
holiday are as follows: 
Maximum Income Tax Rates 
(Percentage of 
Categories of Enterprises Total Annual Income) 
(a) Productive enterprises in general which 
started operation on or before December 
31, 1973, or which were approved on or 
before December 31, 1973, but started 
operation before December 31, 1975, or at 
a government approved later date 25% 
(b) Productive enterprises employing more 
advanced technology, using more dura-
ble equipment and running greater 
business risks with delayed profit expec-
tancies, which started operation on or 
before December 31, 1973, or which were 
approved on or before that date and 
started operation before December 31, 
1975, or at a government approved later 
date 22% 
(c) Productive enterprises in general, ap-
proved after January 1, 1974 30% 
(d) Productive enterprises engaged in the 
manufacture of basic metals or heavy 
machinery, petrochemical industries, and 
capital- or technology-intensive indus-
tries, approved after January 1, 1974 22% 
By comparison, the present rate of business income tax for 
ordinary profit-seeking enterprises, that is, enterprises not eligible 
for encouragement, is 35 percent of the excess of taxable income 
over NT$500,000. 
The investor may also benefit from certain provisions with 
respect to import duties on machinery and equipment used for his 
plant. Under Article 27, paragraph 2, of the SEI, a limited number 
of approved productive enterprises (such as steel, aluminum 
refining, copper refining, electrical engineering, electronics, 
machine making, shipbuilding, chemical, textile dyeing and 
finishing, coal mining, and garbage treatment), if they meet the 
"Categories and Criteria" referred to above, may apply for duty-
free importation of machinery and equipment used for their plants 
under an investment project or a subsequent expansion project 
approved by the government. Machinery and equipment for which 
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a duty exemption may be granted are limited to those which 
cannot be supplied by domestic manufacturers. 
Less favorable than free importation is five-year deferred 
payment of import duties on machinery and equipment. Under 
Article 27 of the Customs Duty Law, a 100 percent export-oriented 
invested enterprise organized as a company limited by shares 
which makes substantial contributions to domestic economic 
development or applies advanced technology is permitted to defer 
the payment of import duties on machinery and equipment used 
for its plant under a government approved project for five years, 
subject to a satisfactory guarantee for the deferred payment being 
furnished to the customs authorities. As of the present, only the 
following industries are eligible for such benefits: steel, aluminum 
and copper, electrical engineering, electronics, machine making, 
automobiles and parts, shipbuilding, chemical, petroleum, mining, 
precision instruments, metal processing, lumber processing, 
rubber, and food. Most American invested electronics companies 
in the ROC took advantage of this benefit, which in its net effect 
is a five-year non-interest-bearing loan from the government to 
the investor. 
If a productive enterprise importing machinery and equip-
ment for its plant qualifies neither for duty exemption nor five-
year duty deferral, it may well seek an installment payment of 
import duties under Article 27, paragraph 1, of the SEI. 
Depending upon the amount levied, the importer may normally 
pay import duties in 12 to 30 equal monthly installments, secured 
by a satisfactory guarantee. The first installment payment is due 
one year from the date of commencement of operation or the date 
that services were first rendered. 
The Regulations Governing Tax Rebates of Export Products 
provide benefits to export factories by way of exemption of import 
duties and commodity tax on raw materials used for export 
products. Briefly stated, the exemption may be realized through 
one of the following arrangements: 
a. If duties, surtax, harbor dues and commodity tax 
(wherever applicable) have been paid on raw materials at the time 
of importation, a refund may be claimed when processed products 
are re-exported; 
b. Duties, surtax and harbor dues may be owed on credit, to 
be offset against the raw material content of the processed 
products re-exported with a prescribed time; 
94 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
c. Imported raw materials may be stored in a bonded 
warehouse inside the importer's factory; and 
d. Imported raw materials may be stored in the importer's 
bonded factory under the supervision of either a designated 
bonding agency or the customs authorities. 
Other Privileges and Benefits 
In addition to the above, foreign investors are entitled to a 
number of other privileges and benefits which are not granted to 
nationals. Under Article 12 of the SIFN, two years after 
completion of his investment project, the foreign investor may 
apply for necessary foreign exchange to repatriate, on an annual 
basis, 15 percent of his invested capital. Repatriation must be 
applied for not later than the end of June of the year immediately 
succeeding the year in which the privilege accrues. The investor 
may, however, with the permission of the Central Bank of China 
(CBC), the nation's foreign exchange controlling agency, postpone 
a particular repatriation for one year if funds are needed by his 
invested enterprise as working capital, but other than this the 
repatriation privilege is non-cumulative. 
Under the same Article, profit earned from investment may be 
remitted by the foreign investor out of the country yearly with no 
limitation of amount. Applications for such remittance must be 
submitted to the CBC within six months from the date tax 
liabilities of the invested enterprise were determined by the tax 
office. Like capital repatriation, the foreign investor may, with the 
permission of the CBC, keep the profit as working capital for the 
invested enterprise for one year, beyond which his privilege for 
that particular remittance will lapse. 
One thing must not slip from the foreign investor's notice. 
Although one's invested enterprise may enjoy a tax holiday, he 
himself remains subject to personal income tax as a non-resident 
on the dividend earned from his investment. While an ordinary 
non-resident is taxed at the rate of 35 percent on dividends or 
other profit distributions received from ROC sources, favorable 
treatment is accorded the foreign investor. According to Article 17 
of the SEI, the withholding tax rate is 15 percent for those foreign 
investors whose investment applications were approved by the 
government on or before December 31, 1973, and 20 percent for 
those foreign investors who received government approval of their 
investment applications on or after January 1, 1974. As for the 
latter, the non-resident taxpayer is entitled to claim a refund in 
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the event he cannot make use of the entire 20 percent paid as a tax 
credit in the country of his domicile. The refundable amount, 
nevertheless, is limited to the excess of the 20 percent tax over 15 
percent, or the excess over the rate which can be claimed as tax 
credit in the country of his domicile, whichever is smaller in 
amount. 
Statutory protection is given to foreign investment from 
government requisition or expropriation. Under Article 14 of the 
SIFN, if the total amount of foreign equity investment of an 
enterprise is less than 51 percent of its total registered capital, the 
enterprise cannot be requisitioned or expropriated except where it 
is required by national defense and then only with payment of 
reasonable compensation. The government is obligated to make 
available the necessary foreign exchange to the foreign investor 
at any time desired by him for remitting such compensation out of 
the country. 
As already mentioned before, as long as the foreign investor's 
equity investment in his invested enterprise is maintained at 51 
percent or more of its total registered capital, there can be no 
requisition or expropriation of the enterprise by the government 
on any ground whatsoever. As this is a statutory guarantee, the 
government is legally bound to honor its commitment. 
Incidentally, the ROC is a signatory to the International 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Legislative 
action has been taken by the ROC government for the implemen-
tation of the said convention in the ROC. Under a statute passed 
by the Legislative Yuan, which is the ROC's national legislative 
body, and promulgated by the President on December 21, 1968, 
ROC courts are required to grant compulsory execution on any 
arbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of the 
said convention. 
Investment Procedures 
Any foreign investor desirous of making an investment in the 
ROC should file a Foreign Nationals Investment Application 
(FNIA) with the ISC, except for the establishment of an export 
enterprise in one of the Export Processing Zones, in which case an 
application should be filed with the MOEA's Export Processing 
Zones Administration. Application forms are obtainable from the 
Chinese Investment and Trade Office in New York City (515 
Madison Avenue) or any ROC Consulate in the United States. 
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One oft-asked question is how long it will take to get an 
investment application approved by the screening agency. Under 
Article 7 of the SIFN, if an application submitted by the foreign 
investor is complete in every respect and accompanied by all 
required supporting documents, such as the certificate of legal 
personality or certificate of nationality of the applicant, the 
certificates of nationality of natural-person co-investors, and 
power of attorney for the local lawyer, all duly consularized, the 
screening agency must act upon it and make a decision not later 
than four months from the date of its filing. In actual fact, if the 
foreign investor hires a competent local lawyer who is capable of 
writing a legally correct and comprehensive application, it is not 
impossible to obtain a decision in less than two months. 
The approval of the screening agency, in its net value, is an 
approval in principle with six months validity only. In other 
words, the government by its approval merely grants the investor 
the privilege to apply for establishment of his proposed enterprise 
within a six-month period. During the period, the investor must 
take necessary steps to cause the approved capital to be remitted 
into the country, to organize and register his invested company, to 
apply for importation of capital equipment and raw materials, 
and to commence the construction of his plant. In the event he 
fails to take all these steps within this six month period, the 
government may, if it sees fit, revoke its prior approval. Such 
being the case, if the investor anticipates that he will be unable to 
implement his approved investment plans within six months from 
the date of the government approval, and he does not want to 
forfeit his privilege of investment either, he should apply to the 
original screening agency for an extension of the investment 
implementation period well in advance of its expiration. Such 
application for extension will normally be granted on good cause 
shown. But, unless circumstances are exceptional, no more than 
two extensions will be granted in one single case. Thus, all told, 
the investor has a total of 18 months at his disposal to implement 
his investment plans. 
A word on the power of attorney granted to the local lawyer 
by the foreign investor. It should be a general power of attorney, 
granting him authority and powers to do any and all acts and to 
make and submit any and all . applications to all relevant 
governmental agencies, whether at the central, provincial or local 
level, on behalf of the investor in connection with- his proposed 
investment in the ROC. Moreover, it should include a substitution 
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clause, as this will give the appointed local attorney the power to 
appoint a substitute or substitutes in case of necessity. 
V. TRADE 
Trade is a much simpler subject than foreign investment. 
Notwithstanding her diplomatic reverses in recent years, trade is 
being carried on presently by the ROC with over 100 members of 
the international community. Among the ROC's major trading 
partners, the United States not only maintains diplomatic 
relations with her but is also a close ally. The two countries have a 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between them-
selves, signed in Nanking on November 4, 1946, which contains a 
provision permitting citizens of each country to carry on trade 
throughout the whole extent of the territory of the other (Art. II). 
By contrast, Japan, Canada, West Germany and Hong Kong have 
no diplomatic relations with the ROC, but the absence thereof 
does not seem to have had any negative effect on the trade 
activities between one territorial unit and the other. Indeed, to the 
amazement of many, since the ROC's termination of diplomatic 
relations with Japan, trade volume between the two countries has 
been steadily on the increase. Just to give some idea of their 
expanding trade volume, in 1976 the ROC exported US$1,090 
million worth of goods to Japan and imported from her US$2,442 
million worth, with an unfavorable balance of US$1,352 million. 
ROC trade with the United States in the same year fared much 
better than with Japan, with sales at US$3,010.7 million and 
purchases at US$1,802.3 million, thus leaving a balance of 
US$1,208.4 million in the ROC's favor. A fair guess is that as her 
economy steadily grows, the ROC will buy more from the United 
States in the years ahead. 
Modes of Trade Operation 
Two principal modes are generally used by Americans or 
other foreign nationals for carrying on trade in the ROC. One is 
the establishment of a company limited by shares under the 
Company Law with some participation of ROC nationals. To form 
such a company, which will be on~ of ROC nationality, no Foreign 
Nationals Investment Application is required to be filed with the 
ISC, for such investment - if it can be called investment at all -
is not a foreign investment within the definition of the SIFN. The 
minimum capital requirement for this type of company varies 
with its business, the highest being NT$500,000,000 and the 
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lowest NT$500,000. If the capitalization of a company is 
NT$20,000,000 or more, the application for incorporation should 
be filed with the MOEA. If it is below NT$20,000,000, the 
application should be filed with the Bureau of Reconstruction of 
the city or county where the principal business office of the 
company is located. 
At the risk of being repetitious, let it be mentioned here that a 
company limited by shares must have at least seven incorpora-
tors, three directors, and one supervisor, all of whom must own at 
least one share of stock. It must also have a chairman of its board 
of directors elected from among the directors. Whereas the SIFN 
expressly waives the nationality and residence requirements for 
board chairman and the residence requirement for incorporators 
and executive directors of foreign investment companies, there are 
no such waivers in the case of companies organized by foreign 
nationals for trading purposes. At least one half of the incorpora-
tors and the supervisor, or one of the supervisors if the company 
has more than one supervisor, must be domiciled in the ROC. If 
the company has executive directors, at least one half of them 
must also have their domiciles in the ROC. 
Through the vehicle of nominees, the minimum number of 
seven incorporators can be easily met. Until now the govern-
ment's liberal policy with respect to local participation for 
companies engaged in trade remains unchanged. There is no hard 
and fast rule concerning a minimum percentage of capital stock 
that must be owned by ROC nationals. The government will 
license a company if there is more than nominal local capital 
participation. 
Companies so formed will be ROC companies and, as such, 
will be entitled to the same treatment as is accorded to any ROC 
companies organized and existing under the Company Law. They 
will, however, not be entitled to repatriation of capital, remittance 
of profit, and the other privileges and benefits under the SIFN. In 
spite of this, some Americans still look with favor upon this form 
of organization because it has the distinct advantage of insulating 
the parent company from liabilities that might arise out of doing 
business in the ROC. 
The other method is for a foreign corporation to establish a 
branch in the ROC. In such case, it is legally identified as a 
branch of a foreign company. Several conditions, enumerated 
below, must be fulfilled before the branch can open for business. 
1. The foreign corporation must adopt a Chinese corporate 
name, normally a literal translation of its English name or name 
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in another language, which must not only indicate the type of 
business organization but also the nationality of the corporation. 
2. The foreign corporation must first apply to the MOEA for 
recognition of its foreign corporate personality and obtain a 
certificate of recognition. This certificate will entitle the recog-
nized foreign corporation to act within the ROC boundaries. 
3. The foreign corporation must remit into the ROC at the 
time of establishment of its branch a minimum amount of 
NT$500,000 as the branch's operating funds. At no time during its 
existence will the branch be permitted to solicit from the public 
subscriptions to the stock or float bonds or other securities of the 
foreign corporation. 
4. The foreign corporation must appoint an ROC national or 
resident foreigner as its attorney in fact and legal representative 
in the ROC to represent it in litigations and non-litigious matters 
and to receive service of legal process on its behalf. 
Only when all the above conditions have been fully met will 
the foreign corporation be permitted to establish its branch and 
commence business operations in the ROC. Within 15 days of the 
date of its establishment, the branch must apply to the MOEA for 
a corporate license. It may only carry on such businesses in the 
ROC as are registered with and specified in the corporate license 
granted by the MOEA. The branch may be headed by a foreign 
national, subject to the requirement that he maintain a residence 
in the ROC. 
A branch of a foreign corporation is permitted under Article 
19 of the Land Law to purchase and own land in the ROC to the 
extent necessary for the carrying out of its business objectives. 
This legal provision, however, is governed in its actual operation 
by the principle of reciprocity. That is to say, only branches of 
foreign corporations whose own States of incorporation permit 
ROC nationals to purchase and own land in their own territory 
may be granted the same privileges in the ROC. 
A foreign corporation having a branch in the ROC has no 
privilege to repatriate the operating funds it remitted in at the 
time of establishment of its branch. Furthermore, profit earned by 
the branch cannot be remitted out of the country. This is, 
nevertheless, offset to some degree by an established practice 
whereby the tax office, on application, will permit branches of 
foreign corporations to remit abroad, on a yearly basis, an 
approved amount of foreign exchange to contribute to the 
overhead of their head offices. 
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Import and Export Control 
Import and export in the ROC are under government control. 
Within the MOEA there have been established a policy-making 
body called the International Trade Commission (lTC) and an 
administrative body called the Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT), 
which has been mentioned previously. These two agencies are 
charged with the important responsibilities of trade development 
and administration of foreign trade. 
Succinctly stated, imports and exports are classified into three 
main categories: (i) permissible items, (ii) controlled items and (iii) 
prohibited items. Depending upon domestic production and 
international market conditions, classification of import and 
export merchandise is subject to constant review and adjustment 
by the lTC and the BOFT. Basic rules for imports and exports are 
provided in the Regulations Governing Classification and Control 
of Imports and Exports, last amended and published by the 
MOEA on June 14, 1973, which importers and exporters should 
familiarize themselves with. 
The mere fact that an ROC company or branch of a foreign 
corporation has come into being does not mean that it can 
automatically engage itself in import or export business, or both. 
To be able to do so, it must qualify for and register itself as a 
Trader and obtain a Trader license from the BOFT. Necessary 
qualifications for registration of a Trader include the following: (i) 
having an export performance record of at least US$200,000 for 
the year immediately preceding the filing of the application 
(certain foreign exchange earned by exporters is assignable which 
the applicant for a Trader license can buy at the prevailing 
market rate); (ii) having a registered paid-up capital of not less 
than NT$2,000,000; and (iii) having a permanent busines~ office 
of its own. If the paid-up capital of the company is over 
NT$100,000,000, the requirement for export performance record 
may be waived by special approval of the BOFT. 
In principle, imports of Traders are limited to permissible 
items. When they import, licenses must first be obtained from the 
BOFT. Controlled items may, nevertheless, be imported by 
Traders when specially authorized by the BOFT. 
Traders may export permissible items by applying directly to 
any of the several government appointed foreign exchange banks. 
For controlled items, however, prior approval must be obtained 
from the BOFT. It should be noted here that export of permissible 
items to countries which enforce import quotas · is subject to 
special regulation by the BOFT. 
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VI. REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
If a foreign corporation does not intend to make investment or 
actually engage in trade in the ROC, but only wishes to do certain 
acts there, such as monitoring trade opportunities, supervising 
execution of its purchase orders by local manufacturers, advertis-
ing its products in local newspapers or through other mass media, 
or giving technical advice or assistance to local purchasers of its 
equipment or materials, a most economical and convenient way of 
achieving these objectives is to send a Representative to the ROC. 
This is permitted by Article 386 of the Company Law. The foreign 
corporation may also authorize its Representative to bring suits 
and receive service of legal process in the ROC on its behalf. 
A Representative of a foreign corporation is permitted to 
maintain an office with a limited staff to assist him in the 
performance of his duties, but he must not carry on business 
transactions. Business transactions, if any, must be conducted 
directly between his principal, the foreign corporation which 
sends him, and the local purchaser. His position is thus very much 
like that of a business correspondent. Furthermore, he must not 
receive payments from his principal's local customers. All 
expenses of his office, including salaries for himself and members 
of his staff and other necessary expenditures, must be remitted in 
by his principal from abroad, and he is required to report such 
remittances to the Bureau of Foreign Exchange of the CBC on a 
monthly basis for record purposes. 
As to tax liabilities, the principal of the Representative is free 
of any ROC taxes as long as transactions are concluded, contracts 
signed, and payments made outside the ROC. Every care should 
therefore be taken by the Representative to see that he does 
nothing that could possibly be interpreted by the local tax office 
as constituting doing business in the ROC. The Representative 
himself and members of his staff are subject to personal income 
tax as any other residents of the ROC. 
The sending of a Representative to the ROC requires an 
application to be filed with the MOEA, giving the name of the 
foreign corporation which sends the Representative, the name, 
nationality and other personal data of the Representative, and the 
juristic acts and/ or the scope of activities he is authorized by his 
principal to do in the ROC. The application must be accompanied 
by certain supporting documents, such as the certificate of legal 
personality of the applicant, a certified transcript of the board 
resolution authorizing the sending of the Representative, the 
power of attorney granted to the Representative, and so on. Mter 
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a written approval is received from the MOEA, the Representative 
can officially function and legally do all the authorized acts in the 
ROC. 
A Representative of a foreign corporation need not be a 
foreign national. If a foreign corporation so wishes, it may 
appoint. a local person as its Representative. American corpora-
tions, however, normally prefer to send Americans as their 
Representatives because of faster entry and exit processing by 
using the American passport. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
How well a local lawyer can help his American clients 
structure their investment and trade operations in the ROC 
depends to a considerable. extent upon certain qualities of the 
lawyer. A prerequisite for him is, of course, an adequate 
knowledge of the English language, both written and spoken. 
While interpreters can always provide a bridge, direct communica-
tion between the lawyer and the client is considered essential, not 
only because of the lawyer-and-client privity but also because of 
the absolute need of meeting of minds in terms of the client's 
objectives. Unless the lawyer understands fully and clearly what 
the client wants to do in the ROC, there is no assurance that he 
can structure the latter's operations satisfactorily. Since much of 
the communication will be through the telex machine and by 
letters, written English is even more important than spoken 
English. The lawyer must have at his command a sufficient 
vocabulary of both legal and business terms. An additional 
arsenal of accounting terms is desirable and useful, but not 
necessary. 
It is absolutely essential that the lawyer be thoroughly 
familiar with the laws and regulations of the ROC applicable to 
investment and trade, particularly foreign investment. His legal 
expertise will be put to an acid test when he is initially called upon 
to prepare a FNIA. A knowledgeable lawyer, after having 
ascertained the client's objectives, will usually be able to work out 
an investment plan tailored to the client's needs and then write a 
flawless application that will ensure its early approval by the ISC. 
On the other hand, if the legal knowledge of the lawyer in such 
field is inadequate, chances are that he may miss something in 
the application, thus either delaying its approval due to the 
necessity of amendment or causing the loss to the client of a 
certain benefit or benefits. With regard to the latter, a good case in 
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point is where the scenario of the client's investment in fact meets 
the requirements for a five-year deferred payment of import duties 
on capital equipment, but this benefit is denied to him because of 
the failure of the lawyer to apply therefor. For a major investment 
project, this could mean a very large sum of money in terms of 
loss of interest. 
Equally important is the lawyer's experience. In an invest-
ment case, the lawyer's professional duties do not end with the 
submission of the FNIA; unless his arrangement with the client 
dictates otherwise, he must go on to take care of many other 
important legal matters including organization of the company, 
importation of equipment and raw materials, and the obtaining of 
a factory license for the plant. Even after the plant has been in 
operation, matters requiring the attention of the lawyer continue 
to spring up. Although by local practice paper work for the 
application for tax holiday or accelerated depreciation of fixed 
assets is within the realm of the CPA's duties, the lawyer's advice 
may be needed hy the client on legal issues pertaining thereto. It 
is possible that the client may desire to add some new products to 
the production lines of his plant, thus requiring the lawyer's 
assistance in preparing and submitting an additional FNIA to the 
ISC. Also, investment equity may have to be increased as a result 
of expansion of manufacturing facilities, necessitating approval 
by the ISC and consequent recapitalization. These are but a few 
examples demonstrating the wide spectrum of work the lawyer 
may be.called upon to perform. They are, nonetheless, sufficient to 
bring home to the investor the point that an experienced local 
lawyer who knows the entire spectrum of the investment process 
is indeed essential for the successful completion of his investment. 
Some background of the investor's business at home will help 
the lawyer in the performance of his duties, particularly in the 
initial stage of his employment when investment plans are being 
worked out by him with data supplied by the investor. As foreign 
investment in the ROC is, in general, gradually shifting from 
labor-intensive to technology-oriented products, it is quite likely 
that in a particular case the local lawyer may know nothing or 
very little about the investor's business or the products he is going 
to manufacture in the ROC. If this is the case, it will be desirable 
for the investor to brief the lawyer along these lines so that the 
latter will acquire a clear notion of the client's business as well as 
his investment objectives. The importance of this cannot be 
overemphasized as the categorization of the investor's products 
will ultimately affect their eligibility for tax holiday or accelerated 
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depreciation of fixed assets, which is a major incentive to most 
investors. 
In the actual selection of business form, the lawyer's 
recommendation will naturally be by and large dictated by the 
client's objectives. Past record indicates unequivocally that an 
option favored by the overwhelming majority of Americans 
seeking business opportunities in the ROC has been foreign 
investment. This is understandable in view of the many 
substantial privileges and benefits conferred by the SEI, the 
SIFN, and the other applicable laws and egulations. With this 
end in view, if the client is prepared to set up some sort of 
manufacturing facilities in the ROC through equity investment, 
the local lawyer should to the extent possible invoke every legal 
support to structure his venture as a foreign investment, so as to 
help him maximize his values . 
. From the standpoint of the host government, large equity 
investment is perhaps the most welcome, and the reason for this is 
not far to seek. In his own interest, however, the foreign investor 
may want to structure his investment with a small equity and a 
large loan. Loans may be obtained from either domestic or foreign 
sources, but one aspect deserving special attention is that the 
ROC government permits foreign investors to make investment in 
the form of loan to their invested enterprises. This makes it 
possible for the foreign investor to substitute loan for cash equity 
with accompanying benefits of interest payment and shorter 
repatriation period. 
A technical and management service agreement between the 
foreign investor and his invested enterprise providing payment by 
the latter to the former of a lump-sum fee is another subtle form of 
accelerated repatriation of capital worthy of exploration. In recent 
years the host government has adopted a more stringent policy as 
regards such agreements. It is, nevertheless, one area which the 
local lawyer should look into in the course of planning investment 
strategy for the client. 
Trade is a lesser and much simpler approach. The establish-
ment of a company or branch of a foreign ·corporation under the 
ROC Company Law does not involve much legal complexity 
insofar as the application process is concerned. Furthermore, the 
Trader license is also not difficult to obtain provided the 
prescription of the required US$200,000 export performance record 
is duly complied with. Subject to the existing applicable regula-
tions, foreign Traders can import and export commodities as 
business exigencies call for. It is not uncommon for them to enter 
CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 105 
into long-term output/supply contracts with local manufacturers 
in order to guard against disruption of supplies. Lack of privilege 
of outbound remittance of profit is a bit annoying. But most 
foreign Traders do not seem to be overly bothered by this, as they 
can either use their profit for paying such expenditures as air 
tickets and hotel bills of visitors, expansion or decoration of 
business offices and the like, or deposit the same in a bank 
savings account. 
Sending Representatives to the ROC was once a popular 
approach among foreign corporations because of its distinct merit 
of tax immunity. Due to abuses by some foreign corporations, the 
host government has lately tightened supervision over such 
establishments. American corporations which have sent or intend 
to send Representatives to the ROC will do themselves a great 
service by requiring the latter to strictly refrain from any kind of 
business activity while in the host country. As stated previously, 
business transactions, if any, must be conducted directly between 
the local customer and the Representative's principal. 
Professor Oldman thanked Dr. Li for his detailed and 
complete presentation, and introduced the session's third princi-
pal speaker, Mr. Myron Solter. Mr. Solter, an attorney in 
Washington, D.C., spoke on the legal resolution of export trade 
disputes, a topic that has taken on great significance following 
the passage of the Trade Act of 1974 and the strengthened role of 
the U.S. International Trade Commission. 
[The following is the text of Mr. Salter's paper.] 
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LEGAL RESOLUTION OF EXPORT TRADE 
DISPUTES WITH THE REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 
MYRON SOLTER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When an underdeveloped country blessed with an intelligent 
and energetic population and favored with a skillful and dedicated 
government adopts a course of economic development, its export 
growth inevitably collides with the business and labor groups 
producing competing products in the receiving countries. 
For the Republic of China, the initial collisions between 
exports from Taiwan and domestic industry began about fifteen 
years ago, with plywood and mushrooms, and have intensified 
since. Presently under attack in the United States are such 
important products as footwear, TV receivers, textiles, solid-state 
watches, and a number of lesser articles. With continued 
expansion of exports to the United States from the Republic of 
China, future collisions may be expected, both as renewals of 
attacks against present export products, and as new products are 
developed and become significant factors in the United States 
market. 
The scope of this paper is therefore directed to the legal 
mechanisms in the United States by which these economic 
conflicts are resolved. 
II. SOURCES OF APPLICABLE LAW 
A. International Sources 
1. US-ROC Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation 
(FCN) 
It is this bilateral treaty which serves as the framework for 
U.S. trade relations with the ROC. It provides, inter alia, for most-
favored-nation treatment in matters affecting imports. 
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The Republic of China is not a member of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and therefore does not 
benefit directly from the rights and privileges enjoyed by GATT 
signatories. 
*Partner, Bregman, Abell, Solter & Kay, Washington, D. C. 
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However, to the extent that the United States must resolve its 
trade conflicts with GAIT members within the framework of that 
body, in multination trade disputes involving both the Republic of 
China and one or more GAIT members, the Republic of China 
receives indirectly the benefit of United States-GAIT resolutions 
by virtue of most-favored-nation treatment under the FCN treaty. 
Not all GATI benefits pass to the Republic of China in this way; 
e.g., it is doubtful whether, after restriction of its exports to the 
United States, the Republic of China would be entitled to 
compensation or retaliation vis-a-vis the United States under the 
GATT rules. Similarly, in a trade dispute involving the United 
States and the Republic of China alone, the United States is not 
obliged to apply the GATI rules, but only the less comprehensive 
articles of the FCN treaty. 
3. Special International Agreements 
Special international agreements, either bilateral or multilat-
eral, are a not infrequent device for resolving trade disputes. The 
most significant such agreement presently in force is the 
Multifiber Textile Trade Agreement, under which the United 
States has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with 
exporting countries, including the Republic of China, limiting the 
quantity of textiles which may be exported to the United States. 
4. Voluntary Restraint Assurances 
A useful device sometimes used to resolve trade disputes on an 
informal basis is the giving of "assurances" by the government of 
an exporting country to the United States, usually in the form of a 
memorandum of understanding, that it will restrain its exports for 
a period of time to a stipulated level. While it-is doubtful that such 
assurances constitute law in the sense of treaties or executive 
agreements, the device can enable more flexible solutions than 
can be achieved under the formal legal means. An example of its 
use with the ROC was to restrain the level of canned mushroom 
exports to the United States in 1968 and again in 1976. 
B. Domestic Sources 
1. Legislation 
With Congress reposes the principal constitutional authority 
to regulate foreign trade. Congress can, and from time to time 
does, pass legislation increasing import duties in response to 
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domestic industry pleas. One example of a significant such bill 
currently under consideration, which would adversely affect 
exports from Taiwan to the United States, is H. R. 14600 (94th 
Congress) to impose very large duty increases on solid state 
watches and parts thereof. 
2. Antidumping 
The Antidumping Act of 1921, and the regulations issued 
thereunder, require that when it is determined that imports have 
been sold at "less than fair value," and that the articles· thus 
imported have caused injury to the domestic industry, an 
additional duty equal to the dumping margin will be assessed. 
Procedurally, the Treasury Department conducts an investigation 
during six months from the date of its Antidumping Proceeding 
Notice, which initiates the matter, to determine the existence of 
sales at less than fair value. If Treasury finds the existence of 
such sales, it forwards the matter to the International Trade 
Commission (lTC), which conducts a three month investigation to 
determine whether the dumped imports have caused injury to the 
domestic industry. If the lTC so finds, it returns the matter to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, who thereupon issues a dumping order. 
The existence of an antidumping order can seriously inhibit 
the growth of exports. For example, an order applying to clear 
sheet glass from Taiwan issued in 1971. Despite the best efforts of 
the manufacturer to remove all possibility of dumping margins, 
by revising its home market and export pricing, uncertainties 
concerning United States Customs administration under the order 
have discouraged would be importers, and exports of clear sheet 
glass from Taiwan have been seriously impaired. 
An antidumping proceeding notice against PVC sheet and 
film from Taiwan was issued on April 1, 1977. The Antidumping 
Act thus remains a serious threat to export expansion from the 
Republic of China. 
3. Countervailing Duty 
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides that when the 
government of an exporting country bestows a "grant or bounty" 
upon exports to the United States, an additional duty equal to the 
amount of the subsidy will be imposed. 
The Republic of China, similarly to many other developing 
countries, offers a number of governmental incentives to encour-
age new investment in productive enterprises. If such encourage-
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ment measures are to be deemed to constitute subsidization of 
exports to the United States, the resulting countervailing duty 
burden could become a major barrier to the Republic of China's 
export growth. 
Presently or recently before the Treasury Department, which 
administers the countervailing duty statute, are three cases on 
articles from Taiwan: non-rubber footwear, bicycles, and hand-
bags. All are based on claims by the domestic petitioners that the 
Republic of China's investment encouragement measures consti-
tute countervailable export subsidization. While final determina-
tion has not been issued as yet in bicycles and handbags, it 
appears from tentative determinations in these cases that 
Treasury will probably finally determine the following incentives 
not to constitute countervailable grants or bounties: 
(a) Reduction in foreign exchange commissions charged by 
banks in converting currency. 
(b) Reduction in import license fees charged by banks for the 
obtaining of an import license. 
(c) Exemption from the business tax (a gross receipts tax) on 
export sales. 
(d) Reduction in the stamp tax on export documents. 
(e) Suspension of interest charged by banks on bills of 
exchange and letters of credit. 
(f) Resumption of duty remissions on imported raw mate-
rials and component parts which reflects internationally 
accepted principles of "drawback" on such items. 
(g) Suspension of harbor dues on exported items. 
(h) Suspension of airport safety dues. 
(i) Increase in processing loss ratios for purposes of duty 
drawback. 
Treasury will probably find that the following incentives do 
constitute grants or bounties: 
(a) Loans at preferential rates of interest for the purchase of 
equipment by manufacturers and short-term export 
financing. 
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(b) Exemption from income taxes, deed taxes and customs 
duties on imported capital items for firms located in 
Export Processing Zones. 
(c) Income tax holidays for newly established firms granted 
under the Statute for Encouragement of Investment. 
However, it appears likely that as applied to exports of bicycles 
and handbags, the impact of these measures on stimulating 
exports to the United States has been de minimis, and that 
countervailing duties will therefore not be assessed. 
4. Escape Clause 
The most significant legal mechanism by which domestic 
industries can seek protection from import competition is the 
"escape clause" found in sections 201-203 of the Trade Act of 
1974. Under this authority, upon petition by an interested group, a 
request by the President, or upon its own motion, the lTC 
conducts a six month investigation to determine with respect to 
the imported article whether: 
(a) Imports are increasing; 
(b) The domestic industry producing like or directly competi-
tive articles is being seriously injured, or is threatened 
with serious injury; and 
(c) The increased imports are a substantial cause of the 
serious injury. 
If the lTC so finds, it reports its findings to the President together 
with its recommendation of the quantum of import restriction 
necessary to remedy the injury, and its opinion on whether 
adjustment assistance would provide a remedy. 
Within 60 days after receipt of the ITC's report and 
recommendations, the President must determine whether and to 
what extent he will grant import relief and/or adjustment 
assistance. The President is not bound to follow the recommenda-
tion of the lTC, but, being guided by the total interest, may 
provide (1) a duty increase, (2) a tariff rate quota, (3) an absolute 
quota, (4) negotiate orderly marketing agreements, (5) take any 
combination of these actions, or (6) take no restrictive action. If 
his action differs from the ITC's recommendation, the Congress 
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may within 90 days override the President's determination by a 
concurrent resolution of both houses. 
Since first implemented in domestic law as section 7 of the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, the escape clause has 
been the device most used by domestic industries to attack import 
competition. It is more flexible than the other statutory remedies, 
since the President may tailor the final result to policy and 
international considerations with which the more narrow determi-
nations of the lTC are not concerned. 
Plywood and canned mushrooms were the first Republic of 
China products to be attacked via the escape clause in the early 
1960s. Since then the escape clause investigations have been 
directed to canned asparagus, sheet glass, footwear (twice), TV 
receivers (twice), canned mushrooms (twice), marble products, 
sugar, and presently cast iron cookware and stoves, all of which 
are important elements in the Republic of China's exports to the 
United States. 
5. Unfair Trade Practices in International Trade 
Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, upon petition, the 
ITC conducts an adjudicatory proceeding to determine whether 
there exists in connection with the importation of an article 
"unfair methods of competition and unfair acts . . . the effect or 
tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an 
industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United 
States or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to 
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States." 
If the lTC finds a violation, it may bar the offending article from 
entry or may issue cease and desist orders. The President can 
revoke the ITC's orders for public policy reasons. 
When this statute was first enacted in 1922, it was hailed as 
the foreign trade counterpart of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. However, in the past, this mechanism has been applied 
virtually exclusively to articles claimed to infringe the United 
States letters patent. 
An example of its application to Republic of China exports 
was the recent exclusion of reclosable plastic bags for patent 
infringement. It does not represent a serious threat to the Republic 
of China's export expansion as long as it is applied only to cases 
of patent infringement. However, there is now pending before the 
ITC a section 337 case against TV receivers imported from Japan, 
which is based solely on allegations of unfair practices. If the ITC 
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should find affirmatively for the petitioners in this case, it would 
represent a very considerable extension of the jurisdiction of the 
United States antitrust laws beyond the scope hitherto allowed 
them. 
III. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
The hypothesis stated at the outset of this paper makes it 
highly probable that trade disputes between export industries in 
the Republic of China and the comp.eting industries in the United 
States will expand as the Republic of China's exports grow. There 
is no doubt that increasingly recourse will be had by domestic 
interests to the protective mechanisms outlined above. However, 
the aggregate outcome of these disputes, in addition to the case-to-
case merits, will be determined very substantially by two extra-
legal factors: United States foreign trade policy and the Republic 
of China governmental policy toward such disputes. 
A. United States Foreign Trade Policy 
As of this time, only one major trade case has been decided by 
the Carter Administration, but its implications give a fair 
appreciation of the policy direction in which the Carter Adminis-
tration may move. This is the non-rubber footwear escape clause 
case. Involving some $2 billion in trade annually, it is economi-
cally important. Due to the geographic dispersal of footwear 
factories in the United States and the long protection-seeking 
effort of the industry, it is politically important. The lTC had 
recommended a tariff-rate quota which would have had a very 
depressing effect on footwear imports. President Carter chose, 
however, to take the least restrictive action, that of announcing 
that he would seek orderly marketing agreements with the 
Republic of China, which by the way is the largest import 
supplier, and Korea. The policy thus indicated is one of reluctance 
to impose unilateral trade restraints, and to seek instead solutions 
based on negotiation. 
B. Policy of the Government of the 
Republic of China 
Some industries in Taiwan such as the mushroom packers, 
have through long experience become knowledgeable and capable 
in coping with trade disputes. Other industries, either small, or 
facing such problems for the first time, are not sophisticated in 
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this sense and have not always taken timely and vigorous 
defensive steps. However, the Board of Foreign Trade, which is an 
agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, under the guidance of 
DirectorY. T. Wong and Deputy Director H. K. Shao, has long 
been sensitive to the need for the affected industries actively to 
defend these actions in the United States at the administrative 
level, rather than relying solely on government-to-government 
efforts. The BOFT is actively encouraging and guiding Taiwan's 
export industries. The continuation of this policy will undoubtedly 
favorably affect the future. 
Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Solter for his presentation and 
then invited the discussants to contribute their comments. The 
first discussant was Edward Laing, Associate Professor of 
International Law and International Transactions at the Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law. 
[The following is the summary of Professor Laing's state-
ment.] 
COMMENTS 
EDWARD LAING 
Taiwan is doing some very interesting things with other 
developing countries. Taiwan has offered technical assistance and 
has had exchanges and visits with other developing countries. 
These kinds of contacts with the rest of the developing world, who 
have seats in the UN, may help Taiwan in the future. 
My reading and discussions with Dr. Li lead me to conclude 
that a lot of the success of Taiwan has to do with a very stable 
and interesting legal order. One thing that interests me is that 
Taiwan seems to steer a middle course between the over-
technicalization of the legal practice of the U.S. and a somewhat 
oversimplified legal practice of the PRC. The legal regime in the 
ROC has contributed rather significantly to the ROC success. 
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One of my areas of interest as a teacher is the protectionist 
forces in the United States, at which I am now quite bothered. 
They are doing things against the interests of the developing 
countries. Protectionist trends in the lTC and elsewhere in the 
U.S. are apparently likely to continue, and unfortunately these 
trends are backed up by some ambiguous legislation, e.g., the 
Trade Act of 1974. 
The Trade Act has loopholes that can be used by protectionist 
forces in the U.S., but I hope they will not continue to be used to 
the disadvantage of the developing countries. For example, the 
lTC "clear glass" case in 1971, an anti-dumping case concerning 
Taiwan, was based on statistics relating to Japan. This was one 
of the more extreme actions of the lTC in this area. I hope that the 
ROC's success in trade in the last few years will not lead 
protectionist forces to hurt Taiwan. 
Finally, I hope that international organizations will realize 
the inadvisability of Taiwan's non-participation in them. It would 
only be to the benefit of the entire trading world if Taiwan were to 
participate in these international organizations. 
Professor Oldman thanked Professor Laing for his comments 
and turned the floor over toR. Daniel Webster, Legal Advisor to 
Chairman Daniel Minchew of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission. 
[The following is a summary of Mr. Webster's comments, 
together with additional remarks submitted for publication after 
the conference.] 
COMMENTS 
R. DAN WEBSTER 
I would like to talk briefly about two recent decisions made by 
the lTC that may have significant impact on Taiwan. 
The first is the footwear case. In this case the lTC found that 
footwear was being imported into the United States in such 
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increased quantities that it was a substantial cause of injury to a 
domestic industry. The ITC recommended that a tariff rate quota 
system be imposed over a five-year period. The quota level would 
be established at 265,000,000 pairs per year with all shoes 
imported above that level to be assessed a tariff of 40 percent 
annually, then reduced to its original levels at the end of that 
period. The quota level for the ROC was 88,000,000 pairs. This is 
to be contrasted with imports of 110,000,000 pairs in 1975. The 
President exercised his authority to provide other relief under the 
Trade Act of 1974, and notified the Congress that he was 
attempting to negotiate orderly marketing agreements. N egotia-
tions are now underway. 
In the television case, the Commission found that color TV's 
were being imported from Japan into the U.S. in such increased 
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the U.S. 
color TV industry. An increase in tariffs on color TV's was 
recommended to the President. While the President has not 
formally announced his decision, indications are that he will 
attempt the same orderly marketing agreements as in the 
footwear case. 
The ROC is the second leading supplier of U.S. imports of 
television receivers. I would suspect that the President will 
attempt to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with the ROC, 
as he is presently doing with Japan. 
There are certain advantages to orderly marketing agree-
ments which the President opted for in the footwear case and 
which the Commission does not have in its authority to 
recommend. The orderly marketing agreement process allows the 
President to negotiate with the supplying country a level of 
imports and possibly by doing so arrive at an agreement which 
has less disruptive effects on both parties. There is the additional 
benefit to the U.S. in that it is not required to give compensation 
under the general agreement on tariffs and trade. 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
Considerable discussion has taken place as to whether the 
U.S. International Trade Commission is properly fulfilling its role 
in administering sections of the Trade Act of 1974 and previous 
legislation amended by that Act. Most of the controversy centers 
on the administration of section 201 of the Trade Act, which 
provides the mechanism for relief to domestic industries seriously 
injured or threatened with serious injury by increasing imports. 
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This provision, known as the import relief section or "escape 
clause," spells out the criteria the Commission must use to 
determine eligibility for relief, and then to provide relief to remedy 
the injury. 
The most common criticism - that the Commission is 
recommending relief which will be damaging to consumers or 
cause serious international political repercussions - shows that 
we at the U.S. International Trade Commission have not done an 
effective job in educating the public and, in some cases, the bar, as 
to our role in the overall trade policy network. 
First of all, we are an independent agency,. not a part of the 
executive branch. Our funds are not reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget, and, as far as I know, we are the only 
agency in the U.S. Government of which this is the case. The 
reason is simple. The Congress, in attempting to exercise its 
constitutional authority, under Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, to regulate international trade, decided to create an 
agency which was totally independent from the executive branch 
so that decisions could be made based on economics, rather than 
politics. 
The criteria for eligibility for relief from imports were relaxed 
with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974. Under the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, the Commission had not in a single case 
been able to find a domestic industry eligible for import relief. It 
was a conscious effort on the part of Congress, not the 
Commission, to relax these criteria. 
As for the criticism that the Commission has not considered 
costs to the consumer in its recommendations, or that we have not 
adequately considered the international implications of our 
"protectionist" policies, let me just say that I am pleased we have 
not. If we had done so, we would have been stepping well outside 
our authority and usurping the role of the President as outlined in 
the Trade Act. The Act provides that the President, after receiving 
our advice on the economic impact of imports on the domestic 
industry and our recommendation of relief which would remedy 
this adverse economic impact, will weigh this impact against such 
factors as consumer costs and international political ramifica-
tions and then make his decision. We do not take it personally 
when the President does not implement one of our remedy 
recommendations; if the law allowed us to consider other factors 
we may have reached the same conclusions. 
Despite the outcry against the U.S. "protectionist" policies, 
there has been only one case since the Trade Act became law in 
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which the United States has placed unilateral restrictions on 
imported goods - that being the case involving specialty steels. 
We at the USITC are comfortable in providing our advice to 
the President based on only the effect of imports on the domestic 
industry. By providing good economic advice in this one area, we 
avoid having to deal with political pressures that the Executive 
and Congress encounter daily, and we are able to give the 
President sound advice on one of the important factors he must 
consider. 
Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Webster for his statement, and 
then introduced Preston M. Torbert, an American attorney 
practicing in Taipei with the law firm of Yahng & Roles. 
[The following is the summary of Mr. Torbert's comments.] 
COMMENTS 
PRESTON M. TORBERT 
The question which I believe people may be asking themselves 
is what am I doing in Taiwan. There are two functions which the 
U.S. lawyer fulfills in Taiwan. First, he advises on U.S. law, 
particularly advising U.S. clients engaging in transactions in 
Taiwan, either directly operating from the U.S. or through 
subsidiaries or joint ventures in Taiwan. The second function is as 
a liaison between Chinese attorneys and American clients. 
The legal system of the Republic of China provides many 
contrasts and surprises for an American attorney. Perhaps one of 
the greatest contrasts is the importance of administrative law in 
the daily operation of the legal system. This will come as no 
surprise to attorneys from Washington, D.C., but for most 
American attorneys administrative law is a very minor part of 
their total practice. Mr. Chun Li's comments on investment, 
import and export procedures indicate well the extent of the 
government bureaucracy's role in managing trade and invest-
ment. 
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The administrative character of law practice is due in large 
part to the great authority exercised by the Executive Yuan, the 
executive branch of government. Statutes in the ROC are often 
broadly drafted grants of authority from the legislative to the 
executive branch to handle certain matters. The executive branch 
then drafts more detailed regulations and interprets them in the 
best interests of the country as it perceives them. One example of 
the executive branch's power to interpret is in the Regulations on 
Visas for Foreign Passport Holders which state that a foreigner 
should present "evidence of his purpose in coming to the ROC." 
Since mid-1976 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fundamentally 
altered practice under these Regulations by interpreting this 
language to mean that all foreigners going to Taiwan to work 
must comply with other regulations which only refer to techni-
cians. Accordingly, foreigners who are not techncians have found 
it impossible to get a visa through normal channels. Examples of 
harsh administrative interpretations are common in all areas, but 
particularly taxation. Of course, the immigration and tax areas 
are in large part administrative in the United States, too. The 
ROC legal system, however, appears to allow substantially more 
administrative discretion to its executive branch sub-departments 
than the American system. One result of this preeminent 
authority of the executive branch is a comparatively large degree 
of administrative supervision of the economy. Indeed, two surveys 
on U.S. corporate investment in Taiwan have mentioned excessive 
government "red tape" as the major complaint of the investors. 
Of course, government involvement in the economy also has 
its positive side. Among these are the statutory incentives for 
investment· mentioned by Mr. Chun Li. In addition to these, 
negotiated business assurances have also been an extremely 
important factor in attracting investments. These assurances by 
the ROC government to the investor have entailed such practices 
as promises to purchase a plant's entire output at a fixed price, a 
guarantee of raw materials supplies at a set price or the exclusion 
of competing foreign products from the Taiwan market. The ROC 
government has also played a positive role in trying to prevent 
unnecessary conflicts between Taiwan and American manufactur-
ers by promoting education about foreign markets. After the 
recent misunderstanding concerning reclosable plastic bags made 
in Taiwan and exported to the U.S. which allegedly infringed an 
American patent, the government took steps to help inform 
Taiwan manufacturers about U.S. patent law to prevent future 
incidents of this kind. 
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An interesting aspect of Taiwan's exports to the U.S. and 
resulting trade disputes involves the nature of the parties. Mr. 
Myron Solter mentioned disputes relating to television receivers 
and solid-state watches made in Taiwan and exported to the U.S. 
It is interesting to note that a large percentage of these products 
made in Taiwan are made by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. 
The disputes, therefore, are often not simple conflicts of interest 
between Taiwan and the United States, but disputes between 
American companies producing in Taiwan and American com-
panies producing in the U.S. 
Finally, in regard to the papers relating to the future of ROC-
US economic relations, a change in U.S. policy toward recognition 
of the People's Republic of China would not necessarily cause any 
significant legal problems under ROC law. The ROC Constitution 
(Article 141) requires the ROC's foreign relations to be conducted 
on the basis of "equality and reciprocity." Recently the Premier 
and the Foreign Minister have made public statements indicating 
that they believe that the ROC's foreign relations include its 
relations with countries which do not have formal diplomatic 
relations with it. _This constitutional standard of equality and 
reciprocity, therefore, should apply generally to ROC-US relations 
after a possible break in formal diplomatic relations. As long as 
the U.S. continued to conduct economic relations with Taiwan on 
a non-discriminatory basis, there is no reason to believe that the 
ROC would discriminate against American business. The practice 
of ROC-Japanese relations indicates that economic ties can 
continue without major difficulties after the rupture of formal 
diplomatic ties. 
Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Torbert for his comments, 
then adjourned the session for 20 minutes. Following this 
intermission, Professor Oldman opened the session for questions 
and comments from the floor. 
DISCUSSION 
PRoF. OLDMAN TO MR. SOLTER: The Chinese find it useful and 
sometimes necessary to defend their actions relating to the United 
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States in American administrative agencies. Do Americans who 
have disputes with Taiwan have the same ability to appear before 
Taiwanese agencies? 
MR. SoLTER: A lot of decisions in Taiwan are made by 
administrative agencies. A foreign investor can appeal his 
decision from a lower administrative agency to a higher one. For 
example, if a request or application of a foreign investor is turned 
down by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the decision can be 
appealed to the Executive Yuan. This is an appeal from the 
ministerial level to the cabinet level. In some cases one can make 
an appeal from the cabinet level to an administrative court. 
PROF. OLDMAN: Is adjustment asSistance one of the forms of 
relief asked for by U.S. groups adversely affected by imports? 
MR. SoLTER: It is generally believed that adjustment assist-
ance doesn't provide a workable solution to imports. The passage 
of the Trade Act in early 1975 has not altered this belief. 
MR. WEBSTER: Adjustment assistance is inadequate as now 
funded. 
MR. SoLTER: You may be interested to know. that President 
Carter has announced that there will be legislation within 90 days 
to amend adjustment assistance. 
PROF. LAING: There is a low limit on adjustment assistance 
loans that can be made available to firms. One million dollars is 
the limit on direct loans and three million is the limit on 
guarantees. I think adjustment assistance can be a good 
alternative to harsh tariffs. 
MR. WEBSTER: Adjustment assistance to workers is different 
from adjustment assistance to firms. It is unlimited and goes 
through labor unions. 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: In the ROC are there 
regulations for foreign technology to be transferred to the local 
people so that the developing state can become independent? 
DR. LI: The ROC wants advanced technology, and it 
encourages the transfer of technology in the form of certain tax 
benefits. If a foreign investor has advanced technology, it is 
entitled to the free import of capital equipment. If this is not met, 
it can apply for five years of tax deferral. Also, a person will 
receive a royalty for importing management know-how. 
PROF. OLDMAN: There are great tax benefits in the ROC. 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: Why is the ROC not a 
member of GA 1T? 
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MR. L. CHAo: Although the ROC was a member of GATr, I 
could not recall when the ROC terminated her membership.* Mr. 
Solter commented, however, that the ROC gets the advantages of 
most favored nation status even though it is not a member of 
GA'IT. 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: How serious are the U.S. 
complaints about Taiwan tariffs on imported products? 
ANswER: The complaint particularly applies to consumer and 
electronic machinery, An American businessman in Taiwan who 
made the complaint said that the import duty makes it impossible 
for him to import to Taiwan. There is no final outcome as yet, but 
the U.S. has suggested to the ROC that the complaint perhaps has 
merit as to certain products. 
Professor Oldman closed the second session by commenting 
on the great complexity ofthe issues involved in the interaction of 
the ROC's political and economic position in the world. He 
thanked the speakers for the clarity they brought to these issues 
and adjourned the session. 
Reported by Stewart Diana and David Simon 
The second session was followed by a reception sponsored by 
the University of Maryland International Law Society, after 
which the conference participants enjoyed a banquet dinner. 
Following the dinner, Jane Brandt, Editor-in-Chief of the 
University of Maryland Law School's International Trade Law 
Journal, introduced the dinner speaker, Mr. William Morell, who 
had recently left his position as Assistant Secretary, Department 
of Treasury, to join the US-ROC Economic Council. 
[The following is the text of Mr. Morell's speech.] 
* See the discussion in Session III at p. 204 infra. 
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PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 
WITH TAIWAN 
WILLIAM MORELL* 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a real privilege for me to speak 
with this distinguished group this evening and it is also a great 
personal pleasure since there are a number of friends here in the 
audience I have known for some time. It was only six weeks ago 
that I left government; and this evening I find myself on new turf. 
I am reminded of a session not long ago with Bill Simon when one 
of our group in Treasury who was about to leave government, 
remarked that he was returning to the "real world." Simon having 
spent some four years in Washington, with all of the usual 
frustrations, responded a little ironically by saying: You know the 
great tragedy is that some people think THIS is the real world. 
In the Republic of China clearly this distinction between 
government and private business is more blurred than in the 
United States. Few would question, however, that the ROC blend 
of government and private business has had an extremely 
salutary effect on its international commerce. The government 
has taken a strong lead in this area and not only has been 
courageous in setting its economic goals but also has been very 
practical in helping to ensure that they are carried out. I was once 
told by a senior ROC official that during a meeting with a number 
of Cabinet officials there was a discussion of books for recom-
mended reading. I asked which ones were at the top of the list. 
Two, he said, led all the rest. One was Peter Drucker's Effective 
Executive; and the other was Jonathan Livingston Seagull. This 
blend of the practical and, in a sense, the inspirational, in part, 
characterizes Taiwan's approach to the development of its 
economy. The results, needless to say, have been impressive. 
As you all know, Taiwan's economy has the great advantage 
of operating in a basically stable political environment with an 
essentially market-oriented, mixed economy. This, together with 
pragmatic economic policies, has enabled Taiwan to achieve one 
of the soundest international financial positions and one of the 
most enviable performances in foreign trade in the world. It also 
has an excellent record of price stability, employment, distribution 
of income and economic development, and as most of you are 
aware, few countries have done more to stimulate the expansion of 
* Managing Director of United States-Republic of China Economic Council; 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Treasury. 
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the external sector and to provide incentives for foreign capital in 
the development of the economy. 
How the economy progresses in the future and how our 
economic ties develop in the coming years will depend to a great 
extent on those laws, regulations and procedures - in both the 
ROC and the U.S.- that are so essential to the maintenance of a 
reasonably predictable and very attractive commercial environ-
ment. I personally am confident that these sessions we are all 
involved in here can usefully contribute to this objective. · 
I need not remind this group that in addition to understand-
ing the law and learning to work within it, there is also an 
obligation to contribute to its formulation. My four and a half 
years on Taiwan convince me that the ROC is almost unique 
among nations in affording international organizations, foreign 
governments and foreign businessmen an opportunity to critique 
its laws and regulations governing international business and 
banking activities. The ROC is no less proud and protective of its 
sovereignty than other nations, but it clearly is less defensive and 
more constructive than most in eliciting assistance which might 
improve the effectiveness of its economic guidelines and commer-
cial law. 
In my opinion, we in the U.S. should take greater advantage 
of this opportunity. During my stay in Taipei we in the Embassy 
worked closely with the Taipei-American Chamber of Commerce, 
for example, in recommending changes in the ROC Statute for 
Encouragement of Investment. While we lost many battles, a 
number of our suggestions were accepted, at least in some form, 
though our proposals often were not as carefully prepared as they 
might have been. Unfortunately, time did not permit adequate 
consultation by American business representatives on Taiwan 
with corporate legal experts in company headquarters. 
In the future, American business must be more alert to 
opportunities to influence legislation of this kind. In many cases, 
of course, we can make our own opportunities by taking the 
initiative in proposing changes; but certainly when the Chinese 
afford us the chance to comment on existing laws and procedures 
we should try to ensure that we have the lead time necessary to 
prepare our case carefully and persuasively. 
A new opportunity involving these regulations governing 
investment may be presented again in the not too distant future. 
The ROC government has recently said it is considering a revision 
of the statute governing these incentives. As Managing Director 
of the new US-ROC Economic Council I have already encour-
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aged our membership to consider what changes in this statute 
they feel would be desirable and mutually beneficial. And on my 
trip to Taiwan in May I will not only be looking for trade, 
investment and contracting opportunities of interest to our 
members; I also intend to look into questions put by our 
membership dealing with current regulations and impending 
changes. 
In addition to laws of broad scope such as the Statute just 
mentioned, there are of course many laws and regulations dealing 
with narrow, more specific topics which affect American firms 
involved in both banking and manufacturing. Here again I 
believe there are rules impacting on American firms which would 
warrant a dialog with the ROC government. Some years ago, for 
example, the withholding tax on interest had been considered 
inequitable by some U.S. firms, and we in the Embassy working 
with the U.S. banking representatives on Taiwan discussed our 
concern with ROC officials and a new formulation was developed. 
All of this is not to suggest that we can readily achieve changes in 
directions favorable to us. Quite often the Chinese have found our 
proposals unacceptable; however, as I have said, opportunities for 
a hearing of U.S. business and U.S. government views are as 
favorable on Taiwan as almost anywhere in the world. 
In applying the law to particular commercial cases, my 
experience has been that when disputes arise the Chinese 
apparently prefer a negotiated solution with consideration to all 
aspects of the situation rather than focusing merely on the legal 
and technical virtues of each position. They would prefer to avoid 
a stand-off confrontation- particularly a confrontation involving 
litigation. The law and the regulations are always present as a 
basic framework for discussion, but on many commercial issues 
other factors are an important part of the negotiation and the 
bargaining. 
This is not to say that matters of principle and law are cast 
aside. They clearly are the basic reference point of the dialog. It is 
incumbent then on those representing U.S. interests - be they 
lawyers, representatives of corporations, Embassy officials, 
whoever - to make certain that all of the major considerations 
are properly presented to those they represent and that the key 
officials in the ROC government most directly concerned with the 
issue are properly informed. While almost axiomatic, this 
approach is often not followed in practice. 
In one case in the early seventies, for example, a major U.S. 
firm had spent a considerable sum preparing to invest in a new 
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facility. The investment application went forward in compliance 
with the regulations several times and each time was returned 
with modifications, mostly adverse to the U.S. company's 
position. Even the Legislative Yuan became involved. The 
American corporation representative finally concluded that the 
ROC government did not want his company involved and that his 
proposal was in effect being rejected. He had about decided to 
throw in the towel and return home. As a last resort he asked the 
Embassy's help. After reviewing the case we felt that, while there 
clearly were misunderstandings on both sides, some of the 
problems were bureaucratic, much as they are in all governments 
including our own. The Embassy presented the case to three key 
officials. The company representative was called in by the 
Chinese again for negotiation and the issue was quickly resolved. 
Needless to say, U.S. companies all over the world have such 
problems even when they adhere to the regulations. On Taiwan 
the difference is that the chances probably are better that a 
solution can be worked out provided there is a good case and 
provided the appropriate officials are brought in and are fully 
informed. 
It is important to understand what is at stake here in our 
search for improvement in the legal aspects of our trading 
relations. The story of the dramatic growth in ROC foreign trade 
has been discussed in this conference at some length. The key 
question is: Where is this trade heading and what is in it for 
American business and the U.S. economy? 
As a starter we can look at the ROC's own trade projections. 
But then how good are they? My own experience has been that the 
ROC has an almost unequaled track record in meeting its foreign 
trade goals. In fact, I have always suspected that there is a 
"kuchi" factor (i.e., a modesty discount) injected into most official 
foreign trade estimates. Therefore, when the ROC announced 
recently that their foreign trade plans call for an increase in 1977 
in two-way trade, worldwide, from $15.7 billion to $18.5 billion, I 
think we are obliged to take this enormous increase seriously and 
to consider what this might mean for American business. 
If the U.S. merely retains its present share of total trade 
which was about 31% in 1976, our two way trade with Taiwan in 
1977 could increase almost $1 billion to a total of around $5.5 
billion. This would rank the ROC within a few hundred million 
dollars of our trade with the Netherlands and Italy, who rank 
ninth and eleventh, respectively, on the spectrum of U.S. trading 
partners. This trend also suggests that by 1978 our commerce with 
126 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
the ROC could well approximate our trade with France, which in 
1976 ranked eighth among our trading partners. I think it is still 
very difficult for many westerners to appreciate that Taiwan has 
already become one of the great trading nations of the world. 
For both importers and exporters it is new business opportuni-
ties that are a prime consideration. If we talk not in terms of 
percentages but dollar gains we find that the ROC, with an 
anticipated surge in trade of almost $3 billion in 1977, offers 
perhaps more new business than most of our leading trading 
partners. Both U.S. exporters and importers will profit substan-
tially from this commerce, to say nothing of the benefits to wages, 
employment and consumer prices in this country. 
Some say that the uncertainties of the next few years raise 
questions about prospects for further expansion of our trade with 
the ROC. I can only say that I have heard this for almost ten 
years and those who have taken counsel of their fears have had to 
count their losses. Those who have looked at the realities have 
prospered. There were those, for example, who were nervous after 
the Shanghai Communique. At that time there was some capital 
flight, Taiwan currency sold at a discount and some businesses 
contracted their operations. However, our economic reporting from 
the Embassy during this period and the advice of many of our 
bankers on Taiwan took an optimistic and we felt a realistic line. 
But some in the Embassy and in the State Department felt, to use 
John Foster Dulles' words, that we were taking on the protective 
coloration of the local scene. As it turned out, our estimates were 
somewhat off the mark, but only because they were not optimistic 
enough. The economy continued to surge ahead; capital returned 
from abroad; the Taiwan dollar increased in value; and business-
men began to expand their investment. 
Again during the world-wide recession of the recent past, 
there were many fears expressed about the viability of Taiwan's 
economy with its enormous dependence on foreign trade. Prices of 
imports were skyrocketing while the ROC's exports were meeting 
resistance all over the world. Inflation became a serious problem. 
But again the economy adjusted in a pragmatic way and today 
Taiwan's price stability is among the best of all nations and 
exports are booming once again. 
Some may ask how recent pressures within the U.S. to 
restrain the import of certain commodities of importance to 
Taiwan's trade, such as footwear, might affect the ROC's ability 
to earn foreign exchange and to support the continued expansion 
of its two-way trade with the U.S. This is a complex equation and 
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I have no more ability than anyone else to look at the future as 
history. But I can draw from the lessons of the past. 
I know that the U.S. government since World War II has 
generally sought to avoid more restraints on trade. In fact, most of 
our efforts have been in the direction of freer trade. And in those 
instances when the U.S. government has felt obliged to restrict 
imports, it has usually not moved precipitously and has sought to 
balance the political and economic considerations involved. 
The "voluntary restraints" imposed on textile imports from 
the ROC in the early seventies did require substantial adjustment 
by Taiwan's manufacturers and of course impacted universally on 
anticipated foreign exchange earnings. But history has shown the 
ROC economy to be dynamic, inventive and adaptable. It has 
accommodated extremely well to new situations, ranging from the 
cutoff in earlier U.S. aid programs to the shock of the Shanghai 
Communique. Considering the expected levels of U.S. trade 
restraints, and without commenting on the arguments for and 
against such restraints, I am confident the ROC will continue to 
grow in importance as one of our leading trading partners. 
A major problem in our trade with Taiwan, however, is the 
weakness in our exports. There has been a noticeable increase in 
recent years in the attention paid by American manufacturers, 
and particularly by our bankers, to the Taiwan market. Major 
efforts are being made by many American firms to develop this 
market both for sales and imports. In addition, our Trade Center 
in Taipei has become one of our two most successful trade centers 
in the world. In recent years it has held some 170 events and has 
attracted enormous attention from prospective buyers of U.S. 
products. But much more needs to be done to promote the sale of 
U.S. commodities. Our trade deficit with Taiwan in 1976 was more 
than $1.3 billion, which in a sense is a measure of the shortcoming 
of our sales promotion. 
The Japanese, of course, are our principal competitors. They 
have outstripped us in this market with exports of almost $2.3 
billion in 1976 compared to our $1.6 billion. Japanese businessmen 
are well aware of the burgeoning Taiwan market and the fact that 
Taiwan is their second largest export market in the world. They 
also know that for the remaining five years of the ROC's 
current six year plan Taiwan represents a market for foreign 
exporters of approximately $50 billion. The Japanese are eager to 
win the lion's share of this market, and their promotion efforts 
treat it accordingly. Within the ROC the Japanese rely very little 
on their local officials resident on Taiwan for trade development 
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support. Essentially they depend on the activities of their 
individual corporations and the aggressive sales promotion of 
their various foreign trade associations, with strong support at 
home from their Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
and the Japanese banks. They are particularly adept at identify-
ing new opportunities for sales and too frequently seem to be 
ahead of us in uncovering the many import and contract 
engineering requirements that fall out of the growing number of 
new development programs in the ROC's public and private 
sectors. 
In many ways the Japanese linkage between government, 
business associations and private firms has not been acceptable 
in our society and does not correspond to many elements of our 
economic philosophy as reflected in our laws and regulations. But 
there are lessons to be learned from the Japanese experience and 
of course many legal questions would be involved if we decided to 
modify our approach to trade promotion. 
On the ROC side there are other questions that should be 
addressed which affect our competitive position vis-a-vis the 
Japanese. For example, the ROC tariff is based on CIF which, 
because of distance, gives Japanese exporters an advantage over 
our own. This is not a new issue but one that perhaps should be 
reviewed. And there are other questions of this kind for those of 
you concerned with the legal aspects of our trade. 
In closing let me say that when the subject of these sessions 
was first announced I was sure there were many questions as_ to: 
whether the exercise was worth the candle. Yet when we consider 
that over the next five years the ROC's two-way trade may total 
roughly $100 billion; that the ROC could be well inside the top ten 
among all of our trading partners; and that there has been, 
perhaps, less thought, discussion and writing by foreigners· 
concerning the laws relating to this trade than for that of most 
other great trading nations we can readily appreciate the 
significance of this pioneer meeting. I think we are all indebted to 
the organizers of this conference for their foresight, and I 
congratulate them for a superb job. 
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The meeting was opened by Mr. Simon, who introduced the 
chairperson for the session, Dr. G. J. Sigur, Director of the 
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington Univer-
sity. Dr. Sigur said that he was delighted to be here this morning 
and to serve as chairman of this final session of the Conference on 
U.S.-Republic of China Relations. He thought that it was always 
exciting to deal with projections concerning the future. He had 
always envied Herman Kahn in the Hudson Institute, and he had 
thought often that perhaps it would be interesting to join him and 
deal with things in a way that you did not have to concern 
yourself too much with facts. However, that was not what we were 
going to try to do today. We were going to be concerned with facts, 
and would deal with one of the most important questions facing 
the United States in its global policies, and especially in its 
policies toward Asia and the Pacific and what would happen in 
terms of our ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan, 
particularly in the economic area. The resolution of the American 
position toward the ROC could be critical to the whole question of 
American intentions and hopes of maintaining peace and 
stability throughout the world. Dr. Sigur did not think that such a 
formulation overstated the case. He believed it was true, and 
therefore he was sure that we would all take this matter of the 
future of these relations with the seriousness which it warranted. 
He was very pleased to start this session off by introducing David 
Simon, who would summarize the American Chamber of Com-
merce on Taipei position paper on US-ROC relations. Dr. Sigur 
then invited Mr. Simon to speak. Mr. Simon said that none of 
what he had to say here was his own words. It was all directly 
from Taiwan's American Chamber of Commerce and he was just 
going to summarize the position paper .. 
The position paper stated that the PRC engages in restrictive 
trade practices as compared to the ROC, which presents a truly 
reciprocal trade pattern with resulting economic benefits to both 
the United States and Taiwan. The People's Republic of China 
has a non-consumer product market of limited products, non-
recurrent purchases and import restrictions. The interest of the 
PRC is in technology, not in products. It was estimated in the 
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report that consumer products will not be in demand in the PRC 
for two generations. The loss of United States relations with the 
Republic of China would have many ramifications: the outlook for 
economic increase would be negative and abrogation of the 
Defense Treaty would remove protection essential for Taiwan. 
Some specific problems cited were Eximbank loans and guaran-
tees of 1.5 billion dollars, U.S. banks on Taiwan, United States 
investment, OPIC insurance, and the most favored nation 
treatment of Taiwan. It was also pointed out by the Chamber of 
Commerce that United States security could also be threatened. 
[The following is the text of the position paper prepared by the 
American Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of China.] 
US-ROC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: 
A BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW* 
AMERICAN CHAMBER oF CoMMERCE IN 
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, a 
great deal of attention has been given to the question of what 
benefits would be gained from improved relations between the 
United States and the People's Republic of China. Aside from the 
fundamental geopolitical advantage of keeping the USSR and the 
PRC from greater solidarity, there have been high expectations as 
to the eventual economic benefits which will accrue to both 
countries. 
At first blush these benefits seem well worth achieving. 
Certainly very few of us would take issue with the goal of keeping 
two communist countries from joining forces against the U.S., or 
support the argument that we should continue to ignore the 850 
million Chinese on the Mainland. But when it comes to the 
economic issues, we believe that these have not been adequately 
analyzed, and that they should be thoroughly assessed before any 
further steps are taken toward normalization with the PRC. In 
essence, we think that the U.S. Government has expected more 
gains than can be realized ... but more importantly, we think it 
has totally ignored the potential losses. 
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For the past few years, the American Chamber of Commerce 
in the Republic of China has supported positions which favor the 
expansion of commercial and cultural relations between the U.S. 
and the PRC, provided this is not done at the expense of the 
Republic of China. Our position has echoed the recent resolution 
by a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives, which states 
"that the U.S. Government, while engaged in reducing tensions 
with the PRC, do nothing to compromise the freedom of the 
Republic of China and its 16 million people." Basically we believe 
that the long· standing American relationship with the Chinese 
who have made Taiwan a flourishing example of economic and 
cultural cooperation should not be sacrificed for a political 
objective which does not give comparable reciprocity to American 
initiatives. 
This position paper has been prepared by members of the 
American Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of China, an 
organization of U.S. business executives who manage some 220 
U.S. invested corporations in Taiwan. The Chamber's prime 
objective is to enhance and protect American trade, investment 
and credit relations with the Republic of China. 
B. U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE TWO CHINAS 
While the opening of U.S. commercial relations with the PRC 
began in an encouraging way and with great expectations, they 
still give no opportunities for normal commerce; even the cultural 
and tourist interchange has been unilaterally restricted by the 
PRC to minimum levels. The U.S. two-way trade with the PRC in 
1975 declined to $462 million (from $922 million in 1974) while the 
U.S. did $3.5 billion in two-way trade with Taiwan in 1975. 
The PRC refuses to accept credits from foreign trading 
partners including the U.S. and has generally confined commer-
cial contacts to the Canton Trade Fair. The PRC also refuses to 
permit American buying or selling offices to operate in the 
country and refuses to permit American banks to handle financial 
and trade transactions between the two countries. 
In extreme contrast, the Republic of China on Taiwan has 
consistently offered full business reciprocity, investment oppor-
tunities and unlimited support to two-way commercial inter-
change, to a point where our two-way trade with them made 
Taiwan America's 13th largest trading partner in 1975. This 
created opportunities for thousands of export-related jobs in the 
United States. Also, U.S. investment as of July 1976 amounted to 
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$476 million and has prospered in one of the most hospitable 
investment climates in the Asia-Pacific area. In addition, Taiwan 
has also opened its arms to American religious groups, scholars 
and tourists serving to maintain our long standing relationships 
with the Chinese people at a high level of compatibility and 
cooperation. 
It could be argued that normalization of the political 
relationship should begin at least to remedy the lack of 
commercial and cultural reciprocity, but thus far this is not 
supported by the experiences of other countries which do have 
diplomatic relations with the PRC. It appears that reciprocity is 
not a 50-50 proposition with the PRC. 
C. WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE U.S.? 
Yet there still seems to be a compulsion to forego the tried-
and-true relationship with the ROC in favor of the hope of great 
economic benefits from the PRC. And even more alarming, we 
observe a sense of urgency in the U.S. Government's desire to 
culminate normalization with the PRC "before it's too late." 
Admittedly, the public posture of the current Administration is 
low at present, no doubt due to the Presidential election campaign. 
But the stated goal is still "normalization" and we perceive that 
even though it is alleged that there is no time-table and no 
formula, there appears to be an academic and State Department 
grounds well (possibly amplified by press speculation) which .. is 
anxious to conclude an early agreement with the PRC. We believe 
this issue will surface rapidly once a new president is elected. 
Therefore, it is essential that we analyze what the real 
economic benefits to the U.S. will be- or put more colloquially, 
what's in it for the U.S.? An analysis follows as to the prospects of 
improved US-PRC trade based on the assumed condition of 
diplomatic recognition. 
D. WHAT'S THE REAL MARKET POTENTIAL WITH THE PRC? 
When we evaluate the PRC's past buying policy we find that 
the potential market for U.S. products is limited to a few select 
product categories, that the purchases are non-recurrent, that the 
availability of a broad consumer market base may well be 40 to 50 
years away, and that the emphasis is on self-sufficiency which 
exhibits itself in an interest in technology rather than in products. 
In addition, the fact that the PRC is a non-market economy will 
affect the ability of U.S. exporters to sell their products on a 
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competitive and reciprocal basis; there are many import restric-
tions levied on a variety of products which limit the current as 
well as eventual market potential. Furthermore, the absence of 
free choice by the consumer will restrict the ability of U.S. 
exporters to develop new markets for their products. Brief 
comments are given below on the three most important categories: 
Industrial Products 
In line with former Premier Chou En-lai's report to the 4th 
National People's Congress, one of the PRC goals is to build "an 
independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and eco-
nomic system by 1980." Therefore it is reasonable to expect that 
the PRC will be looking abroad for equipment during the next few 
years. But history has shown that they are more interested in 
technology than in equipment, with some limited exceptions to 
meet their urgent needs where either their capacity or technical 
know-how is limited. Some of the examples are the purchases of 
jet aircraft, fertilizer plants, and deep-well oil drilling platforms. 
In the case of the aircraft sale, the PRC technology is obviously 
not at a comparable level to the U.S., and purchases of this type 
are expected to continue. As for the fertilizer plants, this is a good 
example of a dire need to supplement their capacity on a one-time 
basis. The same holds true for the oil drilling platforms; after 
purchasing several from Japan, France and Norway, the PRC is 
now manufaCturing their own. 
Consumer Products 
Even though the PRC is a rich land with numerous natural 
resources, ·many areas are still uninhabited and thus have little or 
no infrastructure. In short, its economic development may well be 
some 40 to 50 years away from where the needs of its people can 
be matched to the richness of its resources. Therefore, the 
opportunity for selling U.S. consumer goods appears to be at least 
two generations away. A good example is provided by the 
Japanese: to date they have not managed to sell any consumer 
products to the PRC. 
Agricultural Products 
As for a sustained favorable outlook for agricultural products, 
it is not expected that the PRC will remain a large importer of 
foodstuffs for long. Less than 20% of its total land surface is now 
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cultivated, which is quite low compared to its potential arable 
acreage. In addition the current per acre yield is very low due to a 
lack of fertilizer and pesticides as well as a limited irrigation 
system. Therefore, the capability of the PRC to increase its 
agricultural output is substantial, large enough to be a threat as 
an eventual competitor to the U.S. in their surplus crop years. 
After analyzing the economic realities, the prospects of 
significantly increasing trade between the U.S. and the PRC are 
certainly not optimistic. So the question remains, What's in it for 
the U.S., particularly if it is to be accomplished at the expense of a 
valued trading partner, the Republic of China? 
E. DISADVANTAGES TO THE U.S. 
Now let's turn our attention to what the potential loss would 
be to our economic relations with the Republic of China. There are 
basically two scenarios; the first involves de-facto derecognition of 
the ROC without regard to how future trade, investment and 
credit relations would be handled. In this first scenario we would 
also assume the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, 
inasmuch as we understand that it may not be possible to have a 
Defense Treaty with a country with which we have no diplomatic 
relations. 
Without sounding ominous and without making any predic-
tions as to what the PRC and ROC might do militarily, our feeling 
is that we in Taiwan would experience serious difficulties in doing 
business. There could be a degree of social unrest which might 
vent itself on American companies. Further investment would 
stop, and capital flight would be probable. In short, sudden 
diplomatic derecognition without any redress does not provide a 
positive outlook for U.S. economic interests. (Frankly speaking, it 
seems inconceivable and unrealistic that such a scenario would 
take place; in all our 200 year history there is no precedence for 
abandoning a trusted ally and valued trading partner in the way 
just described.) 
A second scenario involves "normalization" with the PRC but 
not under the three conditions outlined by the PRC (diplomatic 
recognition, U.S. troop withdrawal, and abrogation of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty). We particularly believe that the third condition, 
that of abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, is totally 
unacceptable to the protection of American economic interests 
with the Republic of China. In short, the Mutual Defense Treaty is 
central to our economic survival on Taiwan. Without offering any 
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new "formula" for solution, we will state a number of additional 
issues which need to be resolved before any further steps are taken 
toward normalization with the PRC. We hope that the U.S. 
Government is already working on these areas. It is critically 
important that solutions be found to these problems. 
F. ISSUES WHICH NEED TO BE RESOLVED 
1. Eximbank Loans and Guarantees 
As of December 1975, the ROC had loans and guarantees 
outstanding in the amount of more than US$1.7 billion, thus 
making it the Eximbank's largest customer after BraziL What 
happens to these funds and will Taiwan be eligible for loans in the 
future? 
2. U.S. Banks on Taiwan 
As of July 1976, there were eight U.S. banks represented on 
Taiwan. What will be their status after normalization? Will they 
be allowed to continue their operations in Taiwan? 
3. U.S. Investment on Taiwan 
As of July 1976, there was some US$476 million worth of U.S. 
investment on Taiwan. This investment is distributed across the 
range of the country's industrial projects and infrastructure. A 
series of questions arise which are currently adequately answered 
under the present Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) 
Treaty of 1948, but which will need review if the FCN Treaty were 
not to be in force. 
Will this investment have national treatment, meaning that 
U.S. investment will be subject to the same laws and enjoy the 
same rights as do domestic enterprises of the host country? 
In the event of expropriation or nationalization for a public 
purpose, will it be done without discrimination and accompanied 
by prompt, adequate and effective compensation? 
Will compensation under expropriation amount to the market 
value immediately before the expropriation itself or before the 
host government's official announcement that expropriation will 
occur? 
Will there be international arbitration in the event of a 
dispute between the U.S. investor and the host country? 
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4. Overseas Private Insurance Company 
(OPIC) Coverage 
As of July 1976, the maximum contract value of OPIC 
insurance was $132 million for inconvertability, $153 million for 
expropriation, and $137 million for war. Could additional 
coverage be obtained? 
5. Textile Quotas to the U.S. 
Taiwan's textile exports to the U.S. fall under the 1974 Multi-
Fibre Agreement, the international framework for voluntary 
bilateral restraints between textile exporters and importers. On 
the other hand, the PRC has been unwilling to subscribe to any 
voluntary trade restraints, even with countries with which it has 
diplomatic relations. What happens to Chinese textile exports to 
the U.S.? 
6. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Taiwan 
In 1975, the U.S. exported some $420 million worth of 
agricultural products to Taiwan. Most of these exports are 
conducted under several long-range agreements negotiated be-
tween the U.S. and the ROC. What happens to these agreements? 
7. Nuclear Fuel for Taiwan's Nuclear 
Power Plants 
Currently two nuclear power plants are under construction in 
Taiwan, and four more are planned. Under what conditions will 
Taiwan be able to obtain nuclear fuels for these plants? 
8. Generalized Preference Scheme 
Will Taiwan still be eligible for duty reductions under the 
Generalized Preference Scheme? 
9. Most Favored Nation Treatment 
The ROC currently has MFN treatment, but the PRC does not. 
Before MFN can be granted by the U.S. President to the PRC, the 
Trade Act of 1974 requires that a bilateral trade agreement be 
negotiated first, and then be approved by the U.S. Congress. Part 
and parcel of Congressional approval is the settlement of frozen 
assets, which has been an extremely thorny issue thus far. 
Anyway, what happens to the ROC's Most Favored Nation 
standing? 
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10. Concerns for U.S. Security 
We do not profess to be experts in international security 
matters, but as U.S. citizens, we are vitally concerned with the 
security of our country. We feel it important that the U.S. 
maintain a strong military presence in the area. Breaking our 
faith with the people of Taiwan would only weaken us in the eyes 
of the other nations of the area, and would strengthen the position 
of the Communists. 
We find it ironic that we seem to be having trouble over the 
use of our bases in the Philippines, whereas the ROC no doubt 
would cooperate with us fully in our objective of having a strong 
forward defense in the Western Pacific Island chain. 
The foregoing listing represents only a sampling of the issues 
which need to be resolved before any further steps are taken 
toward normalization with the PRC. 
G. CONCLUSION 
We do not disagree with the objectives of keeping the two 
Communist countries from joining forces against the U.S., but we 
feel that this objective can be accomplished through skillful 
negotiating, without sacrificing the people of the ROC or the U.S. 
position in the Far East. We believe that the PRC has more to 
gain from normalization of relations between the two countries 
than does the U.S., and that the U.S. should negotiate more from 
a position of strength. It appears that a group within the U.S. 
Government is so intent with normalizing relations with the PRC 
"before it's too late," that they are proposing giving in to the 
demands of the PRC in the hope that they will agree to 
normalization. We should have learned by now that this is no way 
to negotiate with the Communists. 
The PRC has stated three demands in the Shanghai 
Communique. We believe that the U.S. negotiators should firmly 
state two conditions. One should be to keep the Mutual Defense 
Treaty with the ROC, and the second should be to protect U.S. 
economic interests with Taiwan. If these two conditions are not 
met, then it is our judgment that normalization of relations is not 
worth the price. 
Dr. Sigur thanked Mr. Simon for his very excellent summari-
zation of the view of the American business community in 
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Taiwan, which represented, of course, some of the largest business 
interests in this country. He thought that it was important that we 
should take seriously what they said. He then invited Dr. Yuan-li 
Wu of Hoover Institution to present the paper on the economic 
impact of US-PRC relations on the ROC; this paper was prepared 
jointly by Dr. Wu and Dr. K. C. Y eh. He also expressed his regret 
that one of the co-authors of the paper, Dr. K. C. Yeh of The RaQ.d 
Corporation, could not come because of his overseas trip. 
Drs. Wu and Yeh's paper discussed the economic impact of 
United States-People's Republic of China relations oil the 
Republic of China. Their purpose was to examine factors 
contributing to the rapid expansion of exports in Taiwan and to 
Taiwan's economic growth and to determine how these factors 
would be affected by the alternatives for changing relations with 
the ROC. 
Taiwanese expansion in exports is correlated with United 
States direct investment. This is what Dr. Wu termed a linear 
correlation, that is, exports from Taiwan come from United States 
and Japanese manufacturers. Dr. Wu stated that for continued 
export growth there must be continued investment and continued 
increase in importation by the United States. However, continued 
export growth depends on the political climate. Investors expect 
stability, and the best way to eliminate uncertainties is for the 
United States to make clear that present relations will continue. 
Dr. Wu identified three alternatives: (1) continuation of the 
status quo, (2) diplomatic recognition of Peking and abandonment 
of the Republic of China, and (3) diplomatic recognition of both 
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. Dr. Wu 
prefers the third alternative, the so-called German plan. 
Dr. Wu stated that if the legal status of Taiwan is questioned, 
a situation would arise where problems are created for business-
men by other countries. Some of those problems identified were 
threats to curtail freedom of access to transportation and 
resources, legal redress, and sea rights. Such problems would 
require private intervention and Dr. Wu questioned whether 
anyone would be willing to assist. Dr. Wu suggested that the 
"open door" should swing both ways. 
[The following is the text of the paper prepared by Dr. Wu and 
Dr. Yeh.] 
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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE 
US-ROC RELATIONS 
Y. L. Wu* AND K. C. YEH** 
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The central question discussed in this paper is the economic 
impact of alternative US-ROC relations. As US-PRC relations 
develop further, alternative forms of the relations between the US 
and the ROC must be considered. Among these broad alternatives 
are: (a) continuation of US-ROC relations as they now stand, (b) a 
more unambiguous two-China policy on the part of the United 
States which will reaffirm the latter's determination to abide by 
existing treaties and to maintain its political and economic 
relations with the ROC under bilateral agreements at the 
government level, whatever may be the relationship between the 
United States and the PRC, and (c) downgrading of US-ROC 
relations, which can be carried out in varying degrees either 
following or simultaneously with the diplomatic recognition of 
Peking. We assume for the purpose of this paper that the term 
"normalization" is used by most people at present as a code word 
for diplomatic recognition of Peking, although the two terms are 
not necessarily identical. (Some countries that have maintained 
full diplomatic relations with Peking for some time do not seem to 
enjoy closer substantive relations with the PRC than does the 
United States. It is hard to define precisely what one means by 
"normal relations" with Peking.) By "economic impact" we mean 
the effect on (a) the economic viability of Taiwan as an 
independent economic entity, (b) the present and future economic 
interests of the United States, and (c) the economic interests of 
such major interested parties as Japan. 
We shall attempt, in the first place, to identify the basic 
factors, insofar as they are relevant for our purpose, that have 
made possible the impressive economic performance of Taiwan, 
both in the decade and a half before the 1973 oil crisis and since 
that crisis (see Figure 1). Taiwan's past economic performance can 
best be illustrated here by a quick reference to (a) the growth of its 
GNP and foreign trade, (b) the relative price stability up to the eve 
of the oil crisis in spite of Taiwan's rapid economic growth, (c) the 
continuous improvement of its balance of payments until the oil 
crisis and even in spite of it, and (d) the relatively equitable 
* Consultant, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; and Professor and 
Chairman of Economic Department, University of San Francisco. 
** Senior Economist, The Rand Corporation. 
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Figure 1 
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distribution of income and economic power among the island's 
population. 
The United States resumed large-scale economic aid to 
Taiwan in 1952. The index of Taiwan's real GNP (at constant 
1966 prices) in 1972, the year immediately preceding the oil crisis, 
stood at 538.2 (1952 = 100).1 The annual rate of growth during the 
two decades averaged 8.8 percent, rising from 7.2 percent a year 
during the first decade to 10.4 percent during the second decade. 
Alternatively, we can point to the increase in the average annual 
growth rate in· successive periods from 7.2 percent in 1952-60 to 
9.6 percent in 196Q-65 and 10.1 percent in 1965-72. The latter 
comparison is perhaps more meaningful, for reasons which will 
become clear later. The trend was briefly interrupted by the world-
wide recession in 1974, but the economy has moved upward again 
since then. While the real growth rate fell to only 0.6 percent in 
1974, it returned to 2.0 percent in 1975, and bounced back to over 
10 percent in 1976.2 On a per capita basis, Taiwan's GNP growth 
rate between 1952 and 1972 averaged 5.6 percent a year in real 
terms, far exceeding the corresponding rates of most other 
developing countries including the PRC. There can be little doubt 
that Taiwan has taken off on a path of sustained economic 
growth. The record of 1974-76 testifies further to the resilience of 
the economic system in the face of exogenous shocks. 
This remarkable growth record was achieved with only 
moderate price increases. The average rate of increase of 
wholesale prices between 1952 and 1972 was 4.6 percent a year; 
that of consumer prices, 5.8 percent. The rate of increase of 
wholesale prices slowed considerably from 8.8 percent a year in 
1952-60 to 3.4 percent a year in 1960-73; correspondingly, that of 
consumer prices fell from 9.7 percent a year in 1952-60 to 4 
percent in 1960-73. As a result of the oil crisis, wholesale and 
retail prices rose by 35.2 percent and 47.5 percent respectively in 
1974. However, the price index was again stabilized after that. It 
dropped by 5.1 percent in 1975 for wholesale and rose by 5.2 
percent for retail. 
After its reform in 1958, the official exchange rate of the New 
Taiwan Dollar has not varied significantly from the free market 
rate, except for a brief period following the loss of Taiwan's U.N. 
1. Council for Economic Cooperation and Development, Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book, 1973, Taipei, p. 18. 
2. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975. For 1976, see report in the Central 
Daily News (Taipei), December 11, 1976. 
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membership in 1971 and, to a lesser extent, during the oil crisis in 
1973-74. Taiwan's official international reserves were at the level 
of about $1.6 billion in October 1976, apart from which additional 
holdings of probably about the same amount are available. 
From the point of view of social stability, the trend toward 
more equitable distribution of income is even more significant. 
The Gini coefficient declined continuously from 0.6 in 1953 to 0.30 
in 1972.3 The top 20 percent of all households on the income ladder 
received 61 percent of total income in Taiwan in 1953; this share 
· dropped to 39 percent in 1972. The shares of those with lower 
incomes increased correspondingly. A comparison of Taiwan's 
pattern of income distribution with those of other countries shows 
that the lowest 40 percent of its population on the income ladder 
had a distinctly larger share of total income than the correspond-
ing segment of populations in most other Asian countries such as 
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and India. In fact, its relative 
shares of income by income class were almost identical with those 
of Japan and came rather close to those of the United States. 
Measured in these terms, income distribution in Taiwan in 1972 
was only slightly "less equal" than that of Poland in 1964 and 
slightly "more equal" than in Yugoslavia in 1968.4 
The underlying factors of Taiwan's rapid economic growth 
are many and their interrelationships complex. Two, however, 
stand out as fundamental and are especially relevant to an 
assessment of Taiwan's economic viability in the future; to wit, 
the rapid growth of human and material capital stock and the 
phenomenal expansion of exports. During the period in question, 
the former laid the groundwork for the increase in the economy's 
productive capacity while the latter provided the necessary 
stimulus for the expansion of aggregate demand. At the initial 
stage, that is, during the 1950s, when the economy faced a dual 
gap in foreign exchange and domestic savings, massive U.S. aid 
played a key role in sustaining a high rate of investment. 
Subsequently, domestic savings and foreign investment replaced 
U.S. aid as the major source of financing development; foreign 
investment also served as a supplement to Taiwan's foreign 
3. See, Wan-Yong Kus, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area -
Changes and Causes," Income Distribution, Employment and Economic Develop-
ment in Southeast and East Asia, The Japan Economic Research Center, Tokyo 
and the Council for Asian Manpower Studies, Manila, July 1975, p. 94. 
4. Y. L. Wu, Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth, 
(forthcoming). 
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exchange earnings. Finally, although its amount has been small 
relative to U.S. aid in the 1950s, foreign investment has been an 
indispensable vehicle in export marketing and in the transfer of 
technology, two of the principal factors that have made possible 
the growth of Taiwan's export-oriented economy and its structural 
change. 
STAGES OF GROWTH OF TAIWAN'S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
Since Taiwan is an island with limited natural resources, its 
continuous growth and economic viability must be predicated 
upon its ability to draw upon available resources in other 
countries. The fruits of these overseas resources must in general 
be purchased. Accordingly, a priori, the sustained growth of the 
economy requires the unimpeded growth of foreign trade and 
investment, as well as long-run equilibrium in the balance of 
payments. Furthermore, as long as the domestic market is 
relatively small, demand for increasing production must rely 
largely upon the export market. Hence our attention should be 
focused, in the first place, upon the principal factors underlying 
Taiwan's expansion in foreign trade. 
A statistical overview of the growth of Taiwan's exports from 
1952 to 1973 suggests that this historical development can best be 
divided into four distinct periods. (Figure 2 depicts the annual rate 
of growth of Taiwan's exports on a year-to-year basis; the index of 
any given year is calculated by using the preceding year as 100.) 
(a) Continual fluctuations were exhibited during the period before 
1959. Increases in exports in some years were followed by declines 
in others, and the annual growth rate in value terms varied within 
a wide range, from +30 percent to -30 percent. (b) The second 
period began in 1959 and ended in 1966. The annual growth rate 
of exports in real terms increased steadily through 1964. The 
corresponding rate in value terms fluctuated more widely due to 
changes in export prices. (An increase of 50 percent in value was 
registered in 1962.) During the second part of this period exports 
in real terms grew at about 20 percent a year. (c) The third period 
began in 1967 and ended in 1973. During this period Taiwan's 
exports grew generally at 20 percent or more in quantum each 
year. The annual increase in value terms was, of course, at a 
faster rate, reaching a peak of 50 percent in 1973 due to a 
considerable rise of prices during that year. (d) The fourth period 
began in 1974. Because of the sharp increase in crude oil price and 
the world-wide recession that ensued, Taiwan's exports declined 
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by 4.4 percent in real terms in 1974. Recovery began in the latter 
part of 1975 and the volume was substantially larger in 1976. 
A similar review of the history of Taiwan's imports presents 
us with the following picture (Figure 3). (a) Before 1963, the annual 
growth rates of Taiwan's imports fluctuated considerably, 
although the fluctuations were within a narrower range than 
those of pre-1959 exports. The corresponding annual growth rate 
of imports in quantum varied from +10 percent to -7 percent in 
most years; greater fluctuations were registered in value terms. 
However, declines in quantum were reported only in two out ofthe 
eleven years in this period; declines in value were registered only 
in three years. (b) The second period began in 1963 and ended in 
1973. In value terms, imports rose at above 20 percent a year in 
most years during 1963-71 with larger variations in quantum. 
Between 1971 and 1973 the rate rose to substantially above 20 
percent a year, reflecting price increases, while the rate of increase 
in quantum remained at slightly above 15 percent. (c) The third 
stage began in 1974. In that year the value of Taiwan's imports 
rose very sharply as a result of the price increases of oil and other 
intermediate products, as well as stepped-up purchases in the 
preceding year. However, the recession led to a decline of real 
imports by 11.2 percent in 1975, followed by a substantial recovery 
in 1976. 
MAJOR BENCHMARKS IN FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT 
The transition of imports from one stage of development to 
another lagged behind that of exports, apparently for two reasons. 
First, imports fluctuated less than exports before 1963 because of 
the availability on substantial imports financed by U.S. aid. 
Second, although production and exports could not rise without 
increasing imports, the expansion of imports in the later stages 
was also an effect of the prior expansion of exports. The 
conservative and cautious policy makers who managed Taiwan's 
balance of payments apparently made sure that import expansion 
would lag slightly behind the growth of exports. They were 
apparently anxious to build up the country's foreign exchange 
reserves in the light of their experience with balance of payments 
deficits over a number of years. 
The first benchmark in the expansion of Taiwan's exports 
occurred in 1959, midway between 1958 and 1960 when major 
foreign exchange reforms were instituted. During these three 
years multiple exchange rates were abolished step by step, and the 
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differential between the official and free market rates was 
successfully narrowed. The premium of the free market rate over 
the official rate, which stood at NT$24.78 to one U.S. dollar in 
1957, declined from 54.9 percent in that year to only 9.6 percent in 
1961. The official rate in 1961 was NT$40.03 to one U.S. dollar 
while the free market rate was NT$43.89. Minor fluctuations 
occurred during the intervening years between 1961 and 1966, 
when the second phase of Taiwan's export development ended. 
However, by 1966, the two rates were virtually at par, NT$40.10 
being the official rate, and NT$41.00, the free market rate. 5 The 
removal of multiple exchange rates and the effective devaluation 
of the New Taiwan dollar were approached in a very gingerly 
manner, and even this cautious approach was not adopted until 
the price level had become sufficiently stabilized during the 
preceding years. While price inflation was rampant in 1951 and 
1952 - wholesale prices rose by 66 percent in 1951 and 23.2 
percent in 1952- the rate of increase had dropped to 7.2 percent 
in 1957 and 1.4 percent in 1958.6 Without this prior development 
and the restoration of confidence in a stable currency, the foreign 
exchange reforms could not have been instituted; nor would they 
have been so successful in promoting exports and in doing away 
with the price distortions and inequities the multiple exchange 
rates had engendered. 
Establishment of the necessary prior conditions for economic 
reform was in a very significant measure also a result of U.S. aid. 
During 1951-55, U.S. aid amounted to 47 percent of Taiwan's 
gross capital formation and 43 percent of total imports; these 
ratios fell to 34 percent and 36 percent respectively in 1956-60, and 
17 percent and 19 percent respectively in 1961-65.7 Absence of 
either of these two conditions - exchange rate reform and U.S. 
aid- would have made a critical difference. 
The benchmark separating the second and third stages of 
Taiwan's export growth occurred in 1965-66. Having already 
liberalized its regulations governing investment by overseas 
investors at the time of the earlier exchange reform, Taiwan took 
5. These data, originally derived from the Central Bank of China, are given 
by Mo-huan Hsing in "Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Policies," in a volume 
entitled The Philippines and Taiwan, Industrialization and Trade Policies, 
published for the Development Center of OECD, Oxford University Press, London, 
1971, Table A. 23, p. 292. 
6. See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan, A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help 
and Development, Praeger, New York, 1966, Appendix C. Table 16, p. 286. 
7. Mo-huan Hsing, op. cit., p. 197. 
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additional steps in the same direction in January 1965. The first 
Export Processing Zone was established at Kaohsiung, and a 
sharp increase in direct investments from abroad followed 
immediately. The cumulative total of foreign direct investment 
approvals rose from $93.1 million at the end of 1964 to $134.7 
million a year later.8 By 1973 the corresponding total had risen to 
$1,287.1 million; it was $1,405.2 million in 1975. The data in Table 
1 will provide a historical perspective in capsule form. 
1952-59 
196Q-64 
1965-69 
197Q-74 
Table 1. Foreign Investment Approvals 
(U.S. $ million) 
U.S. Investors 
9.5 
38.0 
126.9 
254.5 
Investors 
from Japan 
1.4 
6.4 
52.7 
132.2 
All 
Countries 
20.2 
72.9 
327.2 
866.7 
Source: Sjou-eng Koo, "Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Taiwan," 
Academia Ecomonic Papers, Nankang, Taipei: The Institute of Economics, 
Academia Sinica, Vol. 4, No.1, p. 128, March 1976. Original data from the Foreign 
Investment Commission. 
LIBERALIZATION OF FOREIGN TRADE, EXCHANGE AND 
CAPITAL INFLOW: THE DOMESTIC AND 
WORLD ENVIRONMENT 
The history of Taiwan's foreign trade expansion points 
indisputably to the importance of appropriate domestic economic 
measures. Exports became profitable as a result of the 1958-60 
reform which directed the attention of private business toward 
export promotion, away from the hidden subsidy of licensed 
imports at artificially low foreign exchange rates. The export 
processing zones (EPZs) successfully attracted foreign investors to 
Taiwan; not all of them located their plants within the zones. 
Encouragement of di.,rect foreign investment in general, both 
inside and outside the zones, was undoubtedly instrumental in 
solving the very important marketing problem on which export 
expansion depended. Once established in Taiwan, the foreign 
firms outside the zones also supplied their products to Taiwan's 
domestic market where demand was expanding with the very 
8. These data are from the Foreign Investment Commission, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Republic of China. 
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economic growth to which export expansion contributed most 
decisively. The EPZs apparently served a path-breaking function, 
providing this initial attraction to induce foreign investors and 
other businessmen to come to Taiwan, and encouraging domestic 
firms to locate the items solely to promote exports. 
As of March 1977, there were 10 sole U.S.- and 68 sole 
Japanese-owned firms in the EPZs. In addition, there were 68 
joint ventures composed of U.S.-Japanese interests; 4 composed of 
U.S.-Japanese and other interests; 9 composed of U.S. and other 
interests; and 51 composed of Japanese and other interests. Still 
other investors, many from Hong Kong, are also located in EPZs. 
Thus many Japanese, Hong Kong and other firms export to the 
United States, as well as to other markets, from Taiwan. 
An earlier incomplete count shows that as of 1974, 14 U.S. 
firms had been established within EPZs.9 In addition, 313 
American firms were located outside the zones. Of those outside 
the zones 250 firms, or 80 percent, were established after 1965. It 
was in 1965 that foreign investment rules were further liberalized 
and U.S. aid to Taiwan officially came to an end. A more recent 
count based on 1976.data shows that there were 63 additional U.S. 
firms on the later list that were not on the 1974 list. A number of 
these, if not all, must have been established after 1974. All the 63 
are located outside the EPZs. 
Figure 4 presents a vivid illustration of the rise of Taiwan's 
exports and imports in current dollars. However, neither effective 
marketing with the aid of foreign investors nor unilateral reform 
on the part of Taiwan would have sufficed had not the demand for 
Taiwan's exports expanded considerably during this period. 
Figure 5 shows that the share of the U.S. market in Taiwan's 
exports for the first time surpassed that of Japan during 1966-67. 
The shares of the two countries became about equal in 1962. 
Before 1962 Japan's share had been consistently higher. However, 
the emergence of certain new agricultural exports from Taiwan to 
Japan again pushed up Japan's share between 1962 and 1966. The 
crossing of the two lines depicting the respective shares of the 
United States and Japan as buyers of Taiwan's exports in 
1966-67 (Figure 5) signaled the rise of the role of new exports of 
manufactures from Taiwan. Their appearance was a direct 
outcome of the increase in foreign direct investment. 
9. Calculated from directories of U.S. and Japanese firms. The figures are not 
all inclusive. 
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Between 1966 and 1973 U.S. general imports rose from an 
index of 100 to nearly 400 (see Figure 6). During the same period, 
Taiwan's exports to the United States rose much more sharply, 
from an index of 100 in 1966 to 1377 in 1973. This nearly 14-fold 
increase was partly a reflection of the greater competitiveness of 
Taiwan products on the U.S. market, but the increase was also 
aided by the general expansion of U.S. imports. Furthermore, 
Taiwan's exports to the United States had been so small that the 
large increase scored during this period could in most cases be 
better tolerated by Taiwan's competitors. Given the competitive-
ness of Taiwan's products and the increasing U.S. demand for 
imports, the existence of U.S. as well as Japanese firms in 
Taiwan, both making exportable goods for the American market, 
contributed significantly to Taiwan's expanding share in U.S. 
imports. 
In the case of Japan, Taiwan's exports to Japan in general 
increased after 1966 pari passu with the expansion of Japan's 
import demand as a whole (see Figure 6). Taiwan's exports to 
Japan did not rise in as extraordinary a manner as did Taiwan's 
exports to the United States. Japanese direct investments in 
Taiwan probably contributed as much to the increase in Taiwan's 
exports to the United States as they did to increase exports from 
Taiwan to Japan. 
SENSITIVITY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
TO POLITICAL EVENTS 
The rate of foreign direct investment in Taiwan was 
apparently very sensitive to political events, as is to be expected. 
The rate of U.S. investment in Taiwan dropped in 1971 and 1972 
probably as a result of the ROC's international setbacks during 
those years and doubt about its future status (Figure 7). Between 
1972 and 1973 there was a sharp increase in new U.S. investment 
in Taiwan, which seemed to reflect some recovery of confidence on 
the part of U.S. investors. However, the increase was smaller in 
real terms if price increases are discounted. Investments fell again 
in 1974 because of the general recession and postponement of 
investment plans by many firms. 
The flow of direct investment from Japan, including invest-
ments by "overseas Chinese" residents in Japan, rose steadily 
during 1965-70, immediately after the establishment of the export 
processing zones (Figure 8). The rate of flow fell in 1972, reflecting 
the same concern felt by U.S. investors. Following Japan's 
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transfer of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking in 1973, 
another decline of new Japanese investment in Taiwan occurred 
in 1974 and 1975 although the cause of the decline is again 
somewhat ambiguous because it coincided with the recession.10 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF TAIWAN'S ECONOMY AND 
FOREIGN TRADE 
As the economy of Taiwan develops further, not only will 
there be an increase in GNP and the volume of trade, but the 
domestic sector of the economy should expand even faster. Such a 
development would reduce the "foreign trade ratio" - defined 
here as the ratio of foreign commodity trade to GNP plus imports 
- which was as high as 60 percent in 1973. In this connection, the 
case of Japan presents an appropriate illustration and compari-
son. During 1908-17 the Japanese "foreign trade ratio" averaged 
29 percent.11 It declined to 20 percent in 1950-54. The Japanese 
ratio has always been much smaller than that of contemporary 
Taiwan because of the latter's smaller size. To put it in another 
way, Japan's very large GNP has dwarfed the tremendous size of 
its foreign trade. Because of its smaller size, Taiwan probably will 
have for a long time a much higher foreign trade ratio than 
Japan. However, Taiwan is clearly fast approaching the point 
when it should begin to expand the domestic sector of the 
economy by "filling out" the many linkages which its export-
oriented economy has· already succeeded in developing. Even 
during 1972-74, domestic sales were already accounting for over 
40 percent of the sales of enterprises owned by overseas investors 
in Taiwan.12 
In the case of Japan, the ratio of export of goods and services 
to GNP remained at a fairly stable level of 10 to 11 percent during 
1955-73 -in comparison with about 20 percent in the 1930s -
while per capita GNP grew by leaps and bounds.13 The percentage 
10. According to Taiwan statistics, Japanese direct investment approvals, 
including applications by "overseas Chinese" residents in Japan, declined 14.4 
percent between 1973 and 1974, from $48.9 million in 1973 to $41.9 million in 1974. 
Another 37.5 percent drop was registered in 1975. On the other hand, Japan's 
overall direct investment to foreign countries declined even more during 1973-74, 
from $3.5 billion to $2.4 billion, or 32.5 percent. Japan's Direct Investment 
Overseas, Present State and Future Outlook, Keidanren, Tokyo, March 1976. 
11. Simon Kuznets·, Six Lectures on Economic Growth, Free Press of Glencoe, 
Illinois, 1959, p. 103. 
12. Private communication. 
13. Lawrence B. Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi, "Japan and the World 
Economy," in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, Eds., Asia's New Giant, 
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contribution of export to economic growth from 1921-25 to 
1934-38 was estimated at 39 percent as compared to only 17 
percent in 1955-71.14 The decline ofthe export to GNP ratio and of 
export as a component of growth in the post-World War II period 
was accompanied by a dramatic change in the structure of 
exports. The proportion of such labor-intensive exports as textiles 
and clothing, food, beverage and tobacco, etc. dropped from 65 
percent of total exports in 1955 to 43 percent in 1973. Meanwhile, 
the share of R and D-intensive (e.g., optical and precision 
instruments), capital-intensive, and high-wage exports (e.g., 
automobiles, consumer electronics and so forth) rose sharply. If 
the Japanese experience is any useful guide, the continuation of 
Taiwan's GNP and export growth will also have to be accompan-
ied by an increase in value-added in export, as well as a reduction 
of import content per dollar of export. Rising wage rates and an 
increasing share of exports originating from domestic enterprises 
as compared to exports by foreign enterprises will make these 
changes both necessary and possible. 
However, upgrading of the technological content of Taiwan's 
products in general, including exports, an increase in the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled labor in the labor content of these products, 
and a gradual rise in their capital content will take time. Nor can 
they occur without the sustained infusion of new technology, 
much of which will be embodied in capital equipment. Thus there 
wi\1 have to be more direct foreign investment, more licensing 
arrangements between Taiwan and foreign firms, and more joint 
ventures between Taiwan capital and new technology from 
abroad. Between 1972 and 1974 exports by Taiwan enterprises 
registered a 53.4 percent increase in value; however, the share of 
foreign enterprises in total exports increased from 22.3 percent to 
29.2 percent. This means, therefore, that foreign businessmen will 
have to help in marketing an increasing amount of new exports. 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 399; Edward F. Desnon and 
Willing K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," in ibid., p. 84. Also, 
Economic Statistics of Japan, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 4 and 88. 
14. N. Baba and M. Tatemoto, "Foreign Trade ·and Economic Growth in 
Japan: 1858-1937," in Lawrence Klein and Kazushi, Eds., Economic Growth: The 
Japanese Experience since the Meiji Era, Irwin, Homewood, lllinois, 1968, p. 177; 
Denison and Chung, op. cit., p. 79; Krause and Sekiguchi, op. cit., p. 399. The 
percentage contribution of exports is measured by dividing the increment in 
exports by the increment in GNP, in constant prices. 
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Figure 9 shows in a scatter diagram the close correlation (r = 
+0.966) between the volume of cumulative direct U.S. investment 
and Taiwan's export to the United States. A similar correlation 
exists between total direct overseas investment in Taiwan and 
Taiwan's total export. 
It follows from the above that at this stage of its development 
the continuation of direct foreign investment and technological 
inflow are indispensable to the economic viability of Taiwan. 
Furthermore, the flow of goods, people, capital and technology 
must not be impeded or subjected to delay in any way. On the 
contrary, they must expand further and be quickly responsive to 
changing conditions. Finally, as the volume of Taiwan's exports 
increases, further expansion needs to be accompanied by greater 
commodity and geographical diversification in order to minimize 
the effect of protectionist sentiments in the importing countries. 
Thus a primary condition of Taiwan's economic viability is the 
maintenance of the freedom of the high seas, the freedom to travel 
to and from Taiwan, the freedom to communicate between Taiwan 
and the rest of the world, and the ability to enter new markets and 
to diversify - including upgrading - into new exports. Taiwan 
needs the traditional open-door policy of the United States in 
which the door will swing open both ways. 
IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE US-ROC RELATIONS ON THE 
ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF TAIWAN 
How alternative US-ROC relations will affect Taiwan's 
economic viability will depend, in the first instance, upon their 
effect on t,he factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
A. Direct Foreign Investment 
A statement of the American Chamber of Commerce in the 
Republic of China, dated August 25, 1976, raised a number of 
questions about the future status of American business in Taiwan 
if diplomatic recognition is extended to Peking. Will American 
business continue to enjoy national treatment in the hands of the 
ROC government? Will there be nationalization? If so, what will 
be the level of compensation? Will the various insurance schemes 
against inconvertibility and expropriation offered by the U.S. 
government and its agencies (e.g., OPIC) continue to be valid? 
What will be the proper procedure for resolving questions, or 
settling disputes, that may arise in present and future contracts or 
in the course of doing business (e.g., in case of oil spills by one 
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party's tankers in the territorial waters of the other). Whether 
continuation of relations between the two countries as they now 
stand will remove the uncertainty that has inspired these 
questions is by no means sure. It will depend upon how long the 
present status is expected to last. If the present condition is 
expected to be transitory, investors will tend either to stay away 
or to avoid heavy or long-term commitments. This attitude would 
tend to increase Taiwan's dependence on (i) loans, (ii) export 
earnings, and (iii) licensing arrangements for the acquisition of 
capital goods and foreign technology. Conceivably Taiwan may 
then be faced with a higher debt service ratio, and its balance of 
payments position may deteriorate, which would in turn affect its 
credit standing. 
If relations between the two countries are downgraded and 
U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking takes place, many of the 
questions that inspired uncertainty among American business-
men in Taiwan will become immediately relevant. Even if efforts 
are made by either the ROC or the U.S. government to allay fears, 
and even if none of the untoward developments mentioned by the 
American Chamber of Commerce actually transpires, fear of loss 
will not go away entirely. A process of gradual withdrawal by 
U.S. business interests may begin. Such a debilitating process can 
be avoided only if the governments of both countries can offer 
joint assurances, which would seem to require a degree of mutual 
trust and good will that may not be consistent with the initial 
assumption of the downgrading of their bilateral relations. 
Only in the two-China case, which presupposes a reaffirma-
tion of the current de facto situation on a more or less permanent 
and de jure basis- that is, at least as far as the United States is 
concerned - will the above uncertainties be removed. Long-term 
large commitments would then involve no more than the usual 
business risks. In view of Taiwan's past economic performance, 
these risks would be less than in most other developing countries. 
As Taiwan's economic structure changes gradually in the 
directions noted earlier, economic vulnerability to external 
influence will also diminish. This process of progressive improve-
ment will be in direct contrast to the progressive deterioration of 
the previous case. 
B. Current Exports and Imports 
If US-ROC relations remain as they are, Taiwan's external 
trade can continue to expand as long as its products remain 
competitive and the world economy - the U.S. and Japanese 
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economies in particular - remains reasonably prosperous. 
However, even under present conditions, there have been repeated 
PRGinspired efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. One of the 
latest examples was the attempt in 1976 by members of the 
INTELSAT to replace the ROC with the PRC in its membership, 
which could become a prelude to an attempt to deny the ROC 
access to the INTELSAT Indian Ocean satellite for direct 
communication with such countries as Spain, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. 
If US-ROC relations are downgraded and the legal status of 
Taiwan can be questioned, both private organizations and 
governments will be in a position to raise issues that are 
disruptive of Taiwan's foreign trade. For instance, would Taiwan 
continue to enjoy MFN status in the United States and other 
markets? Would Eximbank facilities continue to be available to 
private and public ROC firms? Would Taiwan benefit under the 
General Preference Scheme of tariff reductions? Would ROC flag 
ships and aircraft be able to function in foreign countries without 
interference and delay? Would ROC government and private 
interests be able to exploit resources in the deep sea and on the 
continental shelf under whatever protection international law 
normally provides? Would ROC fishing vessels be able to operate 
in ever-widening areas as they do now? (One experimental voyage 
to the South Polar region for shrimping was completed early this 
year.) Can visa applications by ROC businessmen and other 
travelers be processed quickly? Would contractual obligations 
between ROC and other nationals be enforceable and in what 
court? Perhaps some of these questions cannot be answered 
without court tests. In other cases, administrative interpretations 
of ambiguous regulations and statutes may be necessary. In either 
case, delays will be unavoidable. As a matter of fact, delays can be 
easily created, which alone may raise the cost of doing business 
with Taiwan and by Taiwan businessmen, with the attendant 
adverse effect on profit prospects.15 Such tactics can be adopted by 
15. An example of such delay, which borders on deliberate harassment, is the 
recent case in San Francisco where the acceptance of a gift from the city of Taipei 
to the city of San Francisco in the form of a pavilion to be erected in Golden Gate 
Park has been held up by the San Francisco Planning Commission's insistence 
that the donors file an environmental impact report to show how the aesthetic 
quality of the park would not be adversely affected. 
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Taiwan's political detractors. They can also be initiated by 
business rivals. Only in the case of the two-China alternative can 
the risks noted above be minimized. 
C. Taiwan's Economic Response 
One of the factors that will affect confidence on the part of 
foreign investors and traders who deal with Taiwan is the latter's 
response to the uncertainties and challenges posed by US-ROC 
relations. For instance, following the unfavorable international 
political developments in 1971-72 and partly as a response to 
them, the ROC government has further liberalized its rules 
governing foreign remittance and travel. Import restrictions have 
also been liberalized. Conceivably, a similar response could be 
forthcoming if US-ROC political relations are downgraded, or in 
spite of such a downgrading. However, a diametrically opposite 
response could have been made in the past, and it would be no less 
possible in the future. This possibility is greater if a major adverse 
economic impact, or the rapid worsening of an initially minor 
impact, is envisioned by ROC policy makers. In such an 
eventuality, Taiwan may turn inward with the result of stricter 
foreign trade and exchange controls, rising defense expenditures 
and a slow-down of economic growth and foreign trade. The issue 
involves weighing short-run gains against long-run disadvan-
tages. So far Taiwan has kept its economic policies focused on 
long-term gains. However, short-run risks could loom too large to 
be ignored. 
D. Third Country Policies and Responses 
of Private Individuals 
Threats to curtail the freedom of access between Taiwan and 
the rest of the world in terms of communication, travel by air and 
sea, freight transportation, national markets, legal redress, and 
exploitation of marine and undersea resources are unlikely to 
materialize in the near future as a result of the direct physical 
intervention of the PRC as long as the latter's capacity to do so is 
limited. Implementation of such threats by Peking at this time 
will require the cooperation of other governments or private 
organizations and individuals that take advantage of Taiwan's 
particular international status. While concrete actions can be 
instigated by Peking, they can also be initiated by the individual 
interests of third parties. Hence the policies of countries other 
than the PRC and ROC can play an important role. Will they be 
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willing to be a party to the infringement of the freedoms 
mentioned above with respect to Taiwan or any other economic 
entity regardless of the latter's de jure international political 
status? Will they permit their own citizens to engage in 
discriminatory practices that aim at the economic isolation of 
Taiwan? U.S. policy and leadership in this regard are of vital 
importance and can affect the attitudes of other countries. The 
following examples in 1976 will serve as illustrations. 
1. A message was delivered to the president of the National 
Council for US-China Trade by a member of the PRC Liaison 
Office in Washington in May 1976 to the effect that U.S. firms 
might find their trade with the PRC adversely affected by their 
membership in a recently formed US-ROC Economic Council. The 
message ostensibly originated from the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade in Peking and was duly passed 
on by the president of the National Council to the latter's 
members in a memorandum for their attention, dated May 11, 
1976. 
2. According to a Los Angeles Times report on September 8, 
1976, several U.S. firms had been targets ofPRC discrimination in 
their trade probes because of their attempts to do business with 
both Taiwan and the Mainland. This point was made amply clear 
to them by the PRC. A less clear case was reported by the Wall 
Street Journal on September 14, 1976, concerning the refusal of 
Mainland China banks to cash American Express travellers 
checks for visitors, presumably because of the company's 
relationship with the ROC. 
A directive by President Ford to the then Secretary of 
Commerce, officially released by the White House on October 7, 
1976, during the heat of the presidential campaign, reaffirmed our 
national policy of opposition to boycott actions against "nations 
friendly to us" and made Arab boycott request reports filed by 
U.S. companies with the Department of Commerce available to 
the public. The kind of implied request by Peking that U.S. firms 
intending to sell to the PRC not engage in various relationships 
with the ROC would seem to fall under the purview of U.S. Export 
Administration Regulations paragraph 369.2 and paragraph 369.3 
requiring reporting within 15 calendar days of receipt of the 
request. A California law (A.B. No. 3080) has specifically made it 
unlawful to exclude persons or corporations from business 
transactions on the basis that the party conducts or has 
conducted business in a particular location or on the basis of sex, 
race, creed, color, etc. On the national level several anti-boycott 
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bills with provisions of economic penalties for offenders are now 
in the Congress. It remains to be seen whether the same principles 
would in fact apply to discriminatory measures practiced by the 
PRC aimed at US-Taiwan economic relations. 
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES ON 
U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
The foregoing discussion attempts to identify the economic 
consequences of alternative U.S. policies for Taiwan. From the 
standpoint of the United States the relative desirability of the 
three alternatives depends on which of them would on balance 
further U.S. objectives the most. What are the fundamental U.S. 
economic interests in the present context? In the short run, one 
might include stable and expanding markets for U.S. exports and 
sources of supply of U.S. imports and protection of existing U.S. 
investments abroad. The major long-run U.S. international 
economic objectives are economic security of the countries 
concerned, expansion of world trade and economic growth of per 
capita income in the developing countries, and safeguarding of 
new investment opportunities for American investors. The relative 
weights assigned to these objectives vary somewhat with the 
decision-maker's perceptions, their relation with other noneco-
nomic objectives, and' the specific circumstances in which the 
choices present themselves. There are, therefore, always some 
uncertainies regarding the relative importance of different U.S. 
objectives at any given time. By and large, however, these do 
represent the basic U.S. economic interests. 
US-PRC VERSUS US-ROC TRADE 
Since 1971 the United States has been trading with the PRC 
and Taiwan at the same time. A no-change policy or a two-China 
policy would probably have little short-run effect on US-ROC 
trade prospects but might increase U.S. direct investment in 
Taiwan. The PRC could be antagonized by such stands and divert 
its U.S. trade to elsewhere, other things being equal, if shifts are 
possible. Downgrading of US-ROC relations, together with 
diplomatic recognition of Peking, may also create a similar but 
reverse situation in which the United States may lose in its trade 
with Taiwan and gain in its trade with the PRC. To provide some 
background information for discussion of the possible tradeoffs, 
Figure 10 compares U.S. exports to, and imports from, the PRC 
and Taiwan in 1971-76. The comparison shows two distinctive 
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features. First, US-ROC and US-PRC trade are of very different 
orders of magnitude. Two-way US-ROC trade in 1975 was $3,602 
million, almost eight times the US-PRC trade of $462 million. In 
1976, the respective totals were $337.3 million for US-PRC trade 
and $4,527.3 million for US-ROC trade, or 13 times larger. The 
enormous difference suggests that Taiwan is at present a far more 
important market for U.S. exports and source of supply of U.S. 
imports than the PRC. A 10 percent loss of trade with Taiwan 
would have to be compensated by a 130 percent increase in US-
PRC trade. On the other hand, a total loss of US-PRC trade could 
be made up with a 7.4 percent increase in US-ROC trade. Second, 
U.S. exports to the PRC were more erratic than U.S. exports to 
Taiwan. For instance, there was a sharp drop in U.S. exports to 
the PRC in 1974-75. In part this was a result of overcommitment 
by Peking in the early 1970s. In part it was due to a shift of its 
grain purchase to suppliers. In any event, Peking makes no secret 
of its position that trade is a legitimate economic tool to be used to 
enhance its diplomatic and political leverage, as has been made 
abundantly clear in Teng Hsia-ping's speech before the United 
Nations General Assembly on April 10, 1974. Therefore, in 
expanding exports to the PRC, one must be prepared to face the 
constant risk of abrupt shifts. 
At any rate, a sustained increase in US-PRC trade cannot be 
based on a shift of PRC trade from other partners to the United 
States, but rather on growth of the PRC's total trade. The crucial 
question is, therefore, the trade potential of the PRC. Since 
Peking's imports depend on its exports, trade potential, in the long 
run, means essentially export potential. In the two decades up to 
1970, PRC exports grew at the rate of two to three hundred million 
dollars a year, a small amount compared to T~iwan's current 
level. When the PRC began to export oil in significant quantities 
in 1973, it was widely believed that this new export would provide 
the key to an upsurge of exports. There was indeed an upsurge 
during 1970-75, but it was due largely to price increases during 
this period. More important, it is questionable whether the PRC's 
oil exports could indeed play a leading role; they have not lived up 
to expectations thus far. Whether their growth has been restricted 
by internal supply or demand conditions, or by the leadership's 
change of plans, is not entirely cJP.ar. However, one external factor 
is significant in limiting the contribution of the PRC's oil exports 
to its foreign exchange earning power. Peking began exporting oil 
at a time when the oil crisis triggered world-wide inflation and 
recession. As a result, the prices of the PRC's imports rose much 
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faster than those of its traditional exports (i.e., exports other than 
oil). That is to say, the terms of trade became adverse to the PRC 
so far as traditional exports were concerned. This was offset by 
the rise in price of its oil exports. The net effect is that the increase 
in export capacity in real terms was rather limited. In addition, 
two recent events would probably delay export growth somewhat. 
These were the Tangshan earthquake, which inflicted heavy 
damage on a major coal production center, and the need for 
foreign exchange to pay for the large number of plants contracted 
earlier. 
PRC earnings from exports to the U.S. can increase if Peking 
is granted MFN status, which would enable suppliers of these 
products to promote them more vigorously even if their dollar 
prices were to remain unchanged. Greater sales are possible, of 
course, if prices are reduced somewhat although lower prices are 
by no means contingent upon MFN status since there is no direct 
relationship between external prices and Chinese domestic cost. 
When we compare the types of U.S. imports from the PRC and 
Taiwan, as shown in Table 2, one interesting feature emerges. 
What the United States buys most from Taiwan it buys very little 
from the PRC, and vice versa. This suggests that Taiwan and the 
PRC supplement each other as sources of U.S. imports. The PRC 
provided mostly crude materials, food, chemicals and some 
manufactured goods. Taiwan supplied large amounts of machin-
ery and transportation equipment and manufactured goods. The 
implication ofthis complementarity for the United States is that it 
would be difficult to replace one source of supply with the other. 
To make up for the loss of a supplier, it might be possible to 
restructure the other's exports or to turn to a third source. But 
restructuring exports is not a simple task and the question 
remains as to whether the country's comparative advantage 
would justify such a drastic change economically. As for the 
possibility of a third supplier, the alternative is certainly feasible. 
To a degree, South Korea or Hong Kong could partially take the 
place of Taiwan. But again, there is the question of the terms of 
trade. When there is less competition among the suppliers, the 
terms of trade generally work against the buyer. This brings us to 
the problem of the PRC and Taiwan as alternative markets for 
U.S. exports. 
Table 3 shows U.S. exports to the PRC and Taiwan by 
commodity groups in 1971-76. The picture here is quite different 
from U.S. imports. Both the PRC and Taiwan buy more or less the 
same group of U.S. products. Both are competing for U.S. exports. 
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Table 2. 
U.S. Imports from Taiwan and PRC, 1971-76 (Million U.S. $) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Total imports 
Taiwan 817.4 1,293.5 1,772.5 2,107.6 1,946.0 2,958.4 
PRC 4.9 32.3 64.0 114.7 158.3 201.9 
Food, live animals 
Taiwan 54.2 84.1 85.3 111.9 1_92.4 142.0 
PRC 1.5 4.2 6.0 13.5 14.2 23.8 
Beverages, tobacco 
Taiwan 0.3 0.4 0.09 
PRC 0.7 2.8 1.8 0.3 
Crude materials, inedible 
(except fuel) 
Taiwan 7.0 11.7 15.0 14.1 11.1 13.9 
PRC 2.2 12.3 14.6 16.3 17.6 38.5 
Mineral fuels, 
lubricants, etc. 
Taiwan 0.4 2.1 0.4 3.4 0.01 
PRC 0.4 0.1 neg. 
Oils & fats, animal, 
vegetable 
Taiwan 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 
PRC 0.7 0.4 1.9 2.4 
Chemicals 
Taiwan 6.9 9.5 12.1 31.9 16.2 26.1 
PRC 0.3 2.1 8.2 18.4 15.9 18.0 
Manufactured goods 
Taiwan 119.4 193.2 242.2 288.0 238.0 355.4 
PRC 0.5 7.4 21.0 42.7 79.4 68.5 
Machinery, transportation 
equipment 
Taiwan 202.2 401.1 600.5 685.3 488.5 780.2 
PRC 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.3 
Miscellaneous manufac-
tured articles 
Taiwan 420.1 584.0 797.6 954.7 964.5 1,618.0 
PRC 0.3 6.1 11.2 19.2 25.6 47.5 
Miscellaneous 
Taiwan 7.5 9.4 17.1 20.8 31.4 22.4 
PRC 0.1 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.6 
Sources: 1971: U.S. Department of Commerce, General Imports, World Area by 
Commodity Groups, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 374. 
1972-75: Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 2, 1976, p. 44. 
U.S. Dept. Commerce, Bureau of East-West Trade, Office of East-West Policy, 
U.S. Trade Status with Communist Countries, February 1977. 
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Table 3. 
U.S. Exports to Taiwan and PRC, 1971-76 (Million U.S.$) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Total exports 
Taiwan 342.7 629.5 1,165.0 1,423.8 1,655.7 1,568.9 
PRC 60.2 689.1 806.9 303.6 135.4 
Food and live animals 
Taiwan 30.5 55.9 154.1 167.8 180.9 202.1 
PRC 56.0 410.1 329.6 0.02 
Beverages and tobacco 
Taiwan 10.1 14.9 18.7 30.8 27.5 13.2 
PRC 1.4 2.7 neg. 
Crude materials, inedible 
(except fuel) 
Taiwan 141.6 149.1 319.1 307.3 407.5 304.5 
PRC 171.9 328.0 100.1 13.0 
Mineral fuels, 
lubricants, etc. 
Taiwan 2.1 2.6 3.5 7.2 7.2 0.01 
PRC 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Oils & fats, animal, 
vegetable 
Taiwan 4.4 4.3 5.2 18.4 10.0 12.2 
PRC 2.2 19.2 7.5 
Chemicals 
Taiwan 25.2 32.4 90.0 127.4 125.3 154.6 
PRC 7.9 10.2 5.2 10.4 
Manufactured goods 
Taiwan 25.3 31.4 76.2 123.4 141.3 132.2 
PRC 9.0 18.5 73.8 43.3 
Machinery, transporta-
tion equipment 
Taiwan 157.5 233.4 398.2 562.7 599.7 666.2 
PRC 2.0 69.0 106.7 118.8 65.1 
Miscellaneous manufac-
tured articles 
Taiwan 13.1 20.5 21.2 32.4 39.2 69.5 
PRC 1.1 0.8 2.7 4.9 3.4 
Items not classified 
by kind 
Taiwan 1.8 2.5 5.9 6.7 6.2 3.4 
PRC 0.3 0.4 0.02 
See Sources, Table 2 supra. 
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It would be to the advantage of the United States to have two 
buyers rather than one. On this account, the two-China case is 
perhaps preferable to others simply because it offers the U.S. more 
options so far as export markets are concerned. 
LONG-RANGE U.S. INTERESTS: INTERNATIONAL 
STABILITY AND GROWTH 
The oil crisis has brought into sharp focus the need to insure 
economic security for all countries in an international environ-
ment characterized by growing interdependence through trade, 
flow of technology and investment. It is a declaratory policy of the 
United States to pursue this goal.16 Any abrupt move by the 
United States that causes serious disruption and tension in 
international economic relations is therefore contrary to U.S. 
interests and to what it has been preaching to the OPEC 
countries. By this criterion the no-change policy would obviously 
be less disruptive than the other alternatives, particularly in the 
short-run. As we have noted above, diplomatic recognition of 
Peking and withdrawal of recognition of the ROC would probably 
generate an economic shock in Taiwan with adverse effects on its 
growth rate and perhaps even its viability. 
In its struggle for economic survival, Taiwan may resort to 
rather drastic measures such as devaluation to offset a possible 
export decline, and stricter control of the free flow of goods, 
people, information and capital - a series of measures that 
probably would not hurt the U.S. economy seriously but nonethe-
less could have destabilizing effects in the region. The two-China 
policy might also generate a shock, but it is likely to be a political 
rather than economic shock, and would have its main impact on 
the PRC. If we look beyond the immediate future, the potential 
disputes over resources on the continental shelf could be further 
complicated by an additional claimant. But the emergence of 
Taiwan as an independent state has positive elements. The 
current trend toward expanding trade and international flows of 
technology and investment might continue as risks and uncertain-
ties subside. They may even accelerate in the event of diplomatic 
recognition of the PRC and Taiwan at the same time. 
If indeed the latter occurs, a two-China policy would help to 
attain the long-range U.S. objective of assisting the developing 
16. Address by Henry A. Kissinger, delivered by Daniel P. Moynihan, at the 
Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 1, 
1975. • 
CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 171 
countries to raise their living standards. A no-change policy would 
probably have neutral effects, if we accept the premise that 
Peking could expand its trade and technology transfer as much as 
it can under the present arrangement. By contrast, diplomatic 
recognition of Peking is likely to bring about economic stagnation 
if not a decline in the Taiwan economy. 
For Japan, U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking has yet 
another unfavorable effect. Like Taiwan, Japan depends heavily 
on the free flow of raw materials and fuels. It is therefore 
important that no precedent be establised so that shipping and 
trade involving Japan would be disrupted. Since diplomatic 
recognition might lead to economic warfare and possibly military 
confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC, it would be in 
Japan's economic interest that the United States adopt another 
alternative. 
Dr. Sigur thanked Dr. Wu for giving us quite a bit to think 
about and discuss in the coming hour and a half or so. He was 
particularly grateful that Dr. Wu brought in the Japanese 
dimension, because he thought as we discussed the whole question 
of US-ROC relations and involvement with the PRC, we had to 
keep in mind that successive presidents of the U.S. over the past 
several years as well as the present incumbent, Mr. Carter, had 
stated over and over again that the fundamental American 
relationship in the Asian Pacific is the U.S.-Japanese alliance. 
Therefore we must understand how important this was in any 
discussion that we had on events in Asia. 
Dr. Sigur then introduced Dr. Robert Heuser of the Max 
Planck-Institute at Heidelberg to speak. He said that he need 
not tell the participants very much about that institute since all of 
us knew of that famous institute. Dr. Heuser was going to speak 
on the legal aspects of trade with, and investment in the Republic 
of China in the experience of the German Federal Republic (FRG). 
Dr. Heuser sketched the history of FRG-ROC trade relations 
up to 1976, when Germany was the ROC's third-ranked trade 
partner, following the United States and Japan. He noted also the 
growth of German capital investment in the ROC, especially in 
the last few years. Lack of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, according to Dr. Heuser, is not a substantial impedi-
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ment to trade. Government investment guarantees are available 
to the German investor in spite of the lack of an FRG-ROC 
"investment protection agreement"; however, because of the short-
term nature of most German investment in the ROC and because 
of, among other things, the ROC's internal investment protection 
scheme, German investors rarely take advantage of these 
guarantees. Dr. Heuser also noted that protection with regard to 
trademarks and patents is available, but that protection against 
infringement of copyrighted textile designs remains unsatisfac-
tory. Dr. Heuser concluded by discussing the effects of the EEC 
common commercial policy on FRG-ROC economic relations. To 
date, the common commercial policy has only affected German 
textile imports from the ROC. However, the effects of protective 
measures undertaken by the EEC remain an important matter of 
concern. 
[The following is the text of the paper prepared by Dr. Robert 
Heuser.] 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH AND 
INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA ON TAIWAN: THE 
GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
RoBERT HEUSER* 
I. INTRODUCTIONt 
It is the purpose of this paper to show a pattern of economic 
relationship between two countries whose economies are greatly 
dependent on foreign trade but whose trading citizens have to deal 
* Dr. iur., research fellow, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law 
and International Law, Heidelberg; associated with Dr. Wellbrock and Partners, 
law office, Heidelberg. 
t Abbreviations: ABl. = Amtsblatt der Europaischen Gemeinschaften (EEC 
Gazette); AHD = Aussenhandelsdienst (Dusseldorf); A WD = Aussenwirtschafts-
dienst, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (Heidelberg); BGBl. = Bundesgesetzb-
latt (Gazette of the FRG); Cosway-Ma-Shattuck = R. Cosway, H. P. Ma, W. 
Shattuck, Trade and Investment in Taiwan, Taipei 1973; DWD = (Die Aussenwirt-
schaft, Deutscher Wirtschaftsdienst, (Koln); F. A. = Freies Asien (Bonn); ILM = 
International Legal Materials; TIP = Taiwan Industrial Panorama. 
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without much governmental assistance because of the lack of 
diplomatic relations. 
The information upon which this paper is based has mainly 
been obtained from Chinese and German legal sources, from 
relevant German journals and from interviews I had with Chinese 
representatives in Germany as well as with members of German 
institutes (including the German Ministry of Economic Mfairs), 
finally with executives of German capital and merchandise 
exporting companies. 
Let me make at the beginning some short remarks concerning 
the development of Chinese-German economic relations in 
general, providing you with some statistical data. 
II. GERMAN-CHINESE TRADE AND GERMAN INVESTMENT 
IN TAIWAN: SOME HISTORICAL AND 
STATISTICAL DATA 
The development of economic relations between the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the ROC reflects the relevant pre-
war experiences: a comparatively high trade exchange on the one 
hand and a comparatively small investment willingness on the 
other, a phenomenon - by the way - which can be observed in 
German foreign economic activities in general. Direct investments 
of German companies in developing countries are only one-half of 
the French, one-third of the British and one-ninth of the U.S. 
private investments in those countries.1 The reasons for this are 
highly complex - experiences of expropriation and confiscation 
after two world wars, comparatively little training in dealing in 
and with non-European countries because oflimited experience as 
an imperial·power, may be mentioned. 
A new beginning of ROC-German commercial interest after 
World War II came no earlier than the end of the fifties, 
increasing in the sixties, and taking on considerable volume in the 
seventies. 
Taiwan's development in to one of the leading industrialized 
countries in the Far East within less than one decade, becoming 
able to offer her industrial products to the markets of South-East 
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Americas was 
1. See, e.g., E. Eppler, Wenig Zeit fUr die Dritte Welt, Stuttgart 1971, at 88. For 
a broader inquiry into the problem of direct investment in developing countries see 
Awni-Al-Ani, German Investment in Developing Countries, in: Intereconomics 
(Hamburg), No. 7, 1969, 219-221. 
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carefully observed in German commercial circles.2 It was noticed 
with satisfaction by potential German traders and investors that 
the ROC government promoted the economy of the country 
according to the principles of a free enterprise, supporting the 
extension of the private sector of the economy as well as a more 
active participation of private domestic and foreign capital, 3 that 
the establishment of Export Processing Zones was of such great 
success as to become a model for other developing countries, 4 and 
that the government was reorganizing the foreign-trade bureau-
cracy5 and simplifying investment formalities. 6 
The comprehensive market studies undertaken by the Chinese 
Industrial Development and Investment Center (IDIC) regarding 
the development of industries emphasized six branches of 
industry as deserving preferential support: petrochemical, plas-
tics, electronic, steel, watch-making and synthethic resin indus-
tries. It is clear that such emphasis would appeal greatly to 
German economic interests. 
Since the end of the fifties the Federal Republic has played an 
active role in Taiwan's economy. Leading German producers of 
the chemicals industry are represented in Taiwan, and German 
experts of various industrial branches are advising domestic 
companies, many Qf which are producing under a German license. 
German industries have delivered - partly with U.S. financial 
assistance - a remarkable share of industrial equipment in 
Taiwan. German firms supply on a basis of long-term payment. 
Examples are the "Southeast Soda Ash Plant" in Suao, cement 
plants, machinery for cargo-ships, and projects in the field of 
traffic and communication and more recently in the field of petro-
chemistry. 
Looking at some figures we realize the continuous growth of 
foreign trade between the ROC and the FRG. In 1954 Germany's 
2. See, e.g., AHD vol. 19 (1965), at 600:-Taiwans Werdegang zum autarken 
Staat; DWD 1963, No. 23: Der industrielle Aufschwung in Taiwan; id. 1966, at 1142: 
Giinstiges lnvestitionsklima fordert den industriellen Aufbau in Taiwan; id. 1967, 
at 791: Auslandische Privatinvestitionen forcieren wirtschaftliche Prosperitat 
Taiwans. For a scholarly assessment see J. Riedel, Wirtschaftspolitik und 
Exportentwicklung in Taiwan, in: Die Weltwirtschaft, 1975, No. 1, 100-113. 
3. In AHD vol. 22 (1968) at 190 "the excellent opportunities for foreign 
investment in Taiwan" ("a model case of economic development within the 
developing countries") are stressed. 
4. AHD vol. 26 (1972), at 952. 
5. AHD vol. 23 (1969), at 40. 
6. AHD vol. 22 (1968), at 536. 
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share of Taiwan's total imports was 2.46%, 4.74% in 1961, 5.1% in 
1969 and 5% in 1976. Germany's share of Taiwan's total exports 
was 1.82% in 1954, 3.83% in 1961, 4% in 1969 and 4.7% in 1976. 
Expressed in absolute figures, the value of Taiwan's imports 
from Germany was US$4.3 million in 1954, 9.1 million in 1961, 
about 80.0 million in 1969 and 416 million in 1976.7 For more than 
a decade there has been a trade surplus for the ROC, with the 
single exception of 1974. (This is also the case regarding the U.S. 
but not Japan.) 
A comparison with other major trading partners of the ROC 
shows that Germany ranks at third place after the U.S. and 
Japan, although there is still a broad gap between Germany and 
those two countries concerning trade exchange with the ROC. It 
would seem, however, that the ROC Government is attempting to 
intensify the trade with European countries in order to avoid 
dependence on any single country.8 The trade deficits with Japan 
are a particular object of concern, although Chinese specialists see 
clearly enough that the time of economic independence from 
Japan is "a long way off,"9 and that the competitiveness of 
7. Sources: AHD vol. 16 (1962), at 376; TIP vol. 5, No. 2 (Feb. 1, 1977). 
Shipments and financing of the FRG through Hong Kong are not 
contained in these figures, which only reflect the direct foreign trade relations of 
both countries. In terms of merchandise, the imports from Taiwan consist at the 
present time of 35% textiles and 20% canned goods, tl)e remainder being products of 
light industries as plastics and electrical. See, e.g., Lien·he pao (Taipei), Dec. 19, 
1974. 
8. In "Foreign Trade Development in the Republic of China," issued by the 
Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (1976) it says that "our 
private enterprises have been urged to procure more sophisticated, high quality 
machinery and equipment from European countries ... " (p. 11). And the Secretary 
General of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development 
of the ROC appealed in 1968 to European business men "not (to) give up Taiwan as 
a captive market for Japanese and American suppliers" (see S. Y. Dao, How to 
Strengthen Economic Relations between the Republic of China and Western 
Europe, in: Chronique de Politique Etrangere, vol. 21 (1968), at 709, 719). From May 
25 to June 15, 1969, a "European Industrial Machinery Exhibition" took place in 
Taipei. It was sponsored by the Council for International Economic Cooperation 
and Development and the Free China Europe Industrial Institute. The share of 
German industry was more than 50% of the total participants (eight West 
European countries). In the summer of 1973 a Chinese trade delegation consisting 
of 13 representatives of Chinese companies visited the main commercial and 
industrial centers in Western Europe. With the support of the Government, Chinese 
commercial and industrial circles in Taiwan established in Nov. 1975 a "Society 
for the Promotion of Chinese-European Trade." 
9. Quoted in AHD, vol. 26 (1972), at 914: Europa·Orientierung Taiwans. 
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European products remains adversely affected by Europe's high 
labor costs and the distance separating Europe and Taiwan. 
In contrast to foreign trade, the export of private German 
capital to Taiwan is rather limited in volume. Up to the present 
time little more than a dozen German firms have established 
themselves as government-approved direct investors in Taiwan. 
All but one are fully owned subsidiaries10 and are producing 
mainly in the fields of chemistry, electronics, optics and clothes. 
Most of them are situated in the Export Processing Zones, and 
only the few looking for a local market are outside the zones. 
The development of German direct investment in Taiwan is 
expressed by the following figures: 11 Starting from 1972, the total 
investment was US$3.7 million in that year, 4.1 in 1973, 5.3 in 
1974, 6.6 in 1975, and up to June 30, 1976 already 6.9. 12 
It is obvious that the gap between Germany on the one hand 
and Japan and the U.S. on the other is even wider concerning 
direct investment than it is in the case of trade. It is not surprising 
that the ROC government tries to reduce the domination of single 
countries in favor of a more balanced foreign investment 
situation. A special need for such a balance seems to be felt 
concerning investments in the fields of electronics and automobile 
parts. In March 1972 the Vice-Chairman of the Council for 
International Economic Cooperation and Development of the 
10. One is a joint venture with local firms; another a joint venture with a 
Japanese firm. From the German experience it would seem that the ROC 
government does not follow the general trend in the developing countries towards 
emphasizing joint ventures. For an assessment of the contribution of joint ventures 
to the development of the South Korean economy see Chang Young Kim, Der 
Beitrog von partnerschafts. Unternehmen (Joint Ventures) zum Eut~cklungspro­
zess. Dargestellt am Beispiel der Republik Korea, Ph.D. thesis, Koln 1971. 
11. Source: Information from the Federal Ministry of Economic Mfairs: See 
also also Jahresbericht of the Ostasiatischen Vereins e.V. 1975/1976, p. 32. This is 
little less than investments in the Republic of Korea, only a third of those in Hong 
Kong, a fifth of Indonesia, a seventh of Singapore and less than a fifteenth of 
German investment in Japan. According to paragraphs 55 and 56 of the Foreign 
Economy Regulations (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung) promulgated by the Federal 
Government in 1966, German capital exports are to be notified to the German 
Federal Bank and are published in the Federal Bulletin. All information 
concerning the investor is protected by a secrecy clause. The above-mentioned 
figures, of course, do not contain the quite considerable capital sums which are 
raised by German companies on the well functioning Asia-Dollar market. 
12. Within the last 25 years the total investment of European 'Countries was 
US$194,437,000 (i.e., 17.73% of all foreign investments), as compared to 
US$491,810,000 (i.e., 44.83%) of the US and US$246,632,000 (i.e., 22.48%) of Japan. 
Source: F.A. no. 3/1977 (Feb. 10, 1977), at 4. 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 177 
ROC explained at the International Conference on Foreign 
Investment in Asian Developing Countries held in Hamburg the 
"Reasons and Motives for German Investment in Taiwan,"13 
clearly with the intention of appealing to potential German 
investors. An increase of German capital export to Taiwan is very 
probable. Negotiations concerning a big German investment 
project in the field of electronics have just been successfully 
concluded. 
Let me now turn to the consideration of some specific legal 
problems which emerge in the economic relations between the two 
countries. 
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
A. The Institutional Framework 
After July 3, 1941, when the Chinese Republic - then in 
Chungching - cut off diplomatic relations with Germany (the 
German government had two days before recognized the Wang 
Ching-wei government of N anjing), and after the end of the Wang 
Ching-wei regime in 1945, Germany has never established 
diplomatic relations with the ROC. There are no agreements in 
force between the two countries. Consequently, the existing 
economic relations are of a purely private nature, little aided by 
governmental encouragement and international legal assist-
ance.14 
In view of this situation the institutional framework for 
economic cooperation is merely of a private and - as far as 
Chinese representation in Germany is concerned - of a semi-
official (if at all) character.15 The representation of ROC economic 
interests in the Federal Republic is institutionalized in the Far 
East Trade Service Center, which deals with trade relations 
13. For W.H. Fei's speech see: Industry of Free China (Tzi-yu Chung-Kuo chi 
kung-ye), vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (March 1972), at 2. 
14. On a governmental level there was only "technical help" for a short time 
at the end of the sixties, limited in volume (2.3 mill. DM) and dropping to none 
when diplomatic relations were established with the PRC. (Information from the 
Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation to the author.) 
15. But even less official than Japan-ROC relations, which are characterized 
by simply changing the label. Former diplomatic personnel now work in the 
"Japan-Taiwan Interchange Association" (offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung) and 
the "East Asia Relations Association" (offices in Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka). 
Both organizations concluded an agreement on Dec. 26, 1972 concerning 
"Commerce, economy and culture" (see China aktuell, Hamburg, Dec. 1972, at 14.) 
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between Taiwan and Germany, and the Asia Trade Center, which 
consists of three bodies: one responsible for purchase from all 
Europe, one dealing with investment services concerning all 
European investors, and one dealing with German-ROC tourism. 
Both Centers have their seat in Frankfurt/Main and have close 
contact with the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs. Cultural and 
political information is offered by the Far East Information 
Service, with branches in Bonn, Hamburg and West Berlin. 
As far as German organizations are concerned, only the East 
Asia Association (Ostasiatischer Verein e.V.) of Hamburg and 
Bremen can be mentioned. This private association of German 
businessmen interested in the Far East was founded in 1900 and 
is engaged in the cultivation of trade relations with this region, 
including the ROC. The German economy is so far not represented 
in the ROC. The German Cultural Centers in Taipei and 
Kaohsiung are not prepared to be of any assistance in economic 
matters; there are no German banking and commercial institu-
tions. Information concerning investment projects in Taiwan can 
be received, however, from the German Consulate General in 
Hong Kong.1s 
B. Does This Lack of Diplomatic Relations Have a 
Disturbing Impact on the Execution of Foreign 
Trade and Investment Programs? 
1. Protection of Investments 
Foreign direct investments can be protected by different legal 
means. The domestic legal order of the capital receiving country, 
the contract between the government of this country and the 
foreign investor, finally a bilateral or multilateral international 
legal order all may be concerned with such protection. 
The lack of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic 
and the ROC frustrates the development of a bilateral interna-
tional legal order in favor of the protection of German invest-
ments. Since 1959 the Federal Republic has concluded with 37 
16. In contrast to the German absence of economic representation in Taiwan, 
the Confederation of British Industries plans the establishment of an office in 
Taipei with a "residential manager," and British and Canadian banks will open 
branches in Taiwan. In 1974 an office of the "Australia-Free China Society," 
which represents Australian economic interests in Taiwan, was opened (see China 
aktuell Hamburg, May 1974, at 227). 
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developing countries so-called "investment-protection agree-
ments."17 They are intended to assist in creating more favorable 
conditions for private investments through a guarantee of legal 
protection, especially against expropriation based on an interna-
tional legal commitment. Whereas the government of the USA 
relies for this purpose18 on its traditional form of Treaties of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the German government 
chose with its "investment-protection agreements" a new way. It 
is characterized by being shaped for the special needs of 
developing countries and is confined to the protection of capital; it 
does not contain any provisions concerning commerce and 
freedom of settlement.19 
· Such an agreement was of course not concluded with the 
ROC. Although German investors have confidence in the ROC 
legal order - German lawyers feel at home in a legal system 
which is shaped according to the civil law system and especially 
according to German law - there lacks the confirmation and 
attestation of the relevant contents of this domestic legal order by 
an international legal commitment. While the value of an 
investment-protection agreement might be contested, 20 the non-
consideration of the ROC within the agreement system of the 
German government leads to problems concerning the 
investment-risk guarantee which may be obtained by German 
citizens or companies under the German investment guarantee 
17. See Justus Alenfeld, Die lnvestitionsforderungsvertrage der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M., 1971 and Helmut Frick, Bilateraler Investitions-
schutz in Entwicklungslandern. Ein Vergleich der Vertragssysteme der Verei-
nigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin 1975. 
18. The justification for such U.S. treaties was expressed as follows: " ... to 
reduce the special hazards to which overseas investment may be exposed by reason 
of unfavourable laws or judicial conditions. Rigid exchange controls, inequitable 
tax statutes, or drastic expropriation laws are not conducive to the free flow of 
capital, and it is against obstacles of this kind that these treaties are directed," in: 
UN Doc. E/3021, at 40. 
19. The standard contents of these agreements is mainly as follows: clause of 
non-discrimination (art. 2); provision against expropriation and for sufficient 
compensation (art. 3); guarantee of free transfer of capital and profits (art. 4); 
provisions concerning the transfers (art. 6, 7) and the jurisdiction in case of dispute 
settlement (art. 11). 
20. See, e.g., Ingrid Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in 
Developing Countries, Epping, Essex 1973, at 34 f. She argues that investment 
guarantee agreeeements add "little or nothing to what would anyway apply under 
international law." 
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program21 (covering the risks of war, inconvertibility, and 
expropriation or confiscation). The main condition for receiving 
such a guarantee is the existence of an investment-protection 
agreement. The chief significance of such an agreement is 
therefore its link to the national guarantee scheme.22 
The problem resulting from this legal mechanism for the 
potential investor in Taiwan is as obvious as it is surmountable. 
According to information from the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, an ad hoc declaration of the Chinese government 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs) presented to the German investor 
concerning legal protection is required and is sufficient for 
participating in the national guarantee scheme. This declaration 
must contain an agreement on the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
arbitration tribunal according to the 1966 World Bank Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of other States (International Center for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, New York).23 Up to the present there 
exists only one investment case which produced such a declara-
tion.24 Other German investors just don't take advantage of the 
Federal investment guarantee. They are aware that they are 
participating in Taiwan's export boom and that their investments 
will have amortized within about three years. The Federal 
guarantee thus does not appear to be of major importance. 
In this context it may be interesting to take into consideration 
the results of a study of the Hamburg Institute for International 
Economics (Hamburges Weltwirtschafts-Archiv) concerning Ger: 
man investments in developing countries. Better support to be 
21. See, e.g., paragraph 20 I, No. 3 of the Bundeshaushaltsgesetz of 1969, April 
18, 1969, BGBl. 1969 II, 793 ff. Corresponding provisions are in the subsequent 
Federal Budget Laws. 
22. This function of the treaties is also emphasized by E. J. Nwogugu, The 
Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, Manchester, 1965, 
at 70: "These are important and expensive protective measures which provide a 
firm basis for the insurance of investments." 
23. ROC and FRG have both ratified the Convention. See Joy Cherian, 
Investment Contracts and Arbitration. The World Bank Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Leyden, 1975. List of signatories at 121. See 
also AHD vol. 23 (1969), at 532. The ROC deposited its ratification on Dec. 10, 1968, 
see ILM (1969), at 446. 
24. The legal nature of this ad hoc declaration might be questioned. For this 
complex problem, see, e.g., A.A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign 
Investors, New York and London 1962, at 120 ff., 190ff., and K.·H. Bockstiegel, Der 
Staat als Vertragspartner ausllindischer Privatuntemehmen, Frankfurt 1971; see 
also chapter 2. of Delupis (supra note 20). 
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extended by West Gennan diplomatic missions abroad and the 
conclusion of investment pacts and of agreements on avoiding 
double taxation were among the proposals which Gennan 
companies who had answered the Institute's questionnaires 
recommended for making it easier and more profitable to invest in 
developing countries.2s 
2. Trademark and Patent Protection 
The mutual protection of trademarks was not possible for a 
long time. The Chinese Trademark Law provides that "an 
application for registration of a trademark may be refused 
acceptance if it is filed by a national of a foreign country which 
has not concluded with the ROC a treaty of agreement for 
reciprocal protection of trademarks or which, by its national law 
does not admit of trademark application by nationals of the ROC'' 
(paragraph 1, art. 3, Trademark Law of July 4, 1972). According to 
the German trademark law of January 2, 1968, a foreigner who 
has no fixed establishment in Gennany is protected by the law 
only when the Federal Bulletin announces that the applicant's 
home country protects Gennan trademarks to the same extent as 
those of its own nationals (paragraph 35, art. 1). Thus neither 
trademark law states as a precondition for mutual protection the 
mere existence of treaty relations.26 Because the ROC is not a 
member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (1891, repeatedly revised) or any other convention by 
which mutual trademark protection would be guaranteed without 
the above-mentioned announcement in the Federal Bulletin, this 
protection can only be achieved by undertaking the two one-sided 
measures provided for in the trademark laws of both countries. 
However, it was only in July, 1967 that the Federal Bulletin 
announced that Gennan trademarks are admitted in the ROC for 
legal protection to the same extent as Chinese trademarks,27 thus 
expanding the protection of German trademark law to Chinese 
trademarks. 
25. See Awni-Al-Ani, supra note 1, at 221. 
26. But this was the case before the revis~on of the ROC trademark law in 
1958. 
27. BGBl. I, at 549 and 574 (July 21, 1967): Notification of the Fed.eral Ministry 
of Justice. Not mentioned in the standard work of German trademark law: 
Baumbach-Hefermehl, Wettbewerbs- and Warenzeichenrecht, lOth edition, Munich 
1969, under art. 35. 
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The situation concerning the protection of inventions is less 
complicated insofar as the German patent law does not discrimi-
nate between German and foreign applicants. Applicants who live 
abroad merely have the obligation to appoint a domestic 
representative (art. 16, patent law of January 2, 1968). The 
relevant provision of the valid Chinese patent law (art. 14) is 
identical with that of the cited trademark law, thus leaving patent 
protection for foreigners beyond the need of treaty relations. 28 
3. Copyright Protection of Designs 
Another example for the execution of economic relations 
under the given circumstances is an arrangement concerning the 
protection of copyright in design, which was reached in summer 
1976 on a private basis between the German and the Taiwan· 
Textile Federation (TTF). For western merchants in East Asian 
countries imitation of designs is a matter of some concern. There 
is quite considerable imitation in Taiwan, but the legal measures 
of the domestic legal order are insufficient: there is neither a 
separate law concerning protection of copyright in design nor a 
special legislation concerning the repression of unfair competi-
tion.29 
28. There are some German trademarks registered in the ROC. For figures 
concerning the patents issued to Germans see Cosway·Ma·Shattuck at 474, table 
39. 
For some comparative figures concerning applications of patents and 
trademarks of Asian countries in Germany see the following table: 
Statistical Data Concerning Applications of East-Asian 
Countries in the German Patent Office 
Country Patent applications Trademark applications 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1973 1974 1975 1976 
ROC 4 12 9 19 0 0 1 2 
Singapore 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 
S. Korea 3 4 2 7 0 0 4 3 
Japan 4962 5122 4322 4643 323 301 213 322 
Source: Information from the President of the German Patent Office (Munich) 
to the author. 
29. See Teruo Doi, in: Cosway-Ma-Shattuck, at 462. 
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The above-mentioned arrangement between the textile federa-
tions took as its model a governmental agreement which was 
concluded shortly before (in June 1976) between the Federal 
Republic and Hong Kong. The principles of this agreement may 
be summarized as follows: 30 The Federal government is entitled to 
present to the government of Hong Kong concrete cases showing 
imitations of German designs in the field of textiles and clothes. 
The Hong Kong government will examine - according to the law 
of Hong Kong - whether a German design was wrongfully 
reproduced. If this is the case, it will employ certain measures· in 
order to avoid further infringement. If consultations between the 
Hong Kong government and the company involved show that the 
designs were given by a German ordering firm to the producer in 
Hong Kong without the title to use them, then the government of 
Hong Kong is prepared to communicate the name of the ordering 
firm at the request of the German government. 
The arrangement between the Chinese and German textile 
organizations is based on similar principles. Measures to prevent 
an infringement of copyright in design, including communication 
of the name of the German ordering firm, are based on the private 
legal relationship between TTF and the respective producer. This, 
however, already shows the limits of the arrangement. It concerns 
only textiles; moreover, TTF can only communicate information it 
has received from its members. Therefore it is not surprising that, 
despite the many infringements in Taiwan, the practical rele-
vance of the arrangement is virtually nil. Up to the present only 
two cases were communicated to the German Textile Federation. 
4. Claims of a German Ordering Firm 
Insuperable problems can arise if claims of a German 
ordering firm against the Chinese producer - e.g., because of 
deficiency in the quality of the supplies - are made. The lack of 
diplomatic relations and thus of an official commercial represen-
tation in Taiwan impedes the contact with Chinese companies 
and an examination of their soundness, thus increasing the 
ordering firm's risk. Moreover, more than two-thirds of the goods 
destined for export have to be checked according to the "Commod-
ity Inspection Law."31 Article 8 provides that such commodities 
30. According to Bundesministerium Wirtschaft, Tagesnachricht No. 7245 of 
June 30, 1976. 
31. Promulgated on December 14, 1932, amended on May 25, 1965 and 
September 3, 1970. 
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are to be inspected according to the CNS (China National 
Standard). A possible divergence from the European standard 
may result in claims by the European ordering firm. It is 
suggested that Chinese lawyers do not always handle such claims 
with sufficient emphasis, and that it is sometimes difficult to 
reach court decisions. 
5. FRG Risk Guarantees 
Finally, the Federal Guarantees regarding risks of manufac-
ture (risk before shipping) and export (risk after shipping) which 
can be granted to German exporters may be mentioned. 32 They are 
not affected by considerations concerning the nature of the state-
to-state relationship. 
C. Consequences of EEC Common Commercial 
Policy for FRG-ROC Trade 
As far as trade is concerned, the membership of the Federal 
Republic in the EEC takes on significance. What are the 
consequences of the EEC foreign trade policy for Chinese-German 
trade? 
1. The Commercial Policy of the EEC and Protective 
Measures as an Exception to the Principle 
of Unrestricted Importation 
Articles 110 to 116 of the EEC Treaty deal with the common 
commercial policy of the community. The necessity for such a 
policy derives from the fact that the EEC is founded on a full 
customs union and therefore presents a common face to exporters 
from non-EEC countries.33 After the expiry of the transitional 
period for the implementation of the EEC Treaty, "the common 
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles" (art. 113) 
with regard to both import and export policy.34 Under EEC 
Regulation 1025170 a common system to be applied to imports 
32. The treatment of all relevant guarantees are delegated to the "Hermes 
Kreditversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft" (Hamburg) and the "Deutsche Revisions-
und Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft." 
33. See A. Parry, EEC Law, London arid New York, 1977, No. 37-13. 
34. For the progress made towards a common foreign trade law see Parry, 
supra note 33, No. 37-27 ff., and Ehle-Meier, EWG-Warenverkehr. AuBenhandel-
Z<>lle-Subventionen, K<>ln 1971, at 419 ff. 
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from non-EEC countries was established.35 Its basic principle is 
that of unrestricted importation. It means - together with its 
counterpart in regard to EEC exports - that foreign trade with 
third countries cannot be subjected to quantitative restrictions. In 
a case of emergency, however, this unrestricted foreign trade can 
be suspended for a specific period36 through an introduction of 
quantitative restrictions. Because of its exceptional character, 
these restrictions have to take place within narrow limits, 
particularly shaped by the principles of statutory reserve and of 
proportion. The institutions of the Community and the member 
states have only the right to issue specific protective measures 
when the statutory preconditions exist, i.e., when by the import 
situation the producers of same or similar goods within the 
Community will suffer a substantial damage. The Community 
regulations take the principle of proportion into account by 
factual, temporal and local limits. The type of "appropriate 
measures" (art. 11, Reg. No. 1025170) can be: introduction of a 
license, fixing an import quota, issuing an instruction to stop all 
imports. A newer measure consists of so-called "agreements of 
self-limitation,"37 which result practically in an import quota 
system. 
2. Protection Measures Regarding Imports 
from the ROC 
The ROC was never officially linked with the EEC. 38 
Nevertheless, in 1971 an agreement was concluded concerning the 
trade in cotton.39 This agreement was based on the 1962 Long 
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton 
Textiles - Taiwan was a member of this arrangement - and 
introduced quantitative restrictions by fixing certain quotas for 
the importation of various cotton textiles. This ROC-EEC 
35. Text: ABI. 1970, L 124 of June 8, 1970, p. 6; see also Regulation 1439174, 
Abl. L 159, June 15, 1974. 
36. There is the same mechanism in the GATT legal system. 
37. Their compatibility with the GATT is doubtful; see, e.g., R. Zimmer, Zur 
Problematik von Exportselbstbeschrankungen, in AWD vol. 15 (1969), 297-300. 
38. In 1963 the ROC government applied to the EEC Commission in order to 
accredit its ambassador in Brussels to the Community. It seems that the 
institutions of the EEC were about to express consent see AHD vol. 18, 1964, at 
116) when at the beginning of 1964 the breaking off of diplomatic relations 
between the ROC and France took place, and the establishment of official relations 
with the EEC was never realized. 
39. ABI. February 2, 1971, No. L 43/22. 
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arrangement had a term of three years, but was respected from 
the end of 1973 until June 1975 through a unilateral decision of 
the EEC. From July 1975 the governmental agreement was 
replaced by a unilateral EEC commercial policy toward Taiwan, 
by introducing quotas in the field of textiles. 40 This regulation 
followed lines similar to the 1971 agreement but was extended in 
its contents from cottons alone to all textiles. This extension 
caused a considerable change in the European-ROC trade 
relationship. Textiles presently make up more than one-third of 
the total exports from Taiwan to the Common Market. In the 1971 
agreement only the comparatively small share of cottons was 
subjected to EEC import quotas, whereas the quotas concerning 
all other textiles remained to be fixed by the several member 
states. With the 1975 regulation the most sensitive part of the 
textile sector was put under EEC import restriction. During the 
last two years - in order to mention a pars pro toto - the EEC 
has introduced by regulations issued by both the Commission and 
the Council protective measures (usually import license require-
ments) concerning imports of textiles, canned mushrooms and 
pipe joints made from malleable cast iron for several EEC 
countries. There were also antidumping measures, e.g., concerning 
imports of bicycle chains from Taiwan.41 
I may add that the ROC does not enjoy -probably because of 
political considerations - the benefits of the Generalized System 
of Preferences for developing countries sponsored by UNCTAD, 
which the EEC adopted in July 1971.42 
3. EEC Impact on FRG-ROC Trade 
As far as the significance of EEC commercial policy for ROC-
German trade is concerned, at present only imports of textiles 
40. Regulation No. 1783/75 of July 10, 1975, ABI. No. L 182. The Taiwanese 
textile production was several times the subject of discussion in the European 
Parliament. 
41. ABI. C 138, August 7, 1976. For the introduction of a temporary anti· 
dumping duty in this case see the regulation of the Commission of November 12, 
1976, ABI. No. L 312/41, November 11, 1976. 
42. The Community offers, unilaterally, tariff-free quotas of semi-finished and 
finished industrial goods to the seventy-seven (now more than hundred) developing 
countries. See, e.g., H. Kramer, Zwei Jahre Zollpraferenzen der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften zugensten von Entwicklungslandern. Methoden und erste 
Ergebnisse, in: Die Weltwirtschaft 1973, 1. Heft, pp. 196ff. 
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from Taiwan are restricted, in that a German import authoriza-
tion is required.43 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Let me summarize: The German economy is an important 
trade partner but is somewhat reluctant to employ productive 
capital; this, however, is gradually changing. The existing 
institutional framework is regarded as sufficient for the execution 
of trade and investment projects. The lack of diplomatic relations 
is not felt as a heavy burden. Existing difficulties, as in the case of 
claims, could be minimized by a more effective - of course, 
unofficial - German representation (banking and commercial 
institutions) in Taiwan, or, as in the case of the protection of 
designs, by additional private arrangements and by new Chinese 
legislation. The protection of direct investments in Taiwan seems 
to be on a firm basis, even without the investor's interests being 
secured under international law. The significance of protective 
measures based on EEC law for an assessment of the West-
European markets and consequently for ROC industries remains 
an important matter of concern. 
You will have realized that I have only mentioned those 
legally relevant aspects which develop on the surface of economic 
relations with the ROC, aspects which are more or less familiar to 
every lawyer dealing with foreign trade problems, and are not 
necessarily linked to a specific cultural background. Implications 
of cultural phenomena and their significance for international 
business transactions are not easy to analyze.44 Nevertheless, we 
all know that they should not be neglected if reliable legal 
counselling is to be achieved. Negotiations concerning a dispute 
settlement clause, for instance, take on a quite different signifi-
cance when they concern a contract with, say, a French partner 
than in commerce with Chinese merchants who are well known 
for their ability to compromise, although we must be sensitive 
enough to realize where the cliche begins. 
Only an insight into the socio-cultural environment of the 
trading partner renders a responsible commercial contact possi-
43. Based on EEC regulation 1439174 of July 4, 1974 (see note 35 supra). See, 
e.g., Reg. No. 1782175, ABI. No. L 182/1, of July 12, 1975; No. 3045175, ABI. No. L 
3045175, ABI. No. L 303/26 of November 22, 1975. 
44. See, e.g., A. T. von Mehren, The Significance of Cultural and Legal 
Diversity for International Transactions, in: Ius Privatum Gentium, Festschrift fiir 
Max Rheinstein, vol. 1, Tiibingen 1969, pp. 247-57. 
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ble. This includes a deeper concern with the legal systems 
involved. Chinese representatives in Germany have confirmed 
that a closer cooperation between Chinese and German lawyers 
could contribute in smoothing the way to a solution of trade and 
investment problems and in participating in arbitration and 
conciliation. 
Dr. Sigur thanked Dr. Heuser and also expressed his 
appreciation to the three panelists for adhering to the time limit. 
He then invited the three discussants to speak. The · first 
discussant was Mr. Ralph Clough of the Brookings Institution. 
Mr. Clough, Dr. Sigur pointed out, had served in the American 
foreign service and was acting ambassador (charge d'affaire) at 
the American Embassy in Taipei several years ago. Mr. Clough 
has written extensively on Asia and American policy. 
Mr. Clough stated that Dr. Heuser presented clearly the 
obstacles to trade between West Germany and Taiwan, but 
showed how many had been overcome, permitting trade with the 
ROC to increase substantially. Mr. Clough presented some 
questions for Mr. Heuser: Do merchants have travel problems? 
Are trade fairs permitted? How does lack of diplomatic relations 
with Germany affect Taiwan's trade as compared to its trade with 
France and Canada, or compared to German trade with South 
Korea? Mr. Clough stated that Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh make a strong 
case that United States economic interests in Taiwan would be 
best served by the adoption of a two-China policy, but do not take 
account of overall U.S. interests. For one thing, the paper may 
have underestimated the People's Republic of China's potential as 
a trade partner with the United States. Mr. Clough pointed out 
that in some years Japanese trade with the People's Republic of 
China exceeded its trade with Taiwan. He added that both the 
paper done by Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh and the Chamber of Commerce 
paper discussed the adverse effects of normalization, but did not 
discuss possibilities for mitigating these adverse effects, as, for 
example, by legislation providing for continuing access to 
Eximbank loans. 
[The following is the summary of Mr. Clough's statement.] 
COMMENTS 
RALPH N. CLOUGH 
I would like to comment just briefly on the papers that have 
been presented, raising a number of points which may be useful to 
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discuss further in the question period. First, with respect to Dr. 
Heuser's paper, it was a very interesting and unusual paper which 
dealt with materials that most American scholars are unfamiliar 
with. It brought out very clearly the obstacles to trade and 
investment growing out of the fact that the German Federal 
Republic has had no diplomatic relations with the Republic of 
China since World War II. For example, he points out the absence 
of a commercial representative to assist German merchants in 
handling trade disputes in Taiwan. But he also shows ways in 
which many of the obstacles have been overcome. For example, he 
points out that a unilateral declaration by the government of the 
Republic of China concerning legal protection for a German 
investor qualifies that investor for participation in the German 
national investment guarantee program. A third point that comes 
out in Dr. Heuser's paper is that despite the obstacles which are 
presented by the lack of diplomatic relations, there has been an 
impressive growth in trade between Taiwan and the German 
Federal Republic. 
Perhaps Dr. Heuser could respond to some questions in my 
mind concerning these relationships which he didn't touch on. I 
wonder, for example, whether there are difficulties impeding 
travel by merchants or officials to and from Taiwan. What about 
trade fairs? Are these permitted? Further, I think it would be very 
interesting to do some comparative studies to see how lack of 
diplomatic relations affects trade between the Republic of China 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, it would be 
interesting to look at the trade between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Republic of Korea, where diplomatic relations 
do exist, to see how much greater that may be and why. It might 
also be interesting to examine the trade between France and 
Taiwan during the period before 1964 when diplomatic relations 
existed between France and Taiwan to see how that compared 
with German trade, or to compare the trade with Canada before 
and after severance of diplomatic relations with Taipei to see how 
that trade compares with German trade in these periods. 
The paper by Dr. Wu and Dr. Y eh and the statement of the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan cover many of the 
same problems. The paper by Dr. Wu and Dr. Y eh is certainly an 
excellent analysis of Taiwan's economic development. It identifies 
very well those factors responsible for past development and those 
essential to Taiwan's future economic development. I think the 
paper makes a very strong case that U.S. economic interests in 
Taiwan would be best served if the United States were to develop 
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a more forthright two-China policy. Downgrading the political 
relations between the United States and the Republic of China in 
the process of normalizing relations with the PRC would 
inevitably have some adverse effect on economic relations 
between the United States and Taiwan. However, how lasting or 
how serious that adverse effect might be is a matter for debate. 
Much would depend on how far the United States went in 
downgrading its political relations with the Republic of China. 
I think that the paper may underestimate the potential of the 
PRC as a trading partner of the United States in the long run. 
Certainly, in the past Taiwan has been a good deal more 
important and probably will be so for some years. But looking 
farther ahead, much will depend on the kind of policies carried out 
by the Peking government. Certainly, Mainland China will 
always be a largely self-sufficient economy, just like the other big 
continental economies, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
But trade could grow substantially and provide more opportuni-
ties for American traders. It's interesting to note, for example, 
that despite the importance of Taiwan as a trading partner with 
Japan, there have been some years in which Japanese trade with 
Mainland China has been larger than its trade with Taiwan. 
It was, of course, beyond the scope of Dr. Wu's paper to 
discuss the importance to overall U.S. interests of normalizing 
relations with the PRC. The problem currently before U.S. policy 
makers is to decide whether the potential gains from normalizing 
relations with the PRC would outweigh the potential losses in 
regard to interests in Taiwan. In reaching that decision they 
would have to consider how possible economic losses in regard to 
relations with Taiwan could be minimized. The American 
Chamber of Commerce and Dr. Wu's paper point out ways in 
which Taiwan's economy could be adversely affected by normali-
zation of U.S. relations with the PRC and they identify a number 
of legal questions which would arise on normalization with 
Peking, but they do not consider ways in which the impact of this 
change might be lessened, as, for example, by U.S. legislation 
which retained guarantees of U.S. investment in Taiwan by the 
Overseas Private Investment Insurance Corporation, permitted 
the ROC to buy American military equipment; provided for 
continuing access by the ROC to Eximbank loans, and so forth. 
These are very complex, difficult issues. I don't want to get 
into a discussion of them here, but I would just point out that 
there seem to be two major factors in considering normalization of 
relations with Peking and its potential impact on Taiwan. One is 
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the psychological factor. It has been pointed out that past 
progress in Taiwan and future progress, too, depend a great deal 
on confidence, investors' confidence, in the future of Taiwan. 
Consequently, if the United States nonnalizes relations with 
Peking, it would need to take whatever action available to it to 
preserve confidence in the future of our relations with Taiwan. 
The second major area that needs to be considered - I've already 
touched on it- is the legislative questions that arise. There are a 
multitude of these which would affect American businessmen 
dealing in Taiwan. There are many ways in which they might 
conceivably be dealt with. All these factors have to be taken into 
account. One must try to strike a balance between U.S. interests in 
achieving nonnalization with Peking and retaining a satisfactory 
relationship with Taiwan. Thank you. 
Dr. Sigur thanked Mr. Clough for his comments which 
touched upon some of the very fundamental problems with which 
we were trying to deal at this time. Dr. Sigur then introduced the 
next discussant, Mr. Talbot Linstrom, to speak. Mr. Linstrom, Dr. 
Sigur said, was from one of Washington's most prestigious law 
firms, Whitman and Ransom, and he himself had dealt exten-
sively with legal questions involving economic relations between 
the United States and the Republic of China and other parts of 
Asia as well. 
Mr. Talbot Linstrom stated that law, economics, politics, 
culture and social realities are all inseparable. He stated that the 
papers presented indicate that from the standpoint of U.S. 
balance of payments, trade with the PRC has been more favored, 
because the greater proportion of our trade with the PRC consists 
of American exports, paid for in hard cash, rather than imports. 
On the other hand, while the Republic of China may be a large 
exporter to the U.S., it is also a major debtor of the United States, 
and hence has some leverage in negotiations - the larger the 
debt, the greater the economic advantage. He suggested that 
Taiwan might consider a reverse investment in underdeveloped 
Central American and Caribbean countries and in United States 
cities. He also suggested that as to nuclear and defense questions, 
an abrogation of the defense treaty might not be so bad, because 
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independent countries have a certain bargaining power and such 
treaties prevent self-help in terms of a build-up of a country's own 
defense mechanisms. 
[The following is the summary of Mr. Linstrom's statement.] 
COMMENTS 
TALBOT S. LINSTROM 
I would like to begin my brief remarks by noting that, as I 
think both the papers and the prior discussant have indicated, 
law, economics, politics, military realities and culture are 
inseparable. Although I am here as an attorney, my comments 
will of necessity be broader in scope than just the legal aspects of 
the future relations between the United States and the Republic of 
China and the United States and the People's Republic of China. 
To the extent possible in the available time, I would like to cover 
all three of the papers presented here today. With respect to the 
paper submitted by the Chamber of Commerce, I think we ought 
to focus on some critical issues which have been briefly touched 
upon, and those are the nature of trade between the United States 
and the People's Republic of China and the nature of trade 
between the United States and the Republic of China. While trade 
is mu~h, much larger in dollar terms between the United States 
and Taiwan, in terms of balance of payments, it would appear 
from the papers and, I think, on the basis of my own recollection, 
that in regard to balance of payments the PRC trade has been 
much more advantageous to the United States. There is currently 
a very large, it would appear - I don't have any exact figures 
immediately available -imbalance in trade between the United 
States and Taiwan. Taiwan is a major exporter to the United 
States for hard currency. A great portion of the total trade is 
Taiwanese exports to the United States, whereas in respect to the 
Mainland, the People's Republic, a great portion of that trade is 
going from the United States and is being paid for in hard cash. 
One of the points that the Chamber of Commerce made in its 
paper was that it does not expect - at least it's not currently the 
case - that the PRC will utilize American credit. A lot is being 
paid in cash. I am not sure in respect to long-term good relations 
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between nations that that is a net disadvantage. It may be a net 
advantage. 
However, with respect to the future, the fact that the Republic 
of China has become a major debtor of the United States (I believe 
that the paper points out that it is the second largest user after 
Brazil of Eximbank-type credits from the United States and I 
think that includes both direct credits, guarantees and FCIA 
insurance) may give the Republic of China a very substantial - I 
don't want to use the word "weapon" - means of leverage i.n its 
future relations with the United States. This debtor relationship is 
not a disadvantage to a country. In economic terms it is generally 
an advantage, and the larger a debtor you become, the greater 
your advantage. This has been proven to be the case in respect to 
Yugoslavian financial relationships with both the United States 
and the European Community. Whenever the Yugoslavians have 
payment problems, they indicate to their creditor countries that 
they may have difficulty in meeting their payments. The result of 
that generally is an increase in credits available for purchasing 
goods in both the Community and in the United States. I am not 
suggesting this be done; I am only dealing here with potential 
realities of the future, and I think that that factor is certainly a 
net advantage to the Republic of China, and it's a net advantage 
in dealing with the United States both in political terms and 
economic terms. 
Returning to the question of the proposition of the trade 
between the United States and the Republic of China and its 
future course, I think this has been gone into in some depth in Dr. 
Wu's paper. Imports from Taiwan to the United States in recent 
times have grown much more rapidly than our imports from the 
rest of the world. This, of course, has been to a great extent in the 
textile field and to a certain extent in shoes. I understand shoes 
were touched upon yesterday; textiles were an earlier problem. In 
both cases these rapid increases in imports from Taiwan to the 
United States have resulted in some type of trade-restrictive 
measure by the United States as a result of pressures both from 
U.S. labor and manufacturers. The same thing is happening now 
in the consumer electronics field. I think the major developments 
in this field have also been touched upon both in the International 
Trade Commission in the last month and in federal court two days 
ago in New York, the Customs Court, with respect to consumer 
electronics imports from Japan. But as Dr. Wu has pointed out, 
there is a very close relationship between Taiwan, Japan and the 
United States. Taiwan is a major supplier, not only of the 
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components that go into Japanese consumer electronics, but has 
itself been used by Japan to a certain extent as a supplier 
manufacturing source for finished consumer electronic product 
exports to the United States, a very good use and a very beneficial 
one in trade terms to the U.S. consumer. Taiwan has become, 
often through the aegis of Japanese trading companies, a major 
supplier of consumer electronics to the United States. This means 
it is directly involved in what is happening now. Perhaps if one 
looks at the future, Taiwan ought to consider what Japan has 
done in the U.S., and that is to reverse some ofthe investment and 
itself come into the American market and invest in the areas in 
which we have high degrees of unemployment and can utilize the 
management and technology that Taiwan itself is developing. It 
can also consider doing the same thing in the underdeveloped 
countries of Central America and the Caribbean, which have and 
will continue to enjoy very preferential economic relationships 
with the United States. 
I might touch in the one or two minutes I have left on two 
other points in the Chamber of Commerce paper and which were 
covered peripherally by the prior discussant. These are nuclear 
questions and defense questions. It may not be a disadvantage to 
the Republic of China to be under the threat of the abrogation of 
the mutual defense treaty. What we have tended to learn in the 
world, all of us in this community of nations, is that independence 
gives a great deal more bargaining power. To the extent that 
Taiwan is closely tied to the U.S. by a defense treaty, it is 
hampered in its own development in the nuclear area. Political 
pressures are easily applied by the United States to prevent its 
purchase of nuclear materials from other countries, and at the 
same time similar pressures are probably applied to prevent 
Taiwan from developing its own defense capability. A nation the 
size of the Republic of China is perfectly capable of developing an 
extremely credible defense to protect its own interests in the 
future. To the extent it does so, it enhances its prestige in the 
world and its ability to deal as it should in the future as an equal 
both with the United States and with the PRC. 
The Chairperson thanked Mr. Linstrom and commended him 
for touching upon, like Mr. Clough, some very fundamental issues 
which would certainly generate a great deal of discussion. Dr. 
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Sigur said that he thought that we all knew the importance of the 
Export-Import Bank to the economic relations between the United 
States and the Republic of China. Now we were very fortunate to 
have with us a Senior Counsel from the bank who dealt a great 
deal with these relations, Mr. Marvin Solomon, to be our third 
discussant. The Chairperson then invited Mr. Solomon to speak. 
Mr. Solomon stated that Eximbank has the largest stake in 
Taiwan of any single institution, and cited the Eximbank's 
history of dealings with Taiwan. He said that Eximbank has been 
involved in the Republic of China at least since 1942, when it 
invested in the construction of the Burma-China Highway. From 
1945 to 1948 loans were made to the ROC under the predecessor to 
the Marshall Plan. The PRC has no dealings with the Eximbank, 
largely because the PRC has an outstanding debt which it 
assumed when the ROC left the Mainland. Since 1965, the 
Eximbank's dealings with the ROC have been in the areas of 
financing power projects and petrochemicals, commercial aircraft, 
telecommunications and industrial projects. Other banks partici-
pate with Eximbank in making these loans. 
[The following is the summary of Mr. Solomon's statement.] 
COMMENTS 
MARVIN SoLoMoN 
I am not going to direct myself precisely to the thoughts given 
by the speakers this morning, but to nevertheless make comments 
like them by first giving a little history and then a little bit of 
prognostication for the future involving the Export-Import Bank, 
which by the way, is the single institution in the world having the 
largest exposure in the Republic of China. We have an exposure of 
1.55 billion dollars there. 
Eximbank's first relationship with the Republic of China was 
in 1942 for the amount of 25 million dollars to build the Burma-
China Highway. In 1945 to 1948, Eximbank's relationship with 
the ROC, on the Mainland, was as part of the Marshall Plan 
program and its predecessor programs, principally loans for 
locomotives, some old World War II Liberty vessels, and some 
electrical generating equipment. These loans were in the amount 
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of approximately 30 million dollars. When the ROC left the 
Mainland and went to Taiwan, the equipment was left behind and 
was used by the PRC, and Eximbank considered that since they 
were using the equipment they should be paying for these loans. 
Unfortunately they haven't paid for them. Consequently, Exim-
bank is presently blocked from making any form of financial 
assistance in the PRC for two reasons, the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1962, as amended, and the fact that there is an outstanding 
indebtedness to. Eximbank ofthe PRC. Between the late 1940s and 
mid-1965, Eximbank was not active in the ROC. This was the 
realm of the Agency of International Development and its 
predecessor agencies. Since 1965, Eximbank has been active in the 
ROC, principally in the areas of power, transportation, petrochem-
icals, heavy industry and light industry, and we had an actual 
exposure several years ago of $1.8 billion. This amount has 
dropped off to about 1.55 billion dollars, principally as repayments 
have been received. 
One of the more interesting factors of our activity with the 
ROC is that we do not go to make transactions by ourselves. We 
have participation by commercial banks, usually American 
banks, but even in the past year or so, sometimes from Japan, 
Canada and Great Britain. In many of these transactions we are 
not guaranteeing these banks; they are just participating with us. 
Even though most countries in the world recognize the PRC, 
the United States manufacturer does not have the ROC's 
contracts all to himself. He has to compete with manufacturers of 
other countries, and those manufacturers of the other countries 
have support from their official export credit agencies. So 
notwithstanding the fact that country X does not have diplomatic 
relations with the ROC, its official export credit agency is making 
most of the guarantees in the ROC. This more or less summarizes 
the past and the present situation concerning the Bank's dealings 
with the ROC. 
The future: Last week we authorized official financial 
assistance to the ROC. Last month we had a team over in the 
ROC and we found that Eximbank may be getting approximately 
2 billion dollars worth of business. I might add that since 
Eximbank does not provide 100 percent financing, we're talking 
about 1.2 billion dollars in the ROC's present Six-Year Economic 
Plan. As I pointed out, the Export-Import Bank as an official 
export credit agency is still competing with other export credit 
agencies; consequently Eximbank is looking forward to continu-
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ing its excellent relationship with the ROC and its large 
corporations, banks and industries. 
Dr. Sigur announced a coffee break for five minutes and then 
the session would be resumed for discussion. 
The meeting adjourned at 11:05 a.m. and resumed at 11:15 
a.m. 
Dr. Sigur announced the resumption of the meeting and first 
called Dr. Heuser to answer several questions raised by Mr. 
Clough. 
[The following is the summary of questions and answers.] 
DISCUSSION 
DR. HEUSER: I shall try to respond to Mr. Clough's questions. 
First, as far as the problem of travel is concerned, there is no 
problem at all for private persons. Germans get letters of 
introduction at private ROC agencies such as Far Eastern Trade 
Center and use the letters to get visas at Taipei airport. With 
respect to Taiwanese-Chinese travelling to Germany, they, 
through travel agencies in Taiwan, get their visa at the German 
Consulate-General in Hong Kong. As far as official travel is 
concerned, I can only say that official travelers do not travel 
officially, neither from Germany to Taiwan nor vice-versa. 
As to trade fairs, there was one trade fair held in 1969, and 
none since, perhaps for political reasons. 
I found it very interesting to deal with the question of 
comparison of trade. In order to understand economic relations, 
you have to make a comparison with those countries which are 
economically similar in their structure, for example, Korea and 
Taiwan. For example, German trade with Korea is very similar in 
structure and in quantity to Taiwan. But we are realizing that 
investors seem now to prefer Taiwan. German investments in 
Korea are still a little bit more than in Taiwan, but this seems to 
be changing and Taiwan is getting more interesting to German 
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investments in spite of the fact that Taiwan's labor costs are 
higher than in other countries in Asia or Indonesia. But German 
investors have appreciated very much the development in Taiwan. 
As far as France is concerned, France has, as far as I know, 
no approved investment at all in Taiwan. Trade between France 
and Taiwan is also limited. After 1964, when France established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC the trade relations did not 
increase at all. On the other hand, at the same time West German 
trade increased with ROC. Summarizing, the status of diplomatic 
relations between European countries and Taiwan does not affect 
the quantity of trade with Taiwan. 
DR. SIGUR: Thank you. We'll be entertaining questions and 
comments from the floor. Are there any questions? 
MR. LITTELL: I would like to ask you [apparently referring to 
Chairperson Dr. Sigur] certain questions. 
Do you not think that we should take a position clarifying 
relations with Taiwan by eliminating all reference to it in the 
Shanghai Communique of 1972, which has virtually the effect of a 
treaty as it is being treated from administration to administra-
tion? 
Secondly, not one word has been said in this conference about 
the danger of the excessive importation of opium, heroin, and 
derivative undermining products of which the PRC is the 
principal producer in the world. Not Turkey as one would suppose, 
but the PRC, over 65 percent. I did not touch upon this subject in 
my paper because it was not germane to the subject of private 
enterprise and investment, but it hurt my conscience. I think we 
should be alerted to that frightening problem. 
DR. SIGUR: I suppose as Chairman I might step out of that 
position for a minute and respond, though I would like the 
thoughts of members of the panel also. It seems to me that a 
clarification of our relationship with the ROC and the PRC could 
be beneficial, I think, if done properly. The problem, of course, 
comes from the confusion within the American government itself 
on this issue. The President, after all, has taken the position in the 
campaign in which he referred to the determination to maintain 
the independence and freedom of Taiwan. That is the statement 
that he used in his foreign policy debate with then-President Ford. 
I don't think that he has officially ever retreated from that 
position. He has, I think, in the past couple of months made 
references on one or two occasions to the People's Republic 
perhaps, but he has simply never retreated from that. In the 
CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 199 
Congress of the United States, the House of Representatives 
passed a resolution in support of the continuation of American 
guarantees to Taiwan. This has never been repudiated. It's my 
feeling that if it were put to the House of Representatives for a 
resolution again on that issue, it would once again be strongly 
supported. I think all developments, as of now, indicate the 
strength that our government has, if it has the will and 
determination, to stand by our commitments to the Republic of 
China in Taiwan. I think that's the crux of the matter. When we 
negotiate with Peking, perhaps we are doing so now, on the 
question of diplomatic recognition or whatever we want to call it, 
the normalization process, I think that the American position, as 
you say, should be a tough one, a strong one: this is where we 
stand. If we intend to take a normalization position, it must be 
within the framework of the American commitment to an ally, in 
our interests in terms of our broad security and political and 
economic interests totally to retain the closest possible ties. I look 
at it, of course, from many sides in terms of our relations with the 
Soviets, with the PRC in Southeast Asia. When you get down to it 
and look at the complexity of all this, it would be destabilizing for 
the United States to retreat from its firm commitment to Taiwan. 
Whether the President has to come out fully and restate this 
again, whether it would be advisable for him to do so, is 
something I hope the other people on this panel might have 
comments about. Mr. Morell, can you speak on that issue? 
MR. MoRELL: This is more a political issue than I promised to 
speak of, but I certainly agree with you that the President has 
taken the position as you describe it. If he were to go further than 
that, he would be obliged to go into formalities and details which I 
presume he is not prepared to do at this time. I yield to Ralph 
Clough on this. 
DR. SIGUR: Ralph, could you comment on that? 
MR. CLOUGH: Well, I think the problem is pretty clear. The 
President on the one hand has said that he intends to pursue the 
process of normalizing relations with the PRC and on the other 
hand he has spoken of Taiwan; "independence and freedom" were 
the two words he used. Since then Secretary of State Vance has 
said that he regards the security of Taiwan as essential to the 
United States. So I think the problem is how to reconcile these two 
somewhat contradictory statements. This requires a lot of study. 
DR. SIGUR: Anyone else have any comments? 
DR. Wu: I have some comments on some other points. 
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DR. SIGUR: On this particular point. What about the issue 
which was also raised about the drug trade? Anyone have any 
comments on it? 
MR. MoRELL: I cannot speak to this as a member of the 
government, and I cannot speak with authority; perhaps Ralph 
can. I know it's not a popular thing to say, but I have never seen a 
report in the U.S. government that would support the proposition 
that there is a substantial flow of opium from the PRC. 
DR. SIGUR: Do you know, Ralph? 
MR. CLOUGH: My understanding is that most of the produc-
tion comes from the so-called "golden triangle," Laos, Thailand, 
and southern Burma. How much comes from there is anybody's 
guess. 
DR. KING-YUH CHANG: I would like to make two comments. 
First, I think that it is very difficult for citizens of the Republic of 
China to travel very freely in countries without formal diplomatic 
relations. For instance, in the case of going to a country without 
diplomatic relations with the ROC to attend an academic meeting. 
It would take months to get a visa because there is no official 
representative from those countries in Taiwan and you have to 
apply via other nations. It's very time consuming to get visas, and 
in this period of rapid change obviously our merchants who need 
to take care of their business very fast cannot do so because of the 
inconvenience of getting visas. 
Secondly, I would like to comment on Mr. Linstrom's 
comment about the nuclear treaty and future security arrange-
ments with the United States. I think that I myself consider the 
treaty and security arrangements with the United States to be a 
most vital issue in the ROC. We will not develop nuclear weapons. 
We need nuclear power but not nuclear weapons. We do not want 
that kind of freedom to develop nuclear weapons. Also in this, if 
countries need that kind of freedom, then obviously Japan, the 
United Kingdom, or Germany knows that with that kind of 
freedom it can abandon its treaty commitments with the United 
States. 
MR. LINSTROM: The comment I would make I am inclined to 
express in terms of real politics and that is something that we in 
the United States on occasion tend not to do. I would stand by the 
point that sometimes, I am not advocating the abrogation of the 
treaty with the ROC or taking a position on it, just pointing out 
that sometimes treaties like this tend to create a dependence 
relationship that is not particularly healthy for the independence 
and strength, strong development, of one of the countries. And I 
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think that a careful examination of the relationships in the past 
twenty years in certain key areas, areas that I think of vital 
importance to the Republic of China, its independence and its 
stature in the world, may indeed have been hampered by this 
treaty and the way it has been utilized by the United States 
government to put pressure upon the government of the Republic 
of China. 
DR. WEI: I want to talk about what Dr. Chang said. By the 
way, Dr. Chang is Chairman of the Diplomacy Department at 
National Chengchi University. You must see the consequences of 
your suggestions. We have seen a lot of creative ideas, we have no 
shortage of friends, friends to advance suggestions to get us out of 
this difficult situation. You mention our nuclear policy. Some of 
you have mentioned Russian intervention. You have mentioned 
about separation and independence. On all these matters after 
very close examination I see something very serious. A very 
important factor that I think we should keep in mind is that the 
ROC now and in the future is a normal political entity, normal in 
the sense that we conduct our business as a good member of the 
international community. We want to maintain our credibility and 
maintain ourself as a contributing member to the stability and 
peace in the world. That's a very important factor and that puts 
us in a position of no alternative: our survival is at stake. We 
cannot adopt any policy which will have more importance than 
that function, a function which changes all the rules of the game. 
We have not reached the point yet where we relinquish that 
function. 
Let me come to a few more concrete comments. One reality is 
that many of us who are doing evaluations on the future of Taiwan 
are also involved in its future, such as the Export-Import Bank. 
You assess Taiwan's future, but what you do has got something to 
do with the future of Taiwan. The men whom we are dealing with 
have friends in Taiwan, some of them owners of large firms. They 
ask our opinion: Do you think I should move my factory to. 
somewhere else? et cetera. You say, gosh, I don't know, we're 
trying to see Taiwan stabilize. He's the guy asking the question, 
what do you think of Taiwan? Should I move out? My opinion is 
that if you move out you hurt Taiwan's future. It's very simple. 
That large factory is itself determining in some way Taiwan's 
future, so I think this element should be kept in mind. Many of 
you U.S. scholars in important articles explaining Taiwan's 
future, good or bad, you yourself hold the function of injecting 
some variables into the thinking of people, which in turn will 
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decide in some way Taiwan's future development. In any case, 
prudence and some sympathy are important in this area. 
As to the suggestion that maybe Taiwan's people should 
invest in the United States. That's an interesting proposition. 
However, again, this will be dependent on the confidence that we 
have in the future of Taiwan's prosperity and stability. If 
somehow people are still wondering about the future of Taiwan, 
then we have a very liberal policy toward them as merchants and 
entrepreneurs to invest in the U.S. If we allow a large number of 
factories and firms in Taiwan to move out to the U.S., what it 
would amount to is escape of very needed capital investment in 
Taiwan, where Taiwan is concerned. So all this is very important 
to feelings of confidence, of security, of continued existence as a 
normal state, a normal government. We are not honored, we .do 
not feel comfortable, to be mentioned as "only people." The ROC 
is a member of the international community. We are a government 
controlling a territory. We do not want to be regarded as a people 
only. We do not want to be transformed from a normal state, a 
normal government, into only a non-state entity, and only to be 
identified as a people. 
QuESTION [speaker unidentified]: This question is directed 
toward Professor Wu. Historically, the U.S. investment opportuni-
ties in a country and their investments in the U.S. have not 
included the nationals of the country in top level management 
and policy-making positions. Does the U.S. follow that same 
policy with respect to investment in Taiwan, and if it does, are 
there any moves in Taiwan to include the people of Taiwan in 
policy-J]laking positions? Or do you think that isn't important? 
Will it have any bearing on future trade relations with the 
Taiwanese people? 
DR. Wu: I'd like to answer this question, but before I get there 
I'd like to take this opportunity to get off my chest a number of 
points, if you'll bear with me for a moment. I would like to point 
out, as I think Dr. Chang has already hinted, that the question is 
not whether one can or cannot carry on trade without diplomatic 
relations. Trade can be carried on with countries without 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But if you look at the future 
there are certain changing conditions, one of which is the need for 
Taiwan to continue to increase its trade in circumstances in which 
many existing markets are taking protectionist attitudes. This 
means that for Taiwan to continue to expand trade it would be 
necessary to diversify by commodity, to diversify by market, it 
would be necessary to be very quick on the beat, to respond 
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quickly to changing conditions and go to markets where 
possibilities appear at the first hint of information. That means 
you have to be very quick, you cannot delay, and you have to have 
access. It's not a question whether you eventually can get in 
somewhere, but whether you can get there now. This is the first 
point. 
Secondly, with delay, with uncertainty, suppose you could go 
to a certain place and then get a visa at the airport. But suppose 
you arrive at the airport and can't get in, something has 
happened, then what? Does not this kind of uncertainty increase 
your risk and increase your accounts? With that effect you are 
defenseless in these tenuous conditions. 
The second point I'd like to make is that just as we have on 
the political ground the difference between Japan's applying the 
Japan formula while the U.S. and the ROC are still maintaining 
normal diplomatic relations, there is a difference between that 
and the U.S. applying the Japan formula when there is no third 
party maintaining this kind of relations. We've got to think not in 
what has been called partial equilibrium terms, where you change 
one factor and everything else remaining constant, but we have to 
think of conditions where you change one factor and everything 
else changes. You no longer can apply this example. 
A third thing I'd like to mention. There was some reference 
yesterday, I believe, to the fact that the ROC is now able to 
finance its own investments and therefore a question was raised 
as to whether foreign investment is still necessary. I'd like to 
make some points in that connection. The first is that foreign 
investments. have, as I mentioned in the paper, performed the 
function of export markets. You have got to be able to sell in an 
increasingly larger number of markets. That you can produce is 
one thing, but you've got to be able to sell your product. The 
second point is that with large infrastructure investments, such as 
those of the ten major construction projects, there is still the need 
for financing on a larger scale. This is the kind of borrowing in 
connection with Eximbank and so on that we are talking about. 
And thirdly, I would say that for businessmen interested in the 
ROC in the future, one should explore perhaps more the possibility 
of foreign technology and ROC capital, that is, joint ventures 
under some kind of licensing arrangements. These will present 
greater possibilities for the future. 
In that connection I come to the question that was raised 
earlier. I believe that U.S. practice in Asia has been different from 
Japanese practice in the past. That is, American firms tend to 
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give more opportunities to local nationals at a higher level, and 
there are greater opportunities for advancement. Mr. Morell can 
correct me, but I don't think there is an exception to this rule in 
the case of Taiwan. 
Finally, let me just speak on the point raised by Mr. Clough 
on the prospects of PRC trade with the United States. In some 
studies that my colleagues and I have done in the past based on 
the records up to 1970 or so, we came to the conclusion that aside 
from price changes, the long-term trend in the growth of PRC 
exports (to the U.S.) was probably in the neighborhood of two to 
three hundred million dollars a year, and that this kind of export 
growth would never get very far unless Peking can develop new 
exports. And this was when people became excited when Peking 
began to export oil, but the prospects of Peking oil are somewhat 
more doubtful than once estimated. In particular, some recent 
events have created new problems at least for the next few years, 
one of which was the sharp setback suffered by the coal industry 
from the earthquake. As you know, the earthquake of July 1976 
destroyed the Tanshan coal mines. These mines had a production 
in the neighborhood of 20 million tons a year, which roughly is 
equivalent to 10 million tons of crude oil, which is all that the PRC 
has been able to offer in export. 
DR. SIGUR: Thank you. I think we're getting past our hour 
here, and I did promise to allow Mr. Chao of the Chinese Embassy 
to correct something that he said. 
MR. CHAO: This concerns a statement that I made concerning 
the Republic of China's membership in GATT. Actually the ROC 
has never been a member, but has participated in GATT meetings 
as observer.* 
DR. SIGUR closed the meeting with appreciation to Dr. Chiu, 
Mr. Simon, and their colleagues. 
Reported by Joyce Seunarine 
• Editors' Note: The ROC provisionally applied to the GATT on May 21, 
1948, but notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the cessation of 
that application on March 6, 1950. Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the 
Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions (List of Signatures, Ratifica· 
tiona, Accessions, etc. as of 31 December 1975) (U.N. Doc. St/Leg/Ser. D19), at 237. 
See discussion of Session II, supra at p. 121. 
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